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ABSTRACT 
Poverty eradication is a common fundamental goal of the 
human rights agenda and the sustainable development agenda.  
International human rights law considers poverty to be a denial of 
human rights and acknowledges shared global obligations to 
alleviate poverty and realize socio-economic rights indispensable 
for leading a decent life universally.  In unison with the human 
rights agenda, sustainable development instruments declare healing 
the planet from poverty and freeing people from the tyranny of want 
as a primary goal of the contemporary globalized world.  This was 
reaffirmed by a recent important document—Transforming our 
World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.  That Agenda 
declares that “eradicating poverty in all its forms and dimensions, 
including extreme poverty, is the greatest global challenge and an 
indispensable requirement for sustainable development.”  This 
Article represents a systematic analysis of the global obligations to 
eradicate poverty and ensure a decent standard of living universally 
embedded in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.  It 
provides a general outline of the conception of global obligations for 
sustainable development and opens a novel understanding of their 
nature, status, content, scope, and duty-bearers, as well as the 
mechanisms necessary for their implementation.  This Article also 
examines special features, strengths and limitations, and the 
interrelation between commitments for sustainable development 
and global obligations in the area of socio-economic rights.  Based 
on that analysis, this Article puts forward suggestions for how the 
contemporary sustainable development agenda might be further 
improved in order to realize global obligations for sustainable 
development.  Additionally, this Article explores modes of global 
governance and accountability that are necessary to realize human 
rights and reach the Sustainable Development Goals.  It concludes 
by suggesting how the human rights and sustainable development 
agendas should be harmonized in a way that enriches both agendas 
at normative and institutional levels, in the service of realizing their 
common goals of combating poverty and ensuring a decent 
standard of living universally. 
 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss4/4
2020] Global Obligations for Sustainable Development 1033 
   
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. Introduction .................................................................... 1034 
II. Human Rights Agenda and Sustainable Development 
Agenda ............................................................................. 1040 
A.  Sustainable Development Agenda: From Millennium 
Development Goals to Sustainable Development  
 Goals .......................................................................... 1040 
B.  Human Rights Obligations and Sustainable 
Development Commitments ..................................... 1050 
C.  From Commitments to Obligations:  A Human Rights-
Based Approach to Sustainable Development ........... 1056 
D.  Summary ................................................................... 1064 
III. Global Obligations for Sustainable Development ..... 1065 
A.  Extraterritorial Obligations Presupposed by the 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development ....................... 1065 
B.  Obligations to Create and Maintain a Just and 
Sustainable Global Order .......................................... 1071 
C.  Obligations to Ensure a Decent and Sustainable 
Standard of Living Universally ................................ 1080 
D.  Summary ................................................................... 1096 
IV. Global Partnership for Sustainable Development ..... 1097 
A.  Cooperation as a Goal and a Means for Sustainable 
Development ............................................................. 1097 
B.  Global Development Assistance ................................ 1107 
C.  Institutionalizing Global Partnership ...................... 1120 
D.  Summary ................................................................... 1134 
V. Conclusion ....................................................................... 1135 
 
  
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
1034 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 41:4 
   
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Poverty eradication is one of the most significant and pressing 
contemporary problems.  There is a universal consensus that 
poverty represents a severe socio-economic deprivation, a form of 
unfreedom, and a deadly social disease.1  We can identify four major 
features of this deprivation, each with its own caveat.  First, the 
deprivation is caused by social practices and institutions—although 
there are debates on which particular institutions and practices 
cause poverty.  Second, it is curable through the correction of these 
practices and institutions—although the set of most relevant and 
effective measures is uncertain.  Third, we have an aspiration and 
sufficient aggregate resources to heal it in all of its manifestations—
yet, even if the aspiration has found expression in numerous 
international documents, the resources call for urgent mobilization 
and efficient usage.  Fourth, many global actors, experts, and 
empathic people all over the world are involved in the current fight 
against poverty—though the voices of poor individuals and 
developing societies are still rarely heard and anti-poverty 
programs are often uncoordinated, inefficient, and even violative of 
human rights. 
The focus of this Article is the human rights agenda and the 
sustainable development agenda, which share the same 
fundamental goal of global poverty eradication.  International 
human rights law considers poverty to be a denial of human rights2 
 
 1 Approximately one third of all human deaths have poverty-related causes.  
Thomas Pogge & Mitu Sengupta, Assessing the Sustainable Development Goals from a 
Human Rights Perspective, 32(2) J. INT’L & COMP. SOC. POL’Y 83, 86 (2016).  In 2018, 6.2 
million children under fifteen years, out of which 5.3 million children were under 
five, died from mostly preventable or treatable poverty-related causes.  This means 
that one child dies every five seconds.  U.N. Inter-Agency Group for Child 
Mortality Estimation, Levels & Trends in Child Mortality, at 4 (2019).  
 2 See World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme 
of Action, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23, para. 14 (July 12, 1993) [hereinafter Vienna 
Declaration]; Third U.N. Conference on the Least Developed Countries, Substantive 
Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights: Poverty and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.191/BP/7, para. 1 (May 13, 2001).  Human 
rights theory and practice interpret poverty as a violation of human rights in case it 
is the result of a failure of responsible actors to fulfill their negative or positive 
obligations.  See Thomas Pogge, Severe Poverty as a Human Rights Violation, in 
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and acknowledges shared global obligations to alleviate poverty 
and realize socio-economic rights indispensable for leading a decent 
life universally. 3   In unison with the human rights agenda, 
sustainable development instruments declare healing the planet 
from poverty and freeing people from the tyranny of want as the 
primary goal of the contemporary globalized world; this was 
reaffirmed by a recent important document—Transforming our 
World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (hereinafter the 
2030 Agenda).4  The 2030 Agenda declares that “eradicating poverty 
in all its forms and dimensions, including extreme poverty, is the 
greatest global challenge and an indispensable requirement for 
sustainable development.”5 
Global obligations to eradicate poverty and ensure a decent 
standard of living universally derived from the 2030 Agenda form 
the subject of this Article.  The main objectives of this Article are, first, 
to analyze the nature, status, content, and scope of global 
commitments to combat poverty and secure access to a decent 
standard of living embedded in the 2030 Agenda; second, to examine 
their relation with global obligations in the area of socio-economic 
rights; third, to explore how the sustainable development agenda 
and human rights agenda should interact and enrich one another at 
normative and institutional levels in order to achieve their common 
goal of poverty eradication; and, finally, to suggest ways in which 
the contemporary sustainable development agenda might be further 
improved, including the international organizational structure that 
is necessary to realize global obligations for sustainable 
development. 
 
FREEDOM FROM POVERTY AS A HUMAN RIGHT: WHO OWES WHAT TO THE VERY POOR? 
(Thomas Pogge ed., 2007); CTR. FOR ECON. & SOC. RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND 




 3 See Elena Pribytkova, Global Human Rights Obligations Relating to a Decent 
Standard of Living (2019) (unpublished J.S.D. dissertation, Columbia University). 
 4  G.A. Res. 70/1, Transforming our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development, pmbl. (Sept. 25, 2015) [hereinafter 2030 Agenda]. 
 5 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, para. 2. 
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Since the 2030 Agenda is quite a new document,6 there is still no 
comprehensive research on global commitments to combat poverty 
and secure the decent standard of living it enshrines.7  A few legal 
studies addressing different types of global commitments 8 
presupposed by the sustainable development agenda focus 
primarily on commitments of conduct (i.e., duties of development 
cooperation and assistance)9 rather than on commitments of result 
(i.e., duties to create and maintain a just and sustainable global 
institutional scheme10 and to provide for minimum socio-economic 
guarantees indispensable for leading a decent life). 11   The same 
 
 6 The elaboration of the SDGs’ indicators is still an ongoing process.  See infra 
Section IV.C. 
 7 For some significant studies on the topic, see Pogge & Sengupta, supra note 
1; MARKUS KALTENBORN, SOCIAL RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT: GLOBAL 
LEGAL STANDARDS FOR THE POST-2015 DEVELOPMENT AGENDA (2015); TAHMINA 
KARIMOVA, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2016). 
 8 For a classification of global obligations, see infra Section III.A. 
 9  See, e.g., PHILIPP DANN, THE LAW OF DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION: A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE WORLD BANK, THE EU AND GERMANY (Andrew 
Hammel trans., 2013); Philipp Dann, Accountability in Development Aid Law: The 
World Bank, UNDP and Emerging Structures of Transnational Oversight, 44 ARCHIV DES 
VÖLKERRECHTS 381 (2006); André Frankovits, Rejoinder: The Rights Way to 
Development, 21 FOOD POL’Y. 123 (1996); Hanne Lund Madsen, Development 
Assistance and Human Rights Concerns, 61/62 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 129 (1994); Wouter 
Vandenhole, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the CRC: Is There a Legal 
Obligation to Cooperate Internationally for Development?, 17 INT’L J. CHILD. RTS. 23 
(2009). 
 10 For an analysis of global institutional obligations implied by the sustainable 
development agenda, see, e.g., MARGOT E. SALOMON, GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS: WORLD POVERTY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2007); CELINE TAN, GOVERNANCE THROUGH DEVELOPMENT: POVERTY REDUCTION 
STRATEGIES, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE DISCIPLINING OF THIRD WORLD STATES 
(2011); Arne Vandenbogaerde, The Right to Development in International Human 
Rights Law: A Call for Its Dissolution, 31 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 187 (2013). 
 11  On various sustainable development commitments indispensable for a 
decent standard of living, see, e.g., PEDI CHIEMENA OBANI, STRENGTHENING THE 
HUMAN RIGHT TO SANITATION AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR INCLUSIVE DEVELOPMENT (2018); 
Audrey R. Chapman, Evaluating the Health-Related Targets in the Sustainable 
Development Goals from a Human Rights Perspective, 21 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 1098 (2017); 
Ricard Gine et al., Monitoring Sanitation and Hygiene in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development: A Review through the Lens of Human Rights, 580 SCI. TOTAL ENV’T 1108 
(2016); Owen McIntyre, International Water Law and SDG 6: Mutually Reinforcing 
Paradigms, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS: LAW, THEORY AND IMPLEMENTATION 
(Duncan French & Louis J. Kotzé eds., 2018); Jose Luis Vivero Pol & Claudio 
Schuftan, No Right to Food and Nutrition in the SDGs: Mistake or Success?, 1 B.M.J. 
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tendency can be traced in economic,12  political,13  philosophical,14 
development,15 and interdisciplinary16 studies on commitments for 
sustainable development.  A number of important studies explore 
global interactional and institutional obligations corresponding to 
 
GLOBAL HEALTH (2016); Carmel Williams & Paul Hunt, Neglecting Human Rights: 
Accountability, Data and Sustainable Development Goal 3, 21 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 1114 
(2017). 
 12 See, e.g., PAUL COLLIER, THE BOTTOM BILLION: WHY THE POOREST COUNTRIES 
ARE FAILING AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT (2007); WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE 
WHITE MAN’S BURDEN: WHY THE WEST’S EFFORTS TO AID THE REST HAVE DONE SO 
MUCH ILL AND SO LITTLE GOOD (2006); DAMBISA MOYO, DEAD AID: WHY AID IS NOT 
WORKING AND HOW THERE IS A BETTER WAY FOR AFRICA (2009); JEFFREY D. SACHS, THE 
AGE OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (2015); JEFFREY D. SACHS ET AL., CLOSING THE SDG 
BUDGET GAP (2018); José Antonio Alonso, From Aid to Global Development Policy 
(U.N. Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Working Paper No. 121, 2012). 
 13  See, e.g., JOACHIM MONKELBAAN, GOVERNANCE FOR THE SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT GOALS: EXPLORING AN INTEGRATIVE FRAMEWORK OF THEORIES, TOOLS, 
AND COMPETENCIES (2019); ELHAM SEYEDSAYAMDOST, A WORLD WITHOUT POVERTY: 
NEGOTIATING THE GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT AGENDA (2015) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Columbia University); Bob Deacon, Assessing the SDGs from the Point of 
View of Global Social Governance, 32(2) J. INT’L COMP. SOC. POL’Y 116 (2016); Pogge & 
Sengupta, supra note 1; Thomas Pogge & Mitu Sengupta, Rethinking the Post-2015 
Development Agenda: Eight Ways to End Poverty Now, 7 GLOBAL JUST.: THEORY PRAC. 
RHETORIC 3 (2014); Thomas Pogge & Mitu Sengupta, The Sustainable Development 
Goals: A Plan for Building a Better World? 11(1) J. GLOBAL ETHICS 56 (2015); Thomas 
Pogge & Mitu Sengupta, The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as Drafted: Nice 
Idea, Poor Execution, 24(3) WASH. INT’L L. J. 571 (2015); Mitu Sengupta, 
Transformational Change or Tenuous Wish List? A Critique of SDG-1 (‘End Poverty in 
All Its Forms Everywhere’) 37(1) SOC. ALTERNATIVES 12 (2018). 
 14  See, e.g., DIETER BIRNBACHER & MAY THORSETH, THE POLITICS OF 
SUSTAINABILITY: PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES (2015); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, 
CREATING CAPABILITIES: THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT APPROACH (2011); THOMAS 
POGGE, POLITICS AS USUAL: WHAT LIES BEHIND THE PRO-POOR RHETORIC (2010); 
AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999). 
 15   See, e.g., DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION: CHALLENGES OF THE NEW AID 
ARCHITECTURE (Stephan Klingebiel ed., 2014); OLAV STOKKE, THE U.N. AND 
DEVELOPMENT: FROM AID TO COOPERATION (2009); Deborah Eade, Capacity Building: 
Who Builds Whose Capacity?, 17 DEV. IN PRAC. 630 (2007); Paolo de Renzio & Jurek 
Seifert, South-South Cooperation and the Future of Development Assistance: Mapping 
Actors and Options, 35 THIRD WORLD Q. 1860 (Nov. 26, 2014); Anup Shah, Foreign Aid 
for Development Assistance, GLOBAL ISSUES (Sep. 28, 2014), 
http://www.globalissues.org/article/35/foreign-aid-development-assistance 
[https://perma.cc/S3LV-RQXX]. 
 16 See, e.g., ANDY SUMNER & TOM KIRK, THE DONORS’ DILEMMA: EMERGENCE, 
CONVERGENCE AND THE FUTURE OF FOREIGN AID (2014); THE FRAGMENTATION OF AID: 
CONCEPTS, MEASUREMENTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION 
(Stephan Klingebiel et al. eds., 2016). 
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the right to development. 17   A significant part of research is 
concentrated on commitments for global partnership proclaimed in 
Millennium Development Goal (hereinafter MDG) 8. 18   That 
research, however, does not examine the 2030 Agenda’s substantial 
transformations of the MDGs’ stipulations. 
This Article seeks to fill the existing gaps and suggest answers 
to a set of vital questions about which there is still no consensus in 
literature and practice.  First, what are the strengths and weaknesses 
of the MDGs’ and Sustainable Development Goals’ (hereinafter 
SDGs) approaches to determining global commitments to combat 
poverty and secure a decent standard of living universally?  Second, 
how do sustainable development commitments and global 
obligations in the area of socio-economic rights interrelate?  Third, 
to what extent do the right to development and corresponding 
obligations serve as tools for harmonizing the human rights agenda 
and the sustainable development agenda?  Fourth, what types of 
 
 17 See, e.g., REFLECTIONS ON THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT (Arjun Sengupta et al. 
eds., 2005); ISABELLA D. BUNN, THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC LAW: LEGAL AND MORAL DIMENSIONS (2012); DEVELOPMENT AS A HUMAN 
RIGHT: LEGAL, POLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS (Bård A. Andreassen & 
Stephen P. Marks eds., 2007); Arjun K. Sengupta, Conceptualizing the Right to 
Development for the Twenty-First Century, in UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE 
OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER, REALIZING THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT: ESSAYS IN 
COMMEMORATION OF 25 YEARS OF THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON THE RIGHT 
TO DEVELOPMENT 67 (2013); Stephen Marks, The Human Right to Development: Between 
Rhetoric and Reality, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 137 (2004); Arjun Sengupta, Realizing the 
Right to Development, 31 DEV. & CHANGE 553 (2000); Vandenbogaerde, supra note 10; 
Wouter Vandenhole, The Human Right to Development as a Paradox, 36(3) VERFASSUNG 
UND RECHT IN ÜBERSEE (LAW AND POLITICS IN AFRICA, ASIA AND LATIN AMERICA) 377 
(2003). 
 18   See, e.g., THE MDGS, CAPABILITIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE POWER OF 
NUMBERS TO SHAPE AGENDAS (Sakiko Fukuda-Parr & Alicia Ely Yamin eds., 2015); 
POGGE, supra note 14; CASTING THE NET WIDER: HUMAN RIGHTS, DEVELOPMENT AND 
NEW DUTY BEARERS (Margot E. Salomon et al. eds., 2007); SALOMON, supra note 10; 
Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona, The Obligations of ‘International Assistance and 
Cooperation’ under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
A Possible Entry Point to a Human Rights Based Approach to Millennium Development 
Goal 8, 13(1) INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 86 (2009); Sakiko Fukuda-Parr & David Hulme, 
International Norm Dynamics and the “End of Poverty”: Understanding the Millennium 
Development Goals, 1 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 17 (2011); Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, 
Millennium Development Goal 8: Indicators for International Human Rights Obligations?, 
28 HUM. RTS. Q. 966 (2006); Sakiko Fukuda-Parr et al., The Power of Numbers: A 
Critical Review of Millennium Development Goal Targets for Human Development and 
Human Rights, 15(2-3) J. HUM. DEV. & CAPABILITIES 105 (2014); SEYEDSAYAMDOST, 
supra note 13. 
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global obligations for sustainable development are embodied in the 
2030 Agenda?  Fifth, how do the SDGs define institutional obligations 
to create and maintain a just and sustainable global order?  Sixth, 
what is the status, content and scope of global obligations to ensure 
a decent and sustainable standard of living enshrined in the 2030 
Agenda?  Seventh, what global actors are bound by shared 
obligations to cooperate for sustainable development?  Eighth, how 
should global obligations of development assistance be interpreted?  
Finally, what institutional guarantees are necessary to promote 
global partnership for sustainable development? 
It goes without saying that an article of this scope cannot hope 
to comprehensively answer all these momentous questions.  This 
Article is aimed instead at providing a general outline of the 
conception of global obligations for sustainable development 
relating to poverty eradication and ensuring a decent standard of 
living.  The specification of the exact content and scope of various 
global obligations for sustainable development, as well as rules and 
methods of attributing them to particular actors, goes beyond its 
scope and requires further careful and critical research. 
This Article intends to elaborate an appealing coherent 
framework for global obligations for sustainable development based 
on well-defended principles of global justice, many of which are also 
embedded in existing international human rights and sustainable 
development instruments.  On this ground, the study suggests ways 
to reform and bring into sync both the contemporary human rights 
and sustainable development agendas.  This interdisciplinary 
research involves normative and descriptive components and 
addresses contemporary legal and political discourses and practices 
relating to global obligations for sustainable development.  It 
engages principles developed in moral, legal and political 
philosophy and compelling empirical studies concerning various 
types of commitments for sustainable development. 
This Article’s structure is designed to probe the most contentious 
questions enumerated above.  It contains three parts.  Following this 
introduction, the second part examines the interrelation between the 
human rights agenda and the sustainable development agenda.  In 
particular, it focuses on the evolution of the sustainable 
development movement from the United Nations Millennium 
Declaration (hereinafter the Millennium Declaration) to the 2030 
Agenda (Section II.A), on the correlation between human rights 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
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obligations and sustainable development commitments (Section 
II.B), and on the role of a human rights-based approach and the right 
to development in bringing the sustainable development agenda in 
line with the international human rights agenda and on ways of 
mutually enriching both agendas (Section II.C). 
The third part provides a general overview and classification of 
global obligations, explores which global obligations for sustainable 
development are presupposed by the 2030 Agenda (Section III.A), 
and analyzes global obligations of result—that is, obligations to 
create and maintain a just and sustainable global order (Section III.B) 
and obligations to ensure a decent and sustainable standard of living 
universally (Section III.C). 
The fourth part of this Article addresses global obligations of 
conduct—obligations to cooperate for sustainable development 
(Section IV.A) and obligations to assist those in poverty (Section 
IV.B)—and discusses institutional guarantees of global partnership 
for sustainable development (Section IV.C). 
II.  HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
AGENDA 
A. Sustainable Development Agenda: From Millennium Development 
Goals to Sustainable Development Goals 
Sustainable development implies “meet[ing] the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their own needs.”19  It is proclaimed (along with human rights 
and international peace and security) as one of the three main pillars 
of the United Nations.20  The Declaration on the Right to Development 
(hereinafter DRD) defines sustainable development as “a 
comprehensive economic, social, cultural and political process, 
which aims at the constant improvement of the well-being of the 
 
 19  United Nations, Report of the World Commission on Environment and 
Development: Our Common Future, ch. 2, para. 1 (1987); see G.A. Res. 42/187, Report 
of the World Commission on Environment and Development, pmbl. (Dec. 11, 1987). 
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entire population and of all individuals on the basis of their active, 
free and meaningful participation in development and in the fair 
distribution of benefits resulting therefrom.” 21   Similar to the 
concept of human rights, the concept of sustainable development is 
quite general, multi-faceted and capable of accommodating multiple 
normative meanings and expectations, which most likely 
contributed to its worldwide acceptance.22 
One can distinguish four interrelated basic dimensions of 
sustainable development: social development, economic 
development, environmental development, and political 
development. 23   For instance, the Report to the U.N. Secretary-
General Realizing the Future We Want for All (2012) describes these 
four core aspects of sustainable development and their “enablers” 
as follows.24  Inclusive social development calls for guarantees of 
social security; a decent standard of living, including secure access 
to adequate food, water, sanitation, housing, clothing, and health; 
social and gender equality; quality education and cultural diversity; 
as well as guarantees of demographic dynamics and migration.25  
Inclusive economic development embraces guarantees of income 
poverty eradication, reduction in economic inequality, decent work 
and productive employment, green economic growth, fair and 
stable global trade and financial systems, sustainable energy, and 
affordable access to knowledge and technology.26  Environmental 
sustainability encompasses biodiversity protection, a stable climate, 
the sustainable use of natural resources and waste management, and 
 
 21 G.A. Res. 41/128, Declaration on the Right to Development, pmbl. (Dec. 4, 
1986) [hereinafter DRD]. 
 22  See MONKELBAAN, supra note 13, at 9-10; THE POLITICS OF SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT: THEORY, POLICY AND PRACTICE WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION 5 (Susan 
Baker et al. eds., 1997). 
 23 There is also an alternative approach to classifying three dimensions of 
sustainability—social, economic, and environmental sustainability—that was 
expressed in the U.N. Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) 
Outcome Document, “The Future We Want,” and the 2030 Agenda.  The latter, 
however, also incorporates the SDGs related to political sustainability.  See infra 
notes 49-50.  As shown above, the DRD also determines four fundamental aspects 
of development—that is, economic, social, cultural, and political development.  
DRD, supra note 21, pmbl., art. 1. 
 24  U.N. System Task Team on the Post-2015 U.N. Development Agenda, 
Realizing the Future We Want for All: Report to the U.N. Secretary-General, 24-32 (2012). 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
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resilience to natural hazards.27  Political sustainability (peace and 
security) emphasizes the necessity to ensure human rights; the rule 
of law; democratic and fair global and local governance and 
institution-building; freedom from violence, conflicts and abuses; 
global partnership for development; and equal access to justice and 
public services.28 
These four dimensions of development were manifested in the 
Millennium Declaration adopted on September 8th, 2000. 29  193 U.N. 
member states agreed to achieve eight MDGs by the year 2015.  It is 
important to note that the Millennium Declaration stressed that 
achieving the MDGs depends not only on good territorial 
governance, but also on good global governance.30  It acknowledged 
that states possess “a collective responsibility to uphold the 
principles of human dignity, equality and equity” not only 
territorially but also “at the global level.” States are therefore bound 
by shared global duties towards “all the world’s people, especially 
the most vulnerable and, in particular, the children of the world, to 
whom the future belongs.”31  They promised to “spare no effort to 
free our fellow men, women and children from the abject and 
dehumanizing conditions of extreme poverty, to which more than a 
billion of them are currently subjected.” 32   The Millennium 
Declaration also expressed the commitment to make “the right to 
development a reality for everyone and to freeing the entire human 
race from want.”33 
The Millennium Declaration recognized not only interactional, 
but also institutional global commitments to build and maintain a 
sustainable global order:  “We resolve . . . to create an 
environment—at the national and global levels alike—which is 
 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
 29  G.A. Res. 55/2, United Nations Millennium Declaration (Sept. 8, 2000) 
[hereinafter Millennium Declaration].  The MDGs are as follows: first, to eradicate 
extreme poverty and hunger; second, to achieve universal primary education; third, 
to promote gender equality and empowering women; fourth, to reduce child 
mortality rates; fifth, to improve maternal health; sixth, to combat HIV/AIDS, 
malaria, and other diseases; seventh, to ensure environmental sustainability; and 
eighth, to develop a global partnership for development. 
 30 Id. para. 13. 
 31 Id. para. 2. 
 32 Id. para. 11. 
 33 Id. 
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conducive to development and to the elimination of poverty.” 34  
Institutional guarantees, however, had not crystallized into specific 
MDGs.  While focusing predominantly on states’ commitments in 
the area of sustainable development, the Millennium Declaration also 
called for developing “strong partnerships with the private sector 
and with civil society organizations in pursuit of development and 
poverty eradication.”35 
The Millennium Declaration and the MDGs were widely criticized 
for the way in which they were drafted:  first,  through a decision-
making process behind closed doors that involved only developed 
states, and, second, through a top-down procedure without 
consultations with global/local civil society. 36   Additionally, the 
majority of developing countries did not agree with the document 
issued by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (hereinafter OECD), Shaping the 21st Century: The 
Contribution of Development Co-operation (1996), that contained six 
development goals, on the basis of which the MDGs were 
formulated, 37  and in particular, with the definition of poverty 
 
 34 Id. para. 12. 
 35 Id. para. 20. 
 36  As Elham Seyedsayamdost notes, for the very first time, a significant 
document of this level was elaborated without preliminary consultations with other 
global actors, including global civil society.  See SEYEDSAYAMDOST, supra note 13, at 
197, 207; YASH GHAI & JILL COTTRELL, THE MILLENNIUM DECLARATION, RIGHTS AND 
CONSTITUTIONS 70 (2011).  For an excellent overview of approaches to MDGs’ 
critique, see Philip Alston, Ships Passing in the Night: The Current State of the Human 
Rights and Development Debate Seen through the Lens of the Millennium Development 
Goals, 27 HUM. RTS. Q. 755, 762-66 (2005); see also Maya Fehling et al., Limitations of 
the Millennium Development Goals: A Literature Review, 8 GLOBAL PUB. HEALTH 1109 
(2013). 
 37  Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Co-operation 
includes the following six development goals combined into three groups: (1) 
economic well-being: the proportion of people living in extreme poverty in 
developing countries should be reduced by at least half by 2015; (2) social 
development: there should be substantial progress in primary education, gender 
equality, basic health care and family planning, as follows: (a) there should be 
universal primary education in all countries by 2015; (b) progress toward gender 
equality and the empowerment of women should be demonstrated by eliminating 
gender disparity in primary and secondary education by 2005; (c) the death rate for 
infants and children under the age of five years should be reduced in each 
developing country by two-thirds of the 1990 level by 2015; the rate of maternal 
mortality should be reduced by three-quarters during this same period; (d) access 
should be available through the primary health-care system to reproductive health 
 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
1044 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 41:4 
   
 
enshrined in it.38  For these reasons, the MDGs are often believed to 
be the product of the North and to not correspond to interests of the 
South and especially poor societies.39 
According to the U.N.’s official position, the MDGs were just a 
summary of previous commitments by the international 
community.40  It is not clear, however, why many obligations, both 
in terms of human rights and development, were not embodied in 
the MDGs.41  Civil society representatives claimed that the MDGs 
substantially deviated from sustainable development and 
international law agreements that were already in place.42  It has 
been widely argued that if the MDGs had been drafted under 
conditions of active, full-fledged and meaningful participation by 
developing states, consultation with global civil society, and 
 
services for all individuals of appropriate ages, including safe and reliable family 
planning methods, as soon as possible and no later than the year 2015; and (3) 
environmental sustainability and regeneration: there should be a current national 
strategy for sustainable development, in the process of implementation, in every 
country by 2005, so as to ensure that current trends in the loss of environmental 
resources forests, fisheries, fresh water, climate, soils, biodiversity, stratospheric 
ozone, the accumulation of hazardous substances and other major indicators are 
effectively reversed at both global and national levels by 2015.  On the basis of these 
six goals, the first seven MDGs were formulated, while goal 2(c) included two sub-
goals, that is, to reduce the death rate for infants and children under the age of five 
and to reduce the rate of maternal mortality.  A development goal concerning 
reproductive health was replaced with MDG 6 to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and 
other diseases.  See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., SHAPING THE 21ST 
CENTURY: THE CONTRIBUTION OF DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION 9-11 (1996) 
[hereinafter SHAPING THE 21ST CENTURY]. 
 38  As later MDGs, Shaping the 21st Century referred to the World Bank’s 
extreme poverty threshold, defined as $1 income per capita per day, or $370 annual 
income.  See SEYEDSAYAMDOST, supra note 13, at 79 n.13. 
 39 See POGGE, supra note 14, at 57-74; William Easterly, How the Millennium 
Development Goals Are Unfair to Africa, 37 WORLD DEV. 26 (2009); SEYEDSAYAMDOST, 
supra note 13, at 197. 
 40  See SEYEDSAYAMDOST, supra note 13, at 153; see also Michael W. Doyle, 
Dialectics of a Global Constitution: The Struggle Over the UN Charter, 18 EUR. J. INT’L 
REL. 601 (2011); Richard Manning, Using Indicators to Encourage Development: Lessons 
from the Millennium Development Goals, Report for Danish Institute for International 
Studies 2009:01 (2009); Jan Vandemoortele, The MDG Story: Intention Denied, 42 DEV. 
& CHANGE 1 (2011); David Hulme, The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs): A 
Short History of the World’s Biggest Promise (Brooks World Poverty Inst., Working 
Paper No. 100, 2009). 
 41 For a critique, see Pogge & Sengupta, supra note 1. 
 42 For an overview, see Fehling et al., supra note 36. 
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adequate representation of the global poor, they would have been 
formulated differently.43 
The first seven MDGs inherited from the OECD development 
goals focused on states’ territorial commitments. The inclusion of 
commitments for global partnership (MDG 8)44 pursued two major 
objectives.  First, it was a way to convince developing countries, 
which rejected the OECD development goals, to accept the MDGs, 
rather than a way to reflect the genuine intention to establish a 
global institutional framework for equal partnership and 
developing states’ empowerment.  The lack of actual desire to 
implement the commitment of global partnership is also confirmed 
by the fact that MDG 8 was much less concrete than other MDGs, 
providing for quite vague targets. 45   The second objective for 
introducing MDG 8 was to legitimize to the “donor club” countries’ 
citizens that they have duties to provide development aid.46  Hence, 
the MDGs are rightly considered to be not poor-oriented or 
developing societies-oriented but rather donor-oriented 
commitments.47 
On September 25, 2015, the U.N. General Assembly adopted a 
significant new document—the 2030 Agenda—which formulated 
 
 43 See Peggy Antrobus, Critiquing the MDGs from a Caribbean Perspective, 13 
GENDER & DEV. 94 (2005); Ashwani Saith, From Universal Values to Millennium 
Development Goals: Lost in Translation, 37 DEV. & CHANGE 1167 (2006); 
SEYEDSAYAMDOST, supra note 13, at 170 (recounting Seyedsayamdost’s interview 
with Richard Manning from Mar. 7, 2013). 
 44  UNITED NATIONS, GOAL 8: DEVELOP A GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR 
DEVELOPMENT, https://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/global.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/VH2G-MACT]. 
 45 U.N. Development Programme experts stressed that MDG 8 “provided no 
timetable for policy change; targets and indicators were general statements of 
objectives rather than policy changes; and it was silent on the need to increase the 
voices of poor countries in international decision-making.”  High-Level Task Force 
on the Right to Development, Report of the High-Level Task Force on the Implementation 
of the Right to Development on its Second Meeting, E/CN.4/2005/WG.18/TF/3, para. 
23 (Dec. 8, 2005); see also Fukuda-Parr, supra note 18. 
 46  Seyedsayamdost defends the idea that the MDGs were “initially a construct 
of the donor community, who looked for ways to make aid relevant and to justify 
development assistance to their domestic constituents.”  SEYEDSAYAMDOST, supra 
note 13, at 150. 
 47  See Saskia Hollander & Pearl Heinemans, An Unfinished Symphony—The 
Road Towards the Post-2015 Global Development Agenda, BROKER (Sept. 27, 2013), 
https://www.thebrokeronline.eu/an-unfinished-symphony-d13/ 
[https://perma.cc/2LVF-74CJ]; SEYEDSAYAMDOST, supra note 13, at 32. 
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seventeen SDGs48 and 169 targets.49  The 2030 Agenda emphasizes 
the SDGs’ continuity with the MDGs: the former “seek to build on 
the Millennium Development Goals and complete what they did not 
achieve.”50  Among “continuing development priorities,” the 2030 
Agenda lists “poverty eradication, health, education and food 
security and nutrition.”51  It reaffirms the primary commitment “to 
free the human race from the tyranny of poverty and want” which 
binds “[a]ll countries and all stakeholders, acting in collaborative 
partnership.”52 
At the same time, there are several important differences 
between the MDGs and SDGs: First, though the adoption of the 
MDGs was a top-down and donors-oriented process, which 
excluded the active and meaningful participation of developing 
 
 48 The SDGs are as follows: first, to end poverty in all its forms everywhere; 
second, to end hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote 
sustainable agriculture; third, to ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for 
all at all ages; fourth, to ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and 
promote lifelong learning opportunities for all; fifth, to achieve gender equality and 
empower all women and girls; sixth, to ensure availability and sustainable 
management of water and sanitation for all; seventh, to ensure access to affordable, 
reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all; eighth, to promote sustained, 
inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and 
decent work for all; ninth, to build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and 
sustainable industrialization and foster innovation; tenth, to reduce inequality 
within and among countries; eleventh, to make cities and human settlements 
inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable; twelfth, to ensure sustainable consumption 
and production patterns; thirteenth, to take urgent action to combat climate change 
and its impacts; fourteenth, to conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and 
marine resources for sustainable development; fifteenth, to protect, restore and 
promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, 
combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity 
loss; sixteenth, to promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable 
development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and 
inclusive institutions at all levels; and, seventeenth, to strengthen the means of 
implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development.  
2030 Agenda, supra note 4, SDG 1-17. 
 49   2030 Agenda, supra note 4. Though the 2030 Agenda documents the 
commitment of “achieving sustainable development in its three dimensions—
economic, social and environmental—in a balanced and integrated manner,” it 
includes also goals and targets related to political sustainability, such as democracy, 
good governance, the rule of law, respect for civil and political rights, equality and 
non-discrimination, equal access to justice for all.  Id. paras. 2, 8-9, 18-19, SDG 16.3. 
 50 Id. pmbl. 
 51 Id. para. 17. 
 52 Id. pmbl. 
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states and (global) civil society, during the elaboration of the SDGs, 
a serious attempt to organize the collaboration of states, 
intergovernmental organizations, non-state entities and individuals, 
including those from poor communities, was made.53  Second, while 
the MDGs addressed only developing countries,54 the 2030 Agenda 
applies universally—i.e., to all rich and poor societies.55   This is 
crucial because, according to recent convincing studies, a significant 
proportion of the poor live in middle-income states.56   Those in 
poverty from developed states should be provided with secure 
access to a decent and sustainable standard of living; and 
governments of developed states should be held accountable for 
 
 53  During my internship with the Rule of Law Unit in the Executive Office of 
the U.N. Secretary-General, I was involved in discussions of the Post-2015 Agenda, 
which included consultations with multiple stakeholders guided by the U.N.  See 
also Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, From the Millennium Development Goals to the Sustainable 
Development Goals: Shifts in Purpose, Concept, and Politics of Global Goal Setting for 
Development, 24 GENDER & DEV. 43, 45-47 (2016). 
 54  For instance, Sakiko Fukuda-Parr calls the MDGs “a North-South aid 
agenda.”  Fukuda-Parr, supra note 53, at 44.  By Ashwani Saith’s apt comment, the 
MDGs’ approach was “insufficiently global” and tended “to ghettoize the problem 
of development and locate[d] it firmly in the third world—as if development is 
fundamentally and exclusively an issue of absolute levels of living.”  Saith, supra 
note 43, at 1184.  MDG 8 “effectively polarizes and stereotypes the rich and 
powerful developed countries against the poor and corrupt developing countries.”  
Joy Paton & Elisabeth Valiente-Riedl, Re-evaluating the MDG Framework in Papua 
New Guinea, in THE CAPABILITY APPROACH: DEVELOPMENT PRACTICE AND PUBLIC 
POLICY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION 168, 176 (Francesca Panzironi & Katharine 
Gelber eds., 2012). 
 55  “The Sustainable Development Goals and targets are integrated and 
indivisible, global in nature and universally applicable, taking into account 
different national realities, capacities and levels of development and respecting 
national policies and priorities.”  2030 Agenda, supra note 4, para. 55. 
 56 Currently, approximately 60% of those in extreme poverty live in middle-
income countries.  MARCUS MANUEL ET AL., FINANCING THE END OF EXTREME 
POVERTY, OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE 42 (Sept. 2018), 
https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/12411.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XZ9H-RFW8]; see Joe DeCapua, Where Do the World’s Poor Live?, 
VOA (Aug. 28, 2012, 07:33 AM), https://www.voanews.com/a/poverty-
projections-28aug12/1496954.html [https://perma.cc/FH5T-P7NM]; see also 
United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Statement on Visit 
to the United Kingdom, by Professor Philip Alston, United Nations Special Rapporteur on 
Extreme Poverty and Human Rights (Nov. 16, 2018); United Nations Human Rights 
Office of the High Commissioner, Statement on Visit to the USA, by Professor Philip 
Alston, United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights (Dec. 
15, 2017) (demonstrating that the poverty rate is very high in the world’s richest 
countries). 
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non-compliance with their human rights and sustainable 
development obligations towards their poor populations.57  Third, 
the SDGs are more comprehensive than the MDGs and better 
interlinked.58  Many SDGs are so-called “zero goals” requiring not 
just reduction, but full (though progressive) eradication of extreme 
poverty and poverty-related severe socio-economic deprivations, 
such as hunger59 and the preventable deaths of children.60  Fourth, 
one can draw a clear line between the seven MDGs that are 
presumed to be exclusively local, and only one global goal, MDG 8.  
In the 2030 Agenda, international collaboration is recognized not 
only as one of the development goals61 but also as an important tool 
for achieving all of the other SDGs.62  Fifth, the MDGs and SDGs 
interpret global partnership differently:  although the former see it 
as bilateral donor-recipient relations, in which developed countries 
should play a pivotal role,63  the latter call for a multilateral and 
multilevel partnership inclusive of all stakeholders (“no one will be 
left behind”)64 and put emphasis on guarantees of equal and full-
fledged agency of developing societies and poor individuals in the 
process of poverty eradication.65 
These differences demonstrate that the 2030 Agenda represents a 
partial, positive response to the critique voiced against the MDGs.66  
Nevertheless, the 2030 Agenda does not resolve some essential 
problems.  The MDGs and SDGs are fairly criticized for several 
reasons:  First, though they both declare their application of a human 
rights-based approach, the MDGs and SDGs, in fact, do not pay 
sufficient attention to human rights and the corresponding 
obligations.  The progressive commitments for development do not 
have the status of human rights and, as will be shown, conflict with 
human rights-based obligations that should be fulfilled 
 
 57 See Pogge & Sengupta, supra note 1, at 88-89; Saith, supra note 43, at 1184. 
 58 See MONKELBAAN, supra note 13, at 4. 
 59 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, SDG 2. 
 60 Id. SDG 3; see infra Section III.C. 
 61 Id. SDG 17. 
 62 See infra Section IV.A. 
 63 See UNITED NATIONS, supra note 44. 
 64 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, pmbl.  
 65 Id. SDG 17. 
 66 See, e.g., Fukuda-Parr, supra note 53. 
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immediately.67  Second, the MDGs and SDGs bypass the issue of 
developed states’ and other powerful actors’ remedial 
extraterritorial responsibilities to compensate for the harm caused 
by them and often substitute the former with duties of development 
assistance. 68   Third, though they recognize the injustice of the 
international institutional structure, the MDGs and SDGs 
concentrate predominantly on territorial measures rather than 
global institutional reforms that are necessary to reduce poverty and 
create a just and sustainable global order.69  Fourth, they both use 
the World Bank’s inadequate and much-criticized definition of 
poverty.70  Fifth, despite the acknowledgement that non-state actors, 
including transnational corporations, individuals and global civil 
society, also have sustainable development commitments, the 
Millennium Declaration and the 2030 Agenda remain state-centered 
and do not focus on obligations of actors other than states.71  Sixth, 
the MDGs and SDGs assume that development assistance 
obligations are interactional and do not call for their 
institutionalization.72  Finally, they are often rightly criticized for 
their lack of independent monitoring and accountability 
mechanisms to assess the progress of development goals’ realization 
and hold multiple actors responsible. 73   The rest of this Article 
explores ways to fill these gaps. 
 
 67 See infra Section II.C. 
 68 See infra Section III.A. 
 69  See infra Section III.B. The MDGs and SDGs interpret poverty 
predominantly as a territorial problem that should be solved through good 
domestic governance and not as an extraterritorial issue that calls for global 
governance solutions.  See Pogge & Sengupta, supra note 1, at 89. 
 70 See infra Section III.C. 
 71  See infra Section IV.A; see also Kathleen Sexsmith & Philip McMichael, 
Formulating the SDGs: Reproducing or Reimagining State-Centered Development?, 12 
GLOBALIZATIONS 581 (2015). 
 72 See infra Section IV.B. 
 73 See infra Section IV.C. 
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B. Human Rights Obligations and Sustainable Development 
Commitments 
The 2030 Agenda expresses global commitments with respect to 
certain socio-economic guarantees, in the first instance to eradicate 
extreme poverty and inequality, that are, at the same time, objects of 
internationally recognized socio-economic rights. 74   This Section 
examines the main distinctions between human rights obligations 
and sustainable development commitments.  This analysis will 
enable us to assess the strengths and limitations of the human rights 
and sustainable development agendas.75 
The contrast between human rights-based obligations and 
sustainable development commitments may be explained through 
the parallel with the distinction between perfect duties of justice and 
imperfect humanitarian duties, which was proposed by Kant. 76  
Perfect duties of justice are assigned, specified, claimable and 
enforceable human rights obligations.  In comparison to them, 
imperfect humanitarian (beneficence) duties do not determine 
concrete content and scope, holders and duty-bears but are rather 
aimed at establishing a normative framework giving various duty-
bearers reasons to act.77 
The main differences between human rights obligations and 
sustainable development commitments may be formulated as 
follows (see infra Table No. 1): First, while human rights obligations 
 
 74 For a critique of the position that human rights are aimed to and capable of 
guaranteeing equality, see SAMUEL MOYN, NOT ENOUGH: HUMAN RIGHTS IN AN 
UNEQUAL WORLD (2018). 
 75 On various interpretations of the interrelation between the human rights 
agenda and the sustainable development agenda, see Stephen P. Marks, The Human 
Rights Framework for Development: Seven Approaches, in REFLECTIONS ON THE RIGHT TO 
DEVELOPMENT 23 (Arjun Sengupta et al. eds., 2005); Alston, supra note 36. 
 76 IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 29 (Mary Gregor trans. & ed., 
1996).  This distinction between perfect and imperfect obligations was employed 
and developed by many contemporary researches and practitioners.  See ONORA 
O’NEILL, CONSTRUCTIONS OF REASON: EXPLORATIONS OF KANT’S PRACTICAL 
PHILOSOPHY 191 (1989); Stefan Gosepath, Deprivation and Institutionally Based Duties 
to Aid, in DOMINATION AND GLOBAL POLITICAL JUSTICE: CONCEPTUAL, HISTORICAL, 
AND INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVES 251, 254 (Barbara Buckinx et al. eds., 2015); Marks, 
supra note 75, at 20-21. 
 77 See CHARLES R. BEITZ, THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS 167 (2009); Gosepath, supra 
note 76, at 254; O’NEILL, supra note 76, at 191. 
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refer to international legal framework, sustainable development 
commitments appeal to political agreements that have no status of 
legally binding human rights instruments. 78   Second, whereas 
human rights obligations are grounded in and correspond to 
internationally recognized human rights, the 2030 Agenda records 
unilateral humanitarian self-obligations of actors.79   Third, right-
holders are entitled to claim the performance of human rights 
obligations from certain duty-bearers.  As humanitarian self-
obligations, sustainable development commitments are not owed to 
any particular right-holders and are, therefore, not claimable.  
Nonetheless, in contrast to acts of charity, sustainable development 
commitments are not optional. 80   Fourth, while human rights 
obligations should be assigned to concrete duty-bearers, the 2030 
Agenda does not specify actors responsible for the implementation 
of sustainable development commitments.  Fifth, the U.N. 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereinafter 
CESCR) formulates general and specific criteria of adequacy for 
determining the scope of socio-economic rights obligations. 81  
Though the 2030 Agenda refers to some of these criteria of adequacy, 
it operates mainly with its own set of indicators.  Sixth, although 
socio-economic rights obligations are of both progressive and 
immediate character, sustainable development commitments are to 
be implemented only progressively within a certain timeframe (by 
2020, 2025, or 2030).82  Finally, human rights require the creation of 
special legal monitoring and accountability mechanisms, 83 
 
 78  Some researchers consider that the MDGs and SDGs form customary 
international law, which means that development commitments have a status of 
legal obligations, even if they do not derive from binding legal instruments.  See 
Philip Alston (Special Adviser to the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights 
on the Millennium Development Goals), A Human Rights Perspective on the 
Millennium Development Goals, para. 48; Alston, supra note 36, at 758; ANDREW 
CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE ACTORS 86-87 (2006). 
 79 The 2030 Agenda represents a set of “commitments” to implement the SDGs.  
The word “obligations” is used only twice in the 2030 Agenda, meaning obligations 
under international law.  2030 Agenda, supra note 4, para. 18, SDG 15.1. 
 80 Alston, supra note 36, at 758. 
 81 See infra Section III.C. 
 82 See infra Section III.C. 
 83 In Alston’s important note, “accountability mechanisms are the sine qua non 
of a human rights approach.”  Alston, supra note 78, at 51; see Alston, supra note 36, 
at 813. 
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including judicial and quasi-judicial bodies.  The 2030 Agenda relies 
on periodic monitoring and political pressure as major tools for 
holding actors accountable.  It uses targets and indicators for 
evaluating actors’ efforts in achieving the SDGs and political 
pressure to influence their conduct.84 
TABLE NO. 1 
No. Aspects 














3 Claimability Claimable Non-Claimable 
4 Duty-Bearers Concrete Actors Not Specified 














The human rights agenda has several important interrelated 
strengths regarding obligations when compared to the sustainable 
 
 84 See infra Section IV.C. 
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development agenda.  First, as universal legitimate entitlements that 
individuals have against relevant others,85 human rights ground the 
corresponding obligations of particular actors and give right-
holders a certain level of control over the objects of their rights and 
the behavior of the obliged actors.86  Second, human rights imply an 
opportunity to hold perpetrators accountable for their violations. 
The sustainable development agenda is therefore marred by 
identifiable weaknesses.  Without being rooted in human rights, 
sustainable development commitments are entirely at the disposal 
of self-obliging global actors.  In other words, without enjoying the 
status of right-holders, poor individuals and developing societies 
cannot demand the fulfillment of SDGs from their states, the 
international community and concrete global entities and hold these 
actors accountable for their non-compliance with sustainable 
development commitments.  For these reasons, the 2030 Agenda is 
compared with “a long list of Sustainable Development Wishes.”87  
In order to be more than just a promise of development 
improvements, the SDGs should specify responsible global actors, 
principles of distributing shared sustainable development 
commitments among them, means for their implementation, as well 
as monitoring and accountability mechanisms. 
According to Philip Alston’s persuasive argument, one should 
not unreasonably extol the legal framework and practice of human 
rights and belittle the normative framework and practice of 
sustainable development.88  Traditional points of critique directed at 
socio-economic rights to a large extent coincide with the above listed 
characteristics of the SDGs.  Obligations corresponding to socio-
economic rights are often accused of being non-binding, 
programmatic (or political), progressive, non-claimable, non-
enforceable, and non-justiciable commitments that are neither 
 
 85 See JEFF KING, JUDGING SOCIAL RIGHTS 20-21 (2012); JAMES W. NICKEL, MAKING 
SENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 13-15 (2nd ed. 2007); HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: 
SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 13 (2nd ed. 1996). 
 86 See LEON PETRAZYCKI, LAW AND MORALITY 45-48 (2011); Joseph Raz, Human 
Rights in the Emerging World Order, 1 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 31, 35 (2010). 
 87 Pogge & Sengupta, supra note 1, at 90; see Thomas Pogge & Mitu Sengupta, 
New Millennium Development Goals: A New Version, An Old Wish List, 48 ECON. & POL. 
WKLY. 23 (Sept. 28, 2013); Sengupta, supra note 13. 
 88 Alston, supra note 36, at 767. 
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specified nor assigned to concrete actors.89  Thus, socio-economic 
rights obligations face the same criticisms as do sustainable 
development commitments.  As shown by many researchers and 
practitioners, this critique regarding socio-economic rights is 
refutable.90  Means and strategies to overcome the skepticism about 
socio-economic rights obligations and sustainable development 
commitments partly overlap and may mutually enrich each other.  
One of the ways to overcome the above-mentioned criticism of 
sustainable development commitments, which is also often applied 
to socio-economic human rights obligations, is to justify imperfect 
duties as obligatory, claimable and enforceable legal duties.  Charles 
Beitz, for example, argues against a “modern prejudice” to consider 
imperfect humanitarian self-obligations to be discretionary and 
generate less serious grounds for action.  He develops the concept 
of “strong beneficence” obligations conditional on three factors:  
first, the interest requiring protection should be “maximally 
urgent”; second, there should be actors capable of implementing 
their shared obligations/commitments; and third, the realization of 
these obligations/commitments demand only minor or moderate 
sacrifice from these actors.91  Beitz comes to the conclusion that “in 
some cases of severe poverty considerations of (‘strong’) beneficence 
may be enough” to give actors “strong reasons” to contribute to the 
realization of shared global obligations.92  Sustainable development 
commitments to eradicate poverty and ensure a decent standard of 
living satisfy the “strong beneficence” criteria.  First, saving the lives 
of those in extreme poverty is a demand of extraordinary urgency.  
Second, many global actors are capable of implementing sustainable 
development commitments.  Although contemporary studies assess 
various amounts of resources needed to end poverty universally, 
they agree that cumulative efforts would be sufficient to implement 
relevant SDGs.93   Finally, the burdens of the realization of these 
commitments are quite moderate, provided they are fairly 
 
 89 See, e.g., Marks, supra note 75, at 3. 
 90 See, e.g., id.; SHUE, supra note 83. 
 91  BEITZ, supra note 77, at 167. 
 92  Id. at 169. 
 93  See, e.g., Manuel et al., supra note 56, at 42-43; SACHS ET AL., supra note 12, at 
1-2. 
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distributed among all members of the international community.94  
As Pogge and Sengupta assert, “[n]ever in human history has severe 
poverty been so easily and completely eradicable as in the present 
period.”95 
Strong beneficence obligations have a potential to become legal 
obligations through their legal recognition, specification of right-
holders and duty-bearers, and institutionalization. 96   Individuals 
may, therefore, assert claims that sustainable development 
commitments be performed by concrete actors on the basis of 
international instruments and agreements specifying and assigning 
these commitments to concrete actors.97  Arjun Sengupta, the former 
Independent Expert on the Right to Development for the U.N. 
Commission on Human Rights, pursues a similar logic in 
addressing the problem of perfect and imperfect obligations 
corresponding to the right to development.  He maintains that since 
a development program clearly attributes obligations to various 
actors—states, intergovernmental organizations, and non-state 
actors, including transnational corporations and agencies of global 
civil society, and the international community as a whole—the right 
to development “becomes a complete right; having all the 
justification of a human right with fully identified duties and 
obligations.”98 
 
 94  See, e.g., THOMAS POGGE, WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: 
COSMOPOLITAN RESPONSIBILITIES AND REFORMS ch. 8 (2nd ed. 2008); POGGE, supra note 
14, at 21-24; SACHS ET AL., supra note 12, at 1-2; Oxfam International, Public Good or 
Private Wealth? 60-71 (Briefing paper, 2019), 
https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/bitstream/handle/10546/620599/bp-
public-good-or-private-wealth-210119-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/9JCK-DVBD]. 
 95 Pogge & Sengupta, supra note 1, at 86. 
 96 See BEITZ, supra note 77, at 169; O’NEILL, supra note 76, at 191; Gosepath, 
supra note 76, at 285. 
 97 William Easterly also argues that global actors should be held individually 
responsible for their impact on sustainable development, since unallocated shared 
responsibilities are not efficient.  EASTERLY, supra note 12, at 205. 
 98  Arjun Sengupta, Fourth Report of the Independent Expert on the Right to 
Development, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/WG.18/2, para. 16 (Dec. 20, 2001).  Arjun 
Sengupta draws a parallel between the right to development and the concept of a 
“metaright” formulated by Sen: “A metaright to something x can be defined as the 
right to have policies p (x) that genuinely pursue the objective of making the right to 
x realizable.”  See Amartya Sen, The Right Not to Be Hungry, in THE RIGHT TO FOOD 
70 (Philip Alston & Katarina Tomasevski eds., 1984).  Following Sen, Sengupta 
concludes: “Even if the right to x remains unfulfilled or immediately unrealizable, 
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As shown in this Section, obligations corresponding to and 
arising from human rights differ significantly from humanitarian 
(beneficence) commitments.  Though the former call for legal 
recognition and implementation, the latter may, only under certain 
conditions, enjoy them as well.  In this respect, the application of a 
human rights-based approach seems to be the most efficient way of 
overcoming the criticism of sustainable development commitments 
and harmonizing the human rights and sustainable development 
agendas.  This idea will be defended in the next Section. 
C. From Commitments to Obligations:  A Human Rights-Based 
Approach to Sustainable Development 
Alston compares the sustainable development agenda and the 
human rights agenda with ships passing in the night unaware of 
each other, though they are directed towards similar goals.99  He 
analyzes several interpretations of the relationship between human 
rights and development goals:  “(i) they are entirely consistent with 
one another; (ii) they are potentially complementary; (iii) they are 
not necessarily inconsistent; (iv) they are duplicative; or (v) they 
actually represent competing alternatives.”100  From the previous 
Section, it is clear that options (i) and (iv) are incorrect as the SDGs 
display many differences and inconsistencies with internationally 
recognized human rights.  The question, then, is, which of the other 
three alternatives are valid? 
Though human rights and the SDGs are often seen as competing 
alternatives (v),101 an adequate understanding of their nature does 
 
the metaright to x, p (x), can be a fully valid right if all the obligations associated 
with p (x) can be clearly specified.”  Arjun Sengupta, Fourth Report of the Independent 
Expert on the Right to Development, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/WG.18/2, para. 16 (Dec. 
20, 2001).  According to Stephen Marks’ important observation, both perfect and 
imperfect human rights obligations should be recognized as legal obligations.  
Marks, supra note 75, at 17-21. 
 99 Alston, supra note 36, at 755, 825. 
 100 Id. at 759.  Though Alston focuses on the links between the MDGs and 
human rights, his analysis is also relevant for the 2030 Agenda. 
 101 To this category of criticism, one can attribute a position which refuses the 
SDGs’ potential to realize or advance human rights.  See, e.g., Pogge & Sengupta, 
supra note 1; Thomas Pogge, The Sustainable Development Goals: Brilliant Propaganda?, 
2 ANALELE UNIVERSITĂŢII DIN BUCUREŞTI 25 (2015). 
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not provide reasons for this conclusion.  This idea was put forward 
in a human rights-based approach to development encapsulated in 
the 2030 Agenda.  The very idea of a human rights-based approach 
indicates that (v) is wrong, while (ii) and (iii) remain potentially 
correct.  According to a human rights-based approach, human rights 
and the SDGs are potentially complementary (ii) and the latter 
should be brought in accordance with the former by eliminating 
unnecessary discrepancies (iii).  The 2030 Agenda itself expressed the 
intention to synchronize the human rights and sustainable 
development agendas:  “we reaffirm our commitment to 
international law and emphasize that the Agenda is to be 
implemented in a manner that is consistent with the rights and 
obligations of States under international law.”102  Alston comes to 
the conclusion that the development agenda only partly expresses 
internationally recognized human rights and “a clear challenge 
exists to ensure that there is full mutual compatibility.”103  In his 
compelling opinion, there are ways to create a “human rights 
friendly” development strategy within which both agendas can 
“reinforce one another” and create “a win-win outcome.”104 
Hence, the agendas have ample potential for complementarity, 
and sustainable development commitments should be harmonized 
with human rights obligations.  It should be stressed, however, that 
there cannot be complete parity between them.  Human rights are 
high-priority entitlements giving rise to obligations that “trump” all 
other commitments and designate priorities in allocating resources 
by duty-bearers.105  Human rights should, therefore, be considered 
an essential part of the sustainable development framework and 
corresponding human rights obligations should be integrated into 
global obligations for sustainable development. 
While declaring the application of a human rights-based 
approach, the 2030 Agenda stipulates an international commitment 
“to realize the human rights of all:”106  “We envisage a world of 
 
 102 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, para. 18. 
 103 Alston, supra note 36, at 760; Alston, supra note 78, para. 4. 
 104 Alston, supra note 36, at 766-7; Alston, supra note 78, paras. 4, 24-25. 
 105 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY xi (1977).  For a critique of 
this position, see Joseph Raz, Professor Dworkin’s Theory of Rights, 26 POL. STUD. 123 
(1978); András Sajó, Socioeconomic Rights and the International Economic Order, 35 
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 221, 223-24 (2002). 
 106 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, pmbl. 
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universal respect for human rights and human dignity, the rule of 
law, justice, equality and non-discrimination.”107  The 2030 Agenda 
stresses the significance of international human rights instruments, 
including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (hereinafter 
UDHR) and the DRD, and reaffirms obligations derived from the 
Charter of the United Nations (hereinafter U.N. Charter).108  It does not, 
however, appeal to specific human rights (apart from the human 
right to safe drinking water and sanitation) even when it expresses 
commitments to guarantee secure access to the objects of these 
human rights. 109   The DRD proceeds from the assumption that 
development in all its forms and directions presupposes the 
realization of fundamental rights:  “All States should co-operate 
with a view to promoting, encouraging and strengthening universal 
respect for and observance of all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all without any distinction as to race, sex, language or 
religion.”110 
What, in this context, does the requirement of making the 
sustainable development agenda consistent with international 
human rights law imply?  It entails several important measures:111  
 
 107 Id. para. 8. 
 108 Id. paras. 10, 19.  Cf. DRD, supra note 21, art. 3, para. 2 (“The realization of 
the right to development requires full respect for the principles of international law 
concerning friendly relations and co-operation among States in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations.”) 
 109  See infra Section III.C.  Alston asserts that even if sustainable development 
instruments “do not address human rights per se, they do address issues that are 
in fact the subject of human rights even if discussed in a different terminology.”  
Alston, supra note 36, at 796.  According to the Danish Institute for Human Rights, 
92 % of the SDGs targets are linked to core international human rights instruments.  
THE DANISH INST. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE 2030 AGENDA FOR 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 9, 
https://www.humanrights.dk/sites/humanrights.dk/files/media/dokumenter/
udgivelser/sdg/hr_and_2030_agenda-web_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/K2CN-
MY6L]; see also THE DANISH INST. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, THE HUMAN RIGHTS GUIDE TO 
THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS, http://sdg.humanrights.dk 
[https://perma.cc/L88F-QN2J].  
 110 DRD, supra note 21, art. 6, para. 1. 
 111  The listed measures are consonant with the three (ii, i, and iv) “key 
elements in a new approach to ensuring effective complementarity between human 
rights and the MDGs” delineated by Alston: “(i) overt recognition of the relevance 
of human rights obligations; (ii) ensuring an appropriate legal framework; (iii) 
encouraging community participation but doing so in a realistic and targeted way; 
and (iv) promoting MDG accountability mechanisms.”  Alston, supra note 36, at 827. 
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First, the recognition that the human rights framework is a 
normative basis for certain global obligations for sustainable 
development, the objects of which coincide with the objects of 
internationally recognized human rights, including socio-economic 
rights.  A serious obstacle to synchronizing the human rights and 
sustainable development agendas is connected to the fact that it 
presumes the recognition of socio-economic rights and 
corresponding territorial and extraterritorial obligations in national 
legal orders for which some developed states are not ready.112 
Second, the acknowledgement that certain sustainable 
development commitments are, at the same time, claimable human 
rights obligations to which global obligations of certain actors 
correspond.  This does not mean that sustainable development 
commitments should be formulated in the language of human rights 
obligations.113  It does, however, mean that sustainable development 
commitments should not be in conflict with human rights 
obligations in their content and scope, as well as in the urgency of 
their implementation.  This implies that the SDGs should in no case 
be interpreted as a basis for exemption from human rights 
obligations.114 
Third, the creation of monitoring and accountability 
mechanisms or using the existing human rights accountability 
mechanisms 115  (with respect to sustainable development 
commitments overlapping with human rights obligations) is 
necessary for evaluating the progress of the realization of global 
obligations for sustainable development and holding global actors 
responsible.116 
 
 112 See Sengupta, supra note 98, para. 46. 
 113 An opposite position is expressed by Arjun Sengupta: “[f]rom a human 
rights perspective the objectives of development are to be regarded as entitlements, or as 
rights that can be legitimately claimed by individuals, as right holders, against 
corresponding duty holders, such as the State and the international community, which 
may have specified obligations to enable those rights to be enjoyed.”  Sengupta, 
supra note 98, para. 22 (emphasis added). 
 114 See infra Section III.C. 
 115 Alston, supra note 36, at 814-25; Alston, supra note 78, pt. 7. 
 116  See infra Section IV.C.  As Arjun Sengupta notes, implementing 
development objectives as human rights implies “accountability and, where 
possible, the culpability for not realizing those rights clearly established, leading to 
the adoption of remedial measures.”  Sengupta, supra note 98, para. 22. 
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The right to development is a legal embodiment of a human 
rights-based approach to development.117  This right, standing at the 
intersection of the sustainable development agenda and the human 
rights agenda, carries the potential to reconcile the agendas.  
Although it was pronounced in the DRD more than thirty years ago, 
the status, content, and scope of the right to development are highly 
debatable in legal literature and in practice.118  The DRD stipulates 
that the right to development is “an inalienable human right by 
virtue of which every human person and all peoples are entitled to 
participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and 
political development, in which all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms can be fully realized.”119  The right to development is both an 
individual and collective right.  According to the DRD, the right to 
development is a claim-right to the creation and implementation of 
programs and institutions for the progressive realization of 
development goals, which should lead to their full achievement.  
The same impulse motivated Arjun Sengupta to define the right to 
development as the right to a “process of development.” 120  
However, the right to development is also the right to the results of 
development.121   Thus, the DRD calls for ensuring both “the full 
exercise and progressive enhancement of the right to development, 
including the formulation, adoption and implementation of policy, 
legislative and other measures at the national and international 
levels.”122 
The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action reaffirmed that 
the right to development is a “universal and inalienable right and an 
 
 117  According to Arjun Sengupta, “the process of realizing the right to 
development” should be interpreted “as a method of implementing and designing” 
the sustainable development agenda.  Sengupta, supra note 98, para. 42. 
 118 See, e.g., Vandenbogaerde, supra note 10, at 188; Vandenhole, supra note 17, 
at 378. 
 119 DRD, supra note 21, art. 1, para. 1 (emphasis added).  The African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights first acknowledged the right to development.  African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Organization. of Afr. Unity [OAU], art. 22, 
para. 1 (June 27, 1981). 
 120  See Sengupta (2013), supra note 17, at 68; Sengupta (2000), supra note 17, at 
563; see also Vandenbogaerde, supra note 10, at 197-98. 
 121 See infra Part III. 
 122 DRD, supra note 21, art. 10 (emphasis added). 
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integral part of fundamental human rights.” 123   The Millennium 
Declaration defined the enjoyment of the right to development as an 
important development target.124  As demonstrated, the 2030 Agenda 
also expresses the commitment to respect human rights, including 
the right to development.125 
The right to development is aimed at converting development 
goals “into rights of individuals and identifies the responsibility of 
all the duty holders, in accordance with human rights standards.”126  
The right to development serves, therefore, as a normative basis for 
claimable human rights obligations in the area of sustainable 
development.  Giving rise to global human rights obligations for 
sustainable development—i.e., obligations to create and maintain a 
just and sustainable global order,127 obligations to ensure a decent 
and sustainable standard of living universally,128 and obligations of 
development cooperation 129  and assistance 130 —the right to 
development is key for understanding their nature.   
To what extent do the human rights-based approach to 
development and the right to development as its embodiment 
contribute to bringing the sustainable development agenda in line 
with the international human rights agenda?  As shown, they entail 
two interrelated demands: on the one hand, certain sustainable 
development commitments, the objects of which coincide with the 
objects of international human rights, should be acknowledged as 
human rights obligations for sustainable development;131 and on the 
other hand, territorial and extraterritorial human rights obligations 
 
 123 Vienna Declaration, supra note 2, para. 10; see also G.A. Res. 61/295, United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, art. 23 (Sept. 13, 2007); 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. 1), princ. 3 (Aug. 
12, 1992); World Summit for Social Development, Copenhagen Declaration on Social 
Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.166/9, para. 26, commitments 1, 6 (Mar. 14, 1995). 
 124 Millennium Declaration, supra note 29, paras. 11-12. 
 125 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, para. 35. 
 126 Sengupta, supra note 98, paras. 8-9. 
 127 See infra Section III.B. 
 128 See infra Section III.C. 
 129 See infra Section IV.A. 
 130 See infra Section IV.B. 
 131 The DRD does not specify, however, which monitoring and accountability 
mechanisms are necessary for the realization of human rights obligations for 
sustainable development.  See DRD, supra note 21. 
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relating to sustainable development should be integrated into the 
contemporary sustainable development agenda.  Moreover, 
obligations corresponding to basic human rights, including basic 
socio-economic rights, form a minimum core of sustainable 
development commitments.  In other words, local and global human 
rights obligations to combat poverty and ensure a decent standard 
of living delineate the lower threshold below which the sustainable 
development commitments should not fall. 
Whereas the human rights agenda is capable of expressing only 
minimum ethical demands,132 the sustainable development agenda 
may set goals that go beyond these basic ethical requirements.  The 
sustainable development agenda should, therefore, include not only 
human rights obligations, but also more comprehensive ethical (as 
well as economic, social, and political) commitments aimed at “the 
constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population and 
of all individuals.”133  The sustainable development commitments 
that transcend human rights obligations represent beneficence 
commitments.134  As Amartya Sen notes, sustainable development 
should mirror “the richness of human life.”135  Additionally, the idea 
of sustainability itself calls for going beyond the brackets of social 
relationships and implies principles and commitments ensuring that 
“humanity lives in harmony with nature and in which wildlife and 
other living species are protected.”136 
 
 132  Following proponents of the ethical minimum theory, such as Georg 
Jellinek, Eduard von Hartmann, Vladimir Solov’ev, Jacques Maritain, Henry Shue, 
David Miller, Charles Beitz, and Joshua Cohen, I develop an idea that human rights 
give protection only to minimum ethical demands. 
 133 DRD, supra note 21, pmbl. 
 134 As demonstrated in Section II.B, the most urgent human rights obligations 
for sustainable development aimed at eradicating poverty and ensuring a decent 
standard of living (minimum core obligations for sustainable development) may 
also be interpreted as “strong beneficence” obligations. 
 135  Amartya Sen: A More Human Theory of Development, Interview by Nermeen 
Shaikh with Amartya Sen, ASIA SOC’Y (Dec. 6, 2004), https://asiasociety.org/
business/development/amartya-sen-more-human-theory-development 
[https://perma.cc/TB7Q-KHHD].  
 136 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, para. 9; see also id. SDG 13-15 (demanding to 
combat climate change and its impacts, conserve and sustainably use the oceans, 
seas and marine resources as well as to “[p]rotect, restore and promote sustainable 
use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, 
and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss”). 
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Since some commitments undertaken in the 2030 Agenda are 
substantially narrower than basic socio-economic rights 
obligations,137 this creates a task to further evolve the sustainable 
development agenda.  The achievement of this task may be 
facilitated through the successful implementation of the 2030 
Agenda, particularly the SDGs relating to poverty and extreme 
inequality eradication and securing access to a decent standard of 
living, which overlap with basic human rights obligations. 
It is important to point out some essential virtues of the 
sustainable development agenda, through which it can enrich the 
human rights agenda.  First, it is legitimized through a more 
inclusive political consensus, involving not only states but also non-
state actors, in particular representatives of global civil society.138  
Second, the key principle of the sustainable development agenda—
sustainability—allows for a rethink of the content and scope of 
human rights obligations.  Arjun Sengupta emphasizes the 
significance of sustainability measures for the human rights agenda:  
“a better way of using the existing resources, i.e., more efficiently 
and less wastefully, may have a much greater impact on realizing 
the rights than increasing the supply of resources.”139  Moreover, 
sustainability is recognized as an important element of the criterion 
of adequacy, which is used to assess socio-economic rights.140  Third, 
the SDGs’ indicators allow the progressive realization of global 
obligations for sustainable development to be monitored and may 
complement the human rights agenda, in which these firm 
benchmarks are lacking. 141   Fourth, comprehensive sustainable 
development commitments based on solidarity should supply 
sharply determined and narrower human rights-based obligations.  
Fifth, while recognizing individuals as central subjects, major 
participants and beneficiaries of development, the sustainable 
development agenda may play a crucial role in promoting the shift 
from a state-centered to human-centered global order and the 
 
 137 See infra Sections III.B-III.C. 
 138 See supra Section II.A. 
 139 Arjun Sengupta, On the Theory and Practice of the Right to Development, 24 
HUM. RTS. Q. 837, 866 (2002). 
 140 See infra Section III.C. 
 141 See infra Section IV.C.  As Alston notes, development goals are designed in 
such a way that their progressive realization is to be measured and should provide 
a basis for accountability.  Alston, supra note 36, at 756. 
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rooting of this idea in contemporary international law.142   Sixth, 
taking commitments towards the natural world and other species 
seriously, should lead to reconceptualizing obligations towards 
human beings, as well as the practices of their implementation.  
Finally, the sustainable development agenda calls for designing 
alternative modes of global governance capable of overcoming state-
centrism in the world institutional order.143 
In view of their significant potential to enrich one another and 
further the achievement of their common goal to fight poverty, the 
sustainable development agenda and human rights agenda should 
be brought into sync.  This implies the recognition of global 
obligations corresponding to basic socio-economic rights as 
minimum core obligations for sustainable development. 
D. Summary  
The second part of this Article analyzed relations between the 
human rights agenda and the sustainable development agenda and 
argued that they should be brought into harmony.  Focusing on the 
evolution of the sustainable development agenda from the 
Millennium Declaration to the 2030 Agenda, Section II.A noted its 
significant achievements as well as the urgent necessity of filling its 
substantial gaps.  Section II.B further explored the similarities and 
differences, the strengths and weaknesses, of human right 
obligations and sustainable development commitments.  Section 
II.C examined special features of the human rights-based approach 
to development and the right to development as its embodiment, as 
well as their role in harmonizing international human rights law and 
the sustainable development agenda.  It defended the idea that 
global obligations corresponding to socio-economic rights 
indispensable for leading a decent life should be recognized as 
minimum core obligations for sustainable development. 
 
 142 See infra Section IV.A. 
 143 See infra Section IV.C. 
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III. GLOBAL OBLIGATIONS FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
A. Extraterritorial Obligations Presupposed by the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development 
Extraterritorial obligations are neither horizontal obligations of 
equal (non-subordinate to one another) actors such as states, 
intergovernmental organizations, and non-state entities, nor vertical 
obligations towards actors at different levels of a hierarchy, such as 
governments and citizens, or an organization’s or enterprise’s 
governing bodies and its ordinary members or employees.  Rather, 
extraterritorial obligations are diagonal obligations of global actors 
towards individuals.144 
In legal literature and practice, the major criterion for 
distinguishing among various types of extraterritorial obligations is 
the possibility of identifying a causal link between acts/omissions 
of actors and human rights violations.  On this basis, it is possible to 
classify remedial responsibilities for negative effects on the 
enjoyment of socio-economic rights (hereinafter remedial 
extraterritorial obligations) and global human rights obligations 
(hereinafter global obligations) arising when socio-economic 
deprivations, which amount to human rights violations, cannot be 
attributed to any particular global actors or institutions.145 
To what extent are extraterritorial obligations presupposed by 
the 2030 Agenda?  First, the 2030 Agenda does not provide a 
framework for remedial extraterritorial obligations.  The DRD 
enshrines obligations of states to “eliminate obstacles to 
 
 144 See Elena Pribytkova, What Global Human Rights Obligations Do We Have?, 
20 CHI. J. INT’L L. 384, 407-412 (2020). 
 145  In this respect, the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of 
States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [hereinafter Maastricht 
Principles] distinguish between two types of extraterritorial obligations: first, 
“obligations relating to the acts and omissions of a State, within or beyond its 
territory, that have effects on the enjoyment of human rights outside of that State’s 
territory”; and, second, “obligations of a global character that are set out in the 
Charter of the United Nations and human rights instruments to take action, 
separately, and jointly through international cooperation, to realize human rights 
universally.”  ETO CONSORTIUM, MAASTRICHT PRINCIPLES ON EXTRATERRITORIAL 
OBLIGATIONS OF STATES IN THE AREA OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 
princ. 8 (Jan. 2013). 
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development resulting from failure to observe civil and political 
rights, as well as economic, social and cultural rights,”146 especially 
“the massive and flagrant” human right violations “resulting from 
apartheid, all forms of racism and racial discrimination, colonialism, 
foreign domination and occupation, aggression, foreign interference 
and threats against national sovereignty, national unity and 
territorial integrity, threats of war and refusal to recognize the 
fundamental right of peoples to self-determination.”147  The 2030 
Agenda reaffirms states’ commitments “to remove the obstacles to 
the full realization of the right of self-determination of peoples living 
under colonial and foreign occupation, which continue to adversely 
affect their economic and social development as well as their 
environment.”148 
Thus, both documents recognize the injustice of the global order 
and the role of developed states and other powerful actors in 
creating and maintaining it, as well as obligations to remove 
obstacles for development.  The DRD and the 2030 Agenda, however, 
do not address the issue of remedial extraterritorial obligations of 
responsible actors to compensate the victims for the harm149 caused 
by them or international institutions under their control.150   This 
explains why, in the SDGs, the language of assistance prevails over 
the language of compensation for severe extraterritorial human 
rights violations caused by global actors.151 
 
 146 DRD, supra note 21, art. 6, para. 3. 
 147 Id. art. 5; see also Economic and Social Council, Study on the Current State 
of Progress in the Implementation of the Right to Development Submitted by Mr. 
Arjun K. Sengupta, Independent Expert, Pursuant to Commission Resolution 
1998/72 and General Assembly Resolution 53/155, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1999/WG.18/2, para. 59 (July 27, 1999) [hereinafter Study on the Current 
State of Progress in the Implementation of the Right to Development] (stressing 
extraterritorial aspects of obligations corresponding to the right to development: 
“every State having recognized the right to development is obliged to ensure that 
its policies and actions do not impede enjoyment of that right in other countries and 
to take positive action to help the citizens of other States to realize that right”). 
 148 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, para. 35. 
 149 For a discussion of the difficulties of holding actors accountable for their 
non-fulfilment of human rights obligations for sustainable development and 
applying adequate corrective measures, see  Sengupta, supra note 98, at para. 31. 
 150  See also Malcolm Langford, Lost in Transformation? The Politics of the 
Sustainable Development Goals, 30 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 167, 172 (2016). 
 151  For an analysis of the inadmissibility of substituting remedial 
responsibilities with duties to assist, see Pribytkova, supra note 3, at 258-67. 
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Second, global obligations derived from the 2030 Agenda are 
aimed not at transforming the unfair international order, but rather 
at undertaking national reforms.  As shown above in Section II.A, 
the 2030 Agenda purports to embody the principle of universality, 
i.e., the SDGs extend to individuals in both developing and 
developed societies.  For this reason, SDG 17 calls for the 
revitalization of the “Global Partnership for Sustainable 
Development, based on a spirit of strengthened global solidarity, 
focused in particular on the needs of the poorest and most 
vulnerable and with the participation of all countries, all 
stakeholders and all people.” 152   In addition, Target 16.6 is to 
“develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all 
levels.”153 
However, the 2030 Agenda does not succeed in embodying the 
principle of the universality of sustainable development 
commitments, since it focuses principally on supporting national 
development plans, not on creating a global institutional 
framework.  In this sense, the SDGs represent a global agenda for 
territorial sustainable development.  They require, in particular, the 
“[e]nhance[ment of] international support for implementing 
effective and targeted capacity-building in developing countries to 
support national plans to implement all the Sustainable 
Development Goals, including through North-South, South-South 
and triangular cooperation.”154  In this context, Malcolm Langford’s 
assertion that the SDGs embody “a form of institutional 
cosmopolitanism” is premature.155  Although the 2030 Agenda has 
the potential to promote a cosmopolitan global order, necessary 
institutional guarantees have not yet been expressed in the current 
sustainable development plan.  This lacuna may be filled, in 
particular, through the inclusion of targets and indicators specifying 
 
 152 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, pmbl. 
 153 Id. SDG 16.6. 
 154 Id. SDG 17.9. 
 155 Langford, supra note 150, at 172.  Langford also finds that “the universal 
targets across the SDGs are often vague”, while “[t]he goals are weak on global 
partnership and the corresponding targets are rarely quantified”.  Id. at 173. 
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shared and individual obligations of members of the international 
community concerning global institutional reforms.156 
Thus, the 2030 Agenda, on the one hand, recognizes the injustice 
of the global institutional scheme and, on the other hand, 
concentrates predominantly on states’ territorial obligations and 
does not specify which particular global improvements are 
necessary to ensure sustainable development universally.  This 
contradiction reflects the lack of states’ consensus on questions 
concerning the causes of poverty and extreme inequality, which 
represent obstacles for sustainable development.  These questions 
are at the center of ethical, legal and political debates, in which the 
Global North and the Global South hold divergent positions. 157  
These debates over the causes of poverty and inequality between the 
North and the South are cognate with philosophical discussions 
between statists (nationalists) 158  and cosmopolitans 159  on the 
topic. 160   Developed North countries, the Bretton Woods 
 
 156 See Pogge & Sengupta, supra note 1, at 86-87.  Unlike Pogge and Sengupta, 
I consider that these global institutional obligations for sustainable development 
are not only of a remedial character and should be allocated not only to developed 
states, but to all global actors. 
 157  It is worth noting that the division between the Global North and the 
Global South is rather relative.  One often distinguishes a third group of so called 
“emerging economies”.  In addition, some North representatives, for instance, the 
Scandinavian states, explicitly took the side of Global South countries during the 
debates.  For an analysis of the North-South debates, see SEYEDSAYAMDOST, supra 
note 13, at 12-16, 35. 
 158  See, e.g., WILL KYMLICKA, POLITICS IN THE VERNACULAR: NATIONALISM, 
MULTICULTURALISM, AND CITIZENSHIP (2001); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: 
A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983); MICHAEL WALZER, THICK AND THIN: 
MORAL ARGUMENT AT HOME AND ABROAD (1994); Robert E. Goodin, What Is So 
Special About Our Fellow Countrymen? 98 ETHICS 663 (1988); Thomas Nagel, The 
Problem of Global Justice, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 113 (2005). 
 159  See, e.g., SIMON CANEY, JUSTICE BEYOND BORDERS: A GLOBAL POLITICAL 
THEORY (2005); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE:  DISABILITY, 
NATIONALITY, SPECIES MEMBERSHIP (2006); POGGE, supra note 94; KOK-CHOR TAN, 
JUSTICE WITHOUT BORDERS: COSMOPOLITANISM, NATIONALISM, AND PATRIOTISM (2004); 
PETER UNGER, LIVING HIGH AND LETTING DIE: OUR ILLUSION OF INNOCENCE (1996); 
Richard Arneson, What do we Owe to Distant Needy Strangers?, in PETER SINGER 
UNDER FIRE: THE MORAL ICONOCLAST FACES HIS CRITICS (Jefferey Schaler ed., 2009); 
Peter Singer, Famine, Affluence, and Morality, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 229 (1972). 
 160 See Pribytkova, supra note 3, at 248-253. 
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institutions,161 and some Western NGOs are quick to blame poor 
countries’ domestic institutional shortcomings—such as 
undemocratic regimes, corruption, the lack of human rights 
guarantees, and distortions of the free market—for the persistence 
of severe socio-economic deprivations.  Countries of the Global 
South, in contrast, point to injustices of the global order—the 
exclusion of developing societies from international decision-
making, norm-setting and institution-designing, the lack of 
transparency of global governance, extreme relational and 
distributive inequalities among nations, as well as the unfairness of 
the international financial and trade systems—as driving causes of 
world poverty.162  Ironically, the same actors from the North that 
insist on good domestic governance do not give equal weight to 
improvements in global governance.  At the same time, the Global 
South countries, struggling for their voice to be heard and taken 
seriously in the international arena, often do not consider it 
necessary to guarantee this right to their own people within their 
territory. 
I argue that the origins of poverty do not by themselves 
determine the existence or absence of global obligations to eradicate 
it and to assist poor individuals and societies in the realization of 
their basic socio-economic rights.163  Understanding the causes of 
poverty is, however, important for determining what efforts should 
be undertaken for its elimination.  Each end of the ideological 
spectrum identifies a truth concerning anti-poverty measures: both 
domestic and international institutional reforms are necessary for 
 
 161 The Bretton Woods institutions represent predominantly the developed 
North states, while the U.N. puts forward the interests of the Global South.  The 
OECD “donor club” states are, at the same time, the most authoritative members of 
the World Bank, that traditionally grants privileges to the richest states.  The so-
called “Group of 77” (G-77), which currently includes 135 developing countries, is 
a powerful South voting bloc within the U.N.  See SEYEDSAYAMDOST, supra note 13, 
at 35. 
 162  Fukuda-Parr classifies three types of international obstacles which are 
“beyond the reach of national action”: resource constraints, international policies, 
and “systemic asymmetry in global governance”.  Fukuda-Parr, supra note 18, at 
976-78; Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, A Right to Development Critique of Millennium 
Development Goal 8, in UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH 
COMMISSIONER, REALIZING THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT 201, 206 (2013), 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Development/Pages/RTDBook.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/XM7J-DPWC]; see also SALOMON, supra note 10, at 99. 
 163 See Pribytkova, supra note 3, at 250. 
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the implementation of the sustainable development agenda and the 
eradication of global poverty.  From both standpoints, the tools 
proffered by the 2030 Agenda for overcoming territorial obstacles to 
sustainable development and to the realization of socio-economic 
rights are grossly inadequate. 
Based on the classification of global human rights obligations 
suggested in my article, What Global Human Rights Obligations Do We 
Have?, we can identify three relevant pairs of global obligations for 
sustainable development:164  first, institutional obligations that apply 
to the organization of global order and interactional obligations that 
determine the conduct of global actors towards individuals; 165 
second, obligations of result concentrated on the achievements and 
outcomes of global actors’ activities (obligations to create a just and 
sustainable global order and obligations to ensure a decent and 
sustainable standard of living universally) and obligations of conduct 
relating to global actors’ efforts to achieve the SDGs (obligations of 
global development cooperation and assistance); and, third, 
obligations of relational justice that require treating and regarding 
individuals and societies as equals, that is, with equal concern and 
respect, and as full-fledged partners for sustainable development, 
and obligations of distributive justice that call for a fair allocation of 
social goods and resources necessary for sustainable development 
as well as benefits resulting from it. 
All of the three pairs of global obligations are to some extent 
envisioned by the 2030 Agenda.  They will be addressed in the next 
Sections.  This part will concentrate on global obligations of result, 
including relational and distributive institutional obligations to 
create and maintain a just and sustainable global order (Section III.B) 
and obligations to secure a decent and sustainable standard of living 
universally (Section III.C).  The fourth part will address global 
obligations of conduct, including obligations to cooperate for 
sustainable development (Section IV.A) and obligations of 
development assistance (Section IV.B).  These Sections will consider 
in more detail, first, to what degree these global obligations for 
 
 164 See Pribytkova, supra note 144, at 384. 
 165 According to the Human Development Report 2000, human rights have 
both interactional and institutional aspects, that is, they are “claims on the 
behaviour of individual and collective agents, and on the design of social 
arrangements.”  UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
REPORT 2000, at 25 (2000). 
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sustainable development are incorporated in the 2030 Agenda, and, 
second, what potential the contemporary sustainable development 
agenda and human rights agenda have to solve current problems 
and fill existing gaps concerning global obligations. 
B. Obligations to Create and Maintain a Just and Sustainable Global 
Order 
A normative basis for the right to a just global order is Art. 28 of 
the UDHR that recognizes a fundamental entitlement of an 
individual “to a social and international order in which the rights 
and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.”166  
The DRD reaffirms the UDHR entitlement to a social and 
international order in which human rights are fulfilled.  It stresses 
shared institutional obligations for sustainable development and 
demands that “efforts at the international level to promote and 
protect human rights should be accompanied by efforts to establish 
a new international economic order.” 167   The idea of a new 
international economic order (NIEO) advocated by the states of the 
Global South was designed to empower poor countries and promote 
relational justice between them and the countries of the Global 
North.168  The DRD demands that “States should realize their rights 
and fulfil their duties in such a manner as to promote a new 
international economic order based on sovereign equality, 
interdependence, mutual interest and co-operation among all States, 
 
 166  Following the UDHR, the Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of 
Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms acknowledges “the right of everyone to a 
social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other human rights instruments can be 
fully realized.”  G.A. Res. 53/144, Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of 
Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote Universally Recognized 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 18, para. 3 (Dec. 9, 1998) 
[hereinafter Declaration on the Right and Responsibility]. 
 167 DRD, supra note 21, pmbl. 
 168  See G.A. Res. 3201(S-VI), Declaration on the Establishment of a New 
International Economic Order (May 1, 1974).  On institutional obligations relating 
to equitable global institutional structure, see ANDREASSEN & MARKS, supra note 17; 
SALOMON, supra note 10, at 14, 64. 
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as well as to encourage the observance and realization of human 
rights.”169 
As demonstrated above in Section II.C, the right to development 
embodies a human rights-based approach to development and 
serves as a normative foundation for human rights obligations for 
sustainable development. The High-Level Task Force on the 
Implementation of the Right to Development (HLTF) has defined 
the right to development as “the right of peoples and individuals to 
the constant improvement of their well-being and to a national and global 
enabling environment conducive to just, equitable, participatory and 
human-centered development respectful of all human rights.”170  In this 
interpretation, the content of the right to development has clear 
connotations of two human rights:  the right to “the continuous 
improvement of living conditions” and the right to a just global 
order.171   Although, in the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (hereinafter the ICESCR), the right to “the 
continuous improvement of living conditions” is attached to the 
right to an adequate standard of living,172 the DRD does not enshrine 
the latter.173  An institutional aspect of the right to development is 
the entitlement to a global enabling environment indispensable for 
sustainable development and human rights realization.174  The 2030 
Agenda recognizes commitments to create “an enabling environment 
for sustainable development at all levels and by all actors.”175  In 
particular, it requires “national development efforts . . . to be 
supported by an enabling international economic environment, 
 
 169  DRD, supra note 21, art. 3, para. 3 (emphasis added); see also Vienna 
Declaration, supra note 2, para. 10 (reaffirming that the implementation of the right 
to development demands “equitable economic relations and a favourable economic 
environment at the international level.”) 
 170 Human Rights Council, Right to Development: Report of the High-Level 
Task Force on the Implementation of the Right to Development on its Sixth Session, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/15/WG.2/TF/2/Add.2, annex at 8 (Mar. 8, 2010) [hereinafter 
Right to Development] (emphasis added). 
 171 See G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, art. 11, para. 1 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICESCR]; G.A. Res. 217 
(III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 28 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter 
UDHR]. 
 172 ICESCR, supra note 171, art. 11, para. 1.  
 173 See infra Section III.C. 
 174 Right to Development, supra note 170, annex at 8. 
 175 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, para. 63. 
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including coherent and mutually supporting world trade, monetary 
and financial systems, and strengthened and enhanced global 
economic governance.”176 
How do the right to a just global order and the institutional side 
of the right to development—the right to a global enabling 
environment necessary for sustainable development “respectful of 
all human rights”177—interrelate?  Are these rights identical, as some 
researchers claim? 
Arne Vandenbogaerde reduces the right to development to its 
institutional aspect and maintains that the right coincides 
completely with the right to a just global order.178  This position 
overlooks two important aspects:  first, as shown, the right to 
development also embraces an interactional entitlement to the 
constant improvement of well-being; and second, the particularities 
and “added value” of the right to development are determined by 
the concept of sustainability.179  Based on the discussion in Section 
II.C, the guarantees of a just global order, in which human rights are 
realized, represent a minimum fundamental requirement for a 
sustainable global environment, or order. 180   A global enabling 
environment for sustainable development should not only be just 
and “respectful of all human rights,” but also ensure equitable, 
participatory and human-centered sustainable development. 181  
And, as shown in Section II.A, sustainable development implies that 
the enjoyment of the right to a just global order by the present 
generation does not compromise the ability of future generations to 
enjoy this right.  The principle of sustainability requires changing 
patterns of consumption that promotes not only economic 
 
 176 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, para. 63. 
 177 Right to Development, supra note 170, annex at 8. 
 178 On this basis, Arne Vandenbogaerde argues that the right to development 
is “doing a disservice to other human rights,” in the first instance, to socio-economic 
rights.  Vandenbogaerde, supra note 10, at 187, 209. 
 179 See supra Section II.C. 
 180 The concepts of “global enabling environment” and “global order” are 
used synonymously in this Article.  For development of the conception of “human 
rights ecosystem,” see César Rodríguez-Garavito, Business and Human Rights: 
Beyond the End of the Beginning, in BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: BEYOND THE END OF 
THE BEGINNING 11, 12 (César Rodríguez-Garavito ed., 2017), and César Rodríguez-
Garavito, The Future of Human Rights: From Gatekeeping to Symbiosis, 11 SUR—INT’L 
J. ON HUM. RTS. 499, 505-506 (2014). 
 181  Right to Development, supra note 170, annex at 8. 
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development, but also the realization of human rights.  Therefore, 
the right to development substantially enriches the content and 
scope of the right to a just global order, challenging the view that the 
former simply duplicates the latter.  In this respect, in representing 
an institutional aspect of the right to development, the right to a just 
and sustainable global order lies at the intersection of the human 
rights agenda and the sustainable development agenda, embodies 
their characteristics, and calls for the realization of corresponding 
human rights obligations and sustainable development 
commitments. 
An analysis of global obligations corresponding to the right to a 
just and sustainable global order should take into account key 
distinctions between global obligations of relational justice that require 
treating and regarding individuals as equals, that is, with equal 
concern and respect regardless of their place of origin, citizenship, 
or social status, and obligations of distributive justice that call for a fair 
allocation of certain social goods or resources indispensable for 
leading a decent life. 
I argue that global obligations of relational justice imply two 
important guarantees to enable individuals to enjoy equal status and 
to act as full-fledged actors in the global domain, i.e., to take part in 
creating and maintaining a just global order.  The first guarantee is 
for the correction of the asymmetries in global decision-making 
processes through ensuring developing states’ inclusion as 
independent and equal members of the international community, 
and for respect of the interests and fulfillment of the human rights 
of people they are representing.182  The second is the recognition of 
individuals as subjects of extraterritorial relations and promotion of 
their ability to claim the realization of their human rights directly or 
through their networks and representatives.  Individuals should 
enjoy access to information about and participation in all decision-
making processes concerning their human rights, including 
 
 182  These requirements were embodied in the norm that states designing 
global poverty reduction programs should “ensure that all bilateral and 
multilateral decision-making processes are fair, equitable and transparent, and 
sensitive to the needs of developing States, especially their disadvantaged and 
marginalized individuals and groups, including the poor.”  Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Principles and Guidelines for a 
Human Rights Approach to Poverty Reduction Strategies, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/06/12,  
para. 104(c) (2006). 
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participation in ex ante and ex post human rights impact assessments 
and human rights due diligence, as well as direct access to effective 
and affordable remedies. 
Along with relational justice guarantees, obligations to create 
and maintain a just global order presuppose certain distributive 
arrangements.  I showed elsewhere that global distributive justice 
does not require an equal distribution of resources, wealth, or 
income, whether among states or individuals.  It rather demands 
ensuring universal access to a decent standard of living.183  Multiple 
actors (states, non-state entities, intergovernmental organizations, 
and individuals) share global human rights obligations to create an 
institutional system necessary for the enjoyment of all components 
of the composite human right to an adequate standard of living 
universally.  In particular, it implies elaborating an international 
normative framework and institutions indispensable for enabling a 
decent life, including mechanisms for mobilizing resources and 
providing development assistance to those in poverty.184 
Creating and maintaining a just and sustainable global order 
that satisfies the minimum demands of relational and distributive 
justice is an important tool for poverty eradication as well as for 
achieving the other SDGs. 
These two aspects of the right to a just and sustainable global 
order—relational and distributive 185 —are central to debates 
between the Global North and the Global South.  If representatives 
of the Global North argue that poverty eradication requires 
liberalizing and democratizing governance at the national level, the 
Global South sees the solution in reducing local and global 
inequality and ensuring a fair distribution of basic social goods.  
These arguments of the North’s and South’s development debates 
are in accord with their positions in human rights disputes, in 
particular concerning the right to development.186  As shown above 
in Section III.A, if the Global South suggests a distributive justice 
agenda at both the local and global levels, the Global North argues 
 
 183 See Pribytkova, supra note 144, at 445-448. 
 184 See infra Section III.C. 
 185 As Tan notes, “while the demands of political justice are directed primarily 
at nonliberal countries, the demands of economic justice are directed primarily at 
liberal countries.”  TAN, supra note 159, at 8. 
 186 See Vandenbogaerde, supra note 10, at 189-90. 
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mainly for improving domestic governance and does not welcome 
guarantees of relational justice in the international domain.187  On 
the contrary, some leading developed states make every effort to 
preserve their domination in the global institutional system from 
which they disproportionally benefit. 188   In this sense, the 
democratization of governance should begin with the retraction of 
the developed states’ domination of the global order. 
A broad ideological conflict between the Global North and the 
Global South reinforces their longstanding reluctance to take greater 
programmatic steps towards each other:  the demands for 
distributive justice are considered to promote socialist values of 
equality, while the calls for democratic governance are often seen as 
an appeal to neoliberal imperialism. 189   A long struggle for 
consensus gave the appearance of successful compromise in the 
recognition of poverty reduction as a common denominator and a 
fundamental goal.  Poverty reduction was suitable for the role of the 
common objective for the human rights and sustainable 
development agendas because it did not jeopardize the core 
interests of either the Global North or South. 190   However, the 
compromise between the two political camps, sealed by the MDGs, 
intended to reduce neither relational nor distributive injustice.  The 
MDGs were not aimed at fighting the causes of poverty, but only its 
visible symptoms. 191   Since reducing poverty requires structural 
institutional changes in the spheres of both relational and 
distributive justice at the global and local levels, the MDGs did not 
achieve, in substance, their primary goals. 
 
 187 While the West “prioritize[s] political inclusiveness and the removal of 
discrimination at the domestic level,” the Rest consolidated by the G-77 advocates for 
relational justice at the international level, especially for fair trade and developing 
countries’ full-fledged representation in international financial institutions.  
Langford, supra note 150, at 171; see also SALOMON, supra note 10, at 99. 
 188 See, e.g., POGGE, supra note 14, at 20-24; POGGE, supra note 94, at 118-22; TAN, 
supra note 159, at 25-26. 
 189 See SEYEDSAYAMDOST, supra note 13, at 18-9; Langford, supra note 150, at 171; 
Vandenbogaerde, supra note 10, at 189-90. 
 190 In Seyedsayamdost’s opinion, the focus on poverty succeeded because it 
was legitimized by powerful North states that are also the most influential members 
of the OECD and the World Bank.  SEYEDSAYAMDOST, supra note 13, at 60; see also 
MOYN, supra note 74. 
 191 POGGE, supra note 14, at ch. 3; SEYEDSAYAMDOST, supra note 13, at 161. 
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Does international development law provide for relational and 
distributive guarantees of a just and sustainable order?  The 
preamble to the DRD emphasizes relational and distributive aspects 
of development, and demonstrates that development is aimed “at 
the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population 
and of all individuals on the basis of their active, free and meaningful 
participation in development and in the fair distribution of benefits 
resulting therefrom.”192  Arjun Sengupta rightly notes that “equity 
and justice are primary determinants of development and the whole 
structure of development is shaped by these determinants.”193  He 
also shows that the sustainable development agenda envisages 
relational and distributive justice guarantees.  According to him, the 
empowerment of developing states in international economic 
relations with developed countries was one of the fundamental 
motives to recognize the right to development as a human right.  
Partnership relations between the North and South should 
guarantee developing states’ equitable treatment and participation 
in decision-making as well as their secure access to the benefits of 
the development process.194  The HLTF is also sensitive to relational 
and distributive aspirations of the right to development, 
incorporating the three main attributes of the right:  
“[c]omprehensive and human-centered development policy,” 
“[p]articipatory human rights processes,” and “[s]ocial justice in 
development.”195 
To what extent does the 2030 Agenda acknowledge global 
relational and distributive obligations as tools for creating and 
maintaining a just and sustainable global order?  SDG 16 mandates 
the development of “effective, accountable and transparent 
institutions” 196  and “responsive, inclusive, participatory and 
representative decision-making at all levels” 197  as well as the 
broadening and strengthening of “the participation of developing 
 
 192 DRD, supra note 21, pmbl. (emphasis added). 
 193 Study on the Current State of Progress in the Implementation of the Right 
to Development, supra note 147, para. 53. 
 194 Sengupta, supra note 98, para. 45. 
 195 Right to Development, supra note 170, annex at 8-15. 
 196 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, SDG 16.6. 
 197 Id. SDG 16.7. 
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countries in the institutions of global governance.”198  An important 
innovation of the 2030 Agenda was the recognition of equality, not 
only as a means, but also as a separate goal of sustainable 
development.  SDG 10 requires reducing relational inequality within 
and among countries and ensuring an “enhanced representation 
and voice for developing countries in decision-making in global 
international economic and financial institutions in order to deliver 
more effective, credible, accountable and legitimate institutions.”199  
SDG 10 has been reasonably criticized for not requiring systemic 
global institutional transformations to achieve this goal.200 
The 2030 Agenda also calls for relational justice guarantees to 
empower developing states in the global economic order, i.e., 
“broadening and strengthening the voice and participation of 
developing countries—including African countries, least developed 
countries, landlocked developing countries, small island developing 
States and middle-income countries—in international economic 
decision-making, norm-setting and global economic governance.”201  
SDG 17 has substantially extended the scope of MDG 8 under the 
banner of revitalizing the global partnership for sustainable 
development.  In particular, the former contains the commitment to 
ensure a fair-trade global order, that is, to “[p]romote a universal, 
rules-based, open, non-discriminatory and equitable multilateral 
trading system under the World Trade Organization, including 
through the conclusion of negotiations under its Doha Development 
Agenda.”202 
Despite the substantial importance of the 2030 Agenda’s 
relational justice commitments to correct the asymmetries in global 
decision-making processes by ensuring developing states’ 
meaningful participation, they remain fragmentary and do not 
 
 198 Id. SDG 16.8. 
 199  Id. SDG 10.6.  SDG 10 also demands for local domestic institutional 
arrangements to empower the most disadvantaged and marginalized individuals 
and “promote the social, economic and political inclusion of all.”  Id. SDG 10.2. 
 200 Thomas Pogge and Mitu Sengupta argue that the “SDGs fail to reflect on 
the root causes of the huge and persistent poverty-related human rights deficit and 
they consequently ignore the structural reforms we urgently need to make national 
and supranational institutional arrangements less skewed toward the interests of a 
tiny global power elite.”  Pogge & Sengupta, supra note 1, at 94.  For an additional 
critique, see Deacon, supra note 13. 
 201 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, para. 44. 
 202 Id. SDG 17.10. 
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presuppose any serious reforms of a global institutional order.  This 
gives ground for Thomas Pogge and Mitu Sengupta to compare the 
SDGs with “a smokescreen for extreme global inequalities.”203 
In addition, the 2030 Agenda contains several commitments of 
global distributive justice relating to poverty and extreme inequality 
eradication as well as to guarantees of a decent standard of living.  
It is aimed at the fulfillment of the U.N.’s fundamental task to ensure 
that poor individuals and societies are not excluded from the 
beneficiaries of globalization:  “[t]he central challenge we face today 
is to ensure that globalization becomes a positive force for all the 
world’s people, instead of leaving billions of them behind in 
squalor.” 204   Thomas Pogge and Mitu Sengupta emphasize the 
important correlation between poverty and distributive inequality:  
increasing inequality has deprived the global poor of the 
opportunity to benefit from general economic growth.  Since income 
and wealth inequalities have risen, the global poor have been denied 
potential significant dividends of economic growth.205  
The right to development entitles individuals and societies to an 
equal access to basic resources and a fair distribution of benefits 
resulting from development.206  SDG 17 embodies requirements of 
institutional improvements in the area of global trade:  to 
“significantly increase the exports of developing countries, in 
 
 203 Pogge & Sengupta, supra note 1, at 90, 93-4. 
 204 U.N. Secretary-General, We the Peoples: The Role of United Nations in the 
21st Century 6 (2000), 
https://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/pdfs/We_The_Peoples.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/465Y-F3N3] [hereinafter We the Peoples]. 
 205 The poor’s share in global income amounts to only about 2%.  See Pogge & 
Sengupta, supra note 1, at 85-86, 94.  On the relationship between poverty and 
inequality, see also Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extreme 
poverty and human rights, Philip Alston, Twenty-Ninth Session, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/29/31 (2015).  For an analysis of SDGs’ potential to reduce inequality, see 
Michael W. Doyle & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Eliminating Extreme Inequality: A Sustainable 
Development Goal, 2015-2030, 28 ETHICS INT. AFF. 5 (2014); Inga T. Winkler & 
Margaret L. Satterthwaite, Leaving No One Behind? Persistent Inequalities in the SDGs, 
Special Issue: The Sustainable Development Goals and Human Rights: A Critical Early 
Review, 21 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 1073 (2017); Ignacio Saiz & Kate Donald, Tackling 
Inequality through the Sustainable Development Goals: Human Rights in Practice, 21 
INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 1029 (2017); Gillian MacNaughton, Vertical Inequalities: Are the 
SDGs and Human Rights up to the Challenges?, 21 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 1050 (2017); PETER 
A.G. VAN BERGEIJK & ROLPH VAN DER HOEVEN, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS 
AND INCOME INEQUALITY (2017). 
 206 DRD, supra note 21, arts. 2, 8. 
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particular with a view to doubling the least developed countries’ 
share of global exports by 2020”;207 and to provide a “duty-free and 
quota-free market access on a lasting basis for all least developed 
countries.”208   
In addition, the 2030 Agenda incorporates requirements to, first, 
“create sound policy frameworks at the national, regional and 
international levels, based on pro-poor and gender-sensitive 
development strategies, to support accelerated investment in 
poverty eradication actions”; 209  and second, “ensure significant 
mobilization of resources from a variety of sources, including 
through enhanced development cooperation, in order to provide 
adequate and predictable means for developing countries, in 
particular least developed countries, to implement programmes and 
policies to end poverty in all its dimensions.”210 
As shown, apart from obligations of relational justice, the 2030 
Agenda presupposes obligations of distributive justice aimed at 
alleviating extreme distributive inequality (see above) as well as at 
ensuring a decent and sustainable standard of living universally.  
The latter obligations are analyzed in further detail in the next 
Section.   
C. Obligations to Ensure a Decent and Sustainable Standard of Living 
Universally 
The internationally recognized right to an adequate standard of 
living is aimed at protecting individuals from extreme poverty, 
enabling them to lead a decent life, ensuring their involvement in 
society and access to shared material and intellectual values, and, in 
the final analysis, providing the opportunity for their moral and 
intellectual flourishing. 211   The human right to an adequate, or 
 
 207 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, SDG 17.11. 
 208 Id. SDG 17.12. 
 209 Id. SDG 1, 1.b. 
 210 Id. SDG 1, 1.a. 
 211  For more details, see Elena Pribytkova, The Human Right to a Dignified 
Existence: The Ethical Foundations of the Contemporary Legal Order, in 137 ARCHIV FÜR 
RECHTS- UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE, HUMAN DIGNITY AS A FOUNDATION OF LAW 117 
(Winfred Brugger & Stephan Kirste eds., 2013). 
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decent, standard of living,212 is embedded in the International Bill of 
Human Rights.  The UDHR acknowledges that “everyone has the 
right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being 
of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and 
medical care and necessary social services.” 213   The ICESCR 
reaffirmed both “the right of everyone to an adequate standard of 
living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing 
and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living 
conditions” and the corresponding states’ obligation to “take 
appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right, recognizing 
to this effect the essential importance of international co-operation 
based on free consent.”214  The ICESCR also enshrines “the right of 
everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of 
physical and mental health.”215  Various components of the right to 
a decent standard of living are also anchored in the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (hereinafter CRC), the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities (hereinafter CRPD), and the Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (hereinafter 
CEDAW).216  
 
 212  The right to an adequate standard of living and the right to a decent 
standard of living are interpreted as synonyms. 
 213 UDHR, supra note 171, art. 25, para. 1. 
 214 ICESCR, supra note 171, art. 11, para. 1.  The ICESCR places emphasis on 
the necessity to cooperate internationally for the realization of “the fundamental 
right of everyone to be free from hunger” as the core element of the right to an 
adequate food.  In particular, it requires to “ensure an equitable distribution of 
world food supplies in relation to need.”  Id. art. 11, para. 2.  
 215 Id. art. 12, para. 1. 
 216 See supra notes 217-25.  The right to a decent standard of living and its 
components are also recognized in regional human rights systems.  See Council of 
Europe, European Social Charter, ETS 163, arts. 4, 13 (May 3, 1996); European Union, 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2012/C 326/02, art. 34 (Oct. 26, 
2012); Organization of American States, Additional Protocol to the American 
Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, arts. 
6-7, 9, 12, 15 (Nov. 16, 1999). 
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The core components of the composite right to a decent standard 
of living embrace the right to adequate food, 217  water, 218 
sanitation,219 housing,220 clothing,221 and health.222  Additionally, the 
right to a decent standard of living is often considered to include the 
following supplementary elements:  the rights to transportation, 
energy, and communications technology223 as well as the right to 
social services224 and the right to the continuous improvement of 
living conditions.225 
It is important to note that international law initially proceeded 
from the premise that the right to a decent standard of living should 
be realized not only locally but also globally, and that not only the 
state, but the international community as a whole, bears obligations 
corresponding to the right.226 
In the same vein, the 2030 Agenda stipulates that “a world free of 
poverty, hunger, disease and want, where all life can thrive” is a 
primary goal of the contemporary globalized world.227  It states a 
commitment not only “to end poverty and hunger, in all their forms 
 
 217  UDHR, supra note 171, art. 25, para. 1; ICESCR, supra note 171, art. 11, para 
1; G.A. Res. 44/25, Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 27, para. 3 (Nov. 20, 
1989) [hereinafter CRC]; G.A. Res. 61/106, Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities, art. 28, para. 1 (Jan 24, 2007) [hereinafter CRPD]. 
 218  CRPD, supra note 217, art. 28, para. 2; G.A. Res. 34/180, Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, art. 14, para. 2 (Dec. 
18, 1979) [hereinafter CEDAW]. 
 219 CEDAW, supra note 218, art. 14, para 2. 
 220 UDHR, supra note 171, art. 25, para. 1; ICESCR, supra note 171, art. 11, para 
1; CRC, supra note 217, art. 27, para 3; CRPD, supra note 217, art. 28, para 1; CEDAW, 
supra note 218, art. 14, para 2. 
 221 UDHR, supra note 171, art. 25, para. 1; ICESCR, supra note 171, art. 11, para 
1; CRC, supra note 217, art. 27, para 3; CRPD, supra note 217, art. 28, para 1. 
 222 UDHR, supra note 171, art. 25, para. 1; ICESCR, supra note 171, art. 12, para. 
1; CRC, supra note 217, art. 24, para. 1; CRPD, supra note 217, art. 25; CEDAW, supra 
note 218, art. 12, para. 1. 
 223 CEDAW, supra note 218, art. 14, para 2. 
 224 UDHR, supra note 171, art. 25, para. 1; CRPD, supra note 217, art. 28, para. 
2. 
 225 ICESCR, supra note 171, art. 11, para 1; CRPD, supra note 217, art. 28, para 
1.  Being one of the least explored human rights, the right to the continuous 
improvement of living conditions requires a careful analysis, which is beyond the 
scope of this Article. 
 226 UDHR, supra note 171, art. 22; ICESCR, supra note 171, art. 2, para. 1, art. 
11, para. 1. 
 227 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, para. 7. 
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and dimensions,” but also “to ensure that all human beings can fulfil 
their potential in dignity and equality and in a healthy environment.”228  
The SDGs separately and in their entirety are aimed to ensure that 
all individuals around the world, especially the most vulnerable, 
enjoy an opportunity to “lead decent, dignified and rewarding lives and 
to achieve their full human potential.”229 
The principle of sustainability requires that the enjoyment of the 
right to a decent standard of living by the current generation not 
prevent future generations from having secure access to the object 
of this right.  The 2030 Agenda expresses a commitment to “making 
fundamental changes in the way that our societies produce and 
consume goods and services.”230  It emphasizes that multiple actors 
bear shared commitments to “contribute to changing unsustainable 
consumption and production patterns.”231  As shown in Section II.C, 
promoting sustainable consumption is important for the realization 
of socio-economic rights.  The CESCR has adopted the criterion of 
sustainability as an essential dimension of the principle of 
adequacy.232 
There are several important aspects of the guarantees of freedom 
from poverty and a decent standard of living that are not fully set 
forth in the 2030 Agenda.  First, the definition of poverty employed 
by the 2030 Agenda is itself highly contested (see below).  Second, as 
demonstrated above in Section II.B, guarantees relating to poverty 
alleviation and securing components of an adequate standard of 
living appear to be not human rights obligations, but rather 
beneficence commitments.  Third, sustainable development 
commitments are extremely minimalistic or “thin” and designed to 
ensure a “basic standard of living” rather than a decent standard of 
 
 228 Id. pmbl. (emphasis added). 
 229 Id. para. 50 (emphasis added). 
 230 Id. para. 28. 
 231 Id. para. 28, SDG 12. 
 232 See, e.g., U.N. CESCR, General Comment No. 4: The Right to Adequate Housing, 
U.N. Doc. E/1992/23, para. 8 (Dec. 13, 1991) [hereinafter CESCR General Comment 
No. 4]; U.N. CESCR, General Comment No. 12: The Right to Adequate Food, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/1999/5, para. 7 (May. 12, 1999) [hereinafter CESCR General Comment No. 
12]; U.N. CESCR, General Comment No. 15: The Right to Water, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/2002/11, para. 11 (Jan. 20, 2003) [hereinafter CESCR General Comment No. 
15]. 
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living.233  The latter is not aimed at enabling a dignified life, but the 
mere survival of individuals.  In this sense, it is not surprising that 
SDG 1 proclaims poverty eradication, but not the promotion of a 
“decent,” “dignified,” or “rewarding” life, to be a fundamental goal 
of sustainable development.  This position is contrary to the 
fundamental intention of the 2030 Agenda declared in its preamble.  
Fourth, the SDGs are often believed to ensure minimum core 
obligations corresponding to the right to an adequate standard of 
living (and its particular elements) formulated by the CESCR.234  
However, as mentioned above in Section II.B, the 2030 Agenda deals 
predominantly with progressive commitments and, therefore, does 
not guarantee the immediate realization of minimum core 
obligations.  Fifth, a commitment to “end poverty in all its forms 
everywhere” is interpreted as a global obligation to enable states to 
implement their territorial obligations rather than to change an 
international institutional design.  The sixth deficient feature is 
connected with this:  the 2030 Agenda presumes developing 
countries’ leadership and “ownership of development priorities”235 
and encourages creating national and regional indicators for 
assessing the progressive realization of the SDGs,236 but it does not 
mandate a certain universal minimum standard of a decent life, nor 
a social protection floor, worldwide. 237   This Section further 
examines these aspects in more detail.   
The SDGs have inherited the World Bank’s definition of extreme 
poverty, used earlier by the MDGs, and determined the poor as 
those having less than $1.25 of purchasing power parity (PPP).  SDG 
1 has the objective to:  “by 2030, eradicate extreme poverty for all 
people everywhere, currently measured as people living on less 
than $1.25 a day”; 238  and “by 2030, reduce at least by half the 
proportion of men, women and children of all ages living in poverty 
 
 233 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, para. 24. 
 234 Regarding the MDGs, this position is expressed by Alston.  See Alston, 
supra note 78, at para. 164. 
 235 See infra Section IV.B. 
 236 See infra Section IV.C. 
 237 SDG 1 does not imply a commitment to ensure a universal social protection 
floor, but merely the call for territorial social protection systems.  See Pogge & 
Sengupta, supra note 1, at 89. 
 238 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, SDG 1.1. 
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in all its dimensions according to national definitions.” 239   This 
poverty definition provoked a lot of criticism from lawyers, 
economists, sociologists, philosophers, and politicians.240  They have 
contested it for several interconnected reasons:  (1) it is ill-defined 
and excludes millions of the poor; (2) it contradicts fundamental 
moral and legal duties; (3) it does not take into account individuals’ 
abilities to convert income into guarantees indispensable for leading 
a decent life; and (4) it serves the interests of developed states and 
powerful non-state actors, rather than those in poverty.  The 
following subsections will provide a more detailed analysis of these 
points of critique.   
(1) Many researchers and practitioners criticize the SDGs’ metric 
for poverty for being arbitrary and based on the “absurdly low” 
purchasing power of $1.25.241  Measuring extreme poverty at this 
extremely low level disregards millions of the poor that do not enjoy 
a minimally decent standard of living in developing countries as 
well as those living below absolute national poverty thresholds in 
developed states.242   As shown above in Section II.A, the MDGs 
focused exclusively on developing countries and therefore 
disregarded the fate of the poor from developed states.  Due to its 
extremely narrow definition of extreme poverty, the 2030 Agenda 
cannot match its fundamental goal of universal poverty eradication.  
Implementing this goal without “leaving anyone behind” requires 
the recognition of guarantees of the universal social protection floor 
which embodies criteria of adequacy (see below). 
(2) The 2030 Agenda has also been rightly criticized for allowing 
an unacceptable postponement of the implementation of moral and 
legal duties that should instead be fulfilled immediately.  Modern 
theories of justice underpin the shared moral obligation of members 
of the international community to eradicate extreme poverty as 
quickly as possible. 243   Although the ICESCR applies the 
 
 239 Id. SDG 1.2. 
 240 See, i.e., DEBATES ON THE MEASUREMENT OF GLOBAL POVERTY (Sudhir Anand 
et al. eds., 2010); POGGE, supra note 14; Amartya Sen, Capability and Well-Being, in 
THE QUALITY OF LIFE 41 (Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993). 
 241 Pogge & Sengupta, supra note 1, at 95. 
 242 See supra Section II.A. 
 243 See, e.g., POGGE, supra note 94; TAN, supra note 159; Singer, supra note 159; 
UNGER, supra note 159; CANEY, supra note 159; NUSSBAUM, supra note 159; Arneson, 
supra note 159. 
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“progressive realization” clause in relation to socio-economic 
rights,244 the CESCR stresses that “minimum core obligations” to 
secure access to essential foodstuffs, drinking water, basic 
sanitation, primary health care, and basic shelter are of an 
immediate character.  That is, they should be implemented by states 
as a matter of priority and regardless of resources at their disposal.245  
States’ inability to fulfill their minimum core obligations with their 
maximum available resources246 gives rise to global obligations of 
the international community.247   
By setting the goals of eradicating extreme poverty,248 ending 
malnutrition,249 ensuring access to drinking water and sanitation,250 
ending preventable deaths of newborns and children under five, 
ending the epidemics of AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, 251  and 
ensuring “access for all to adequate, safe and affordable housing and 
basic services and upgrade slums” only by 2030,252 the 2030 Agenda 
permits preventable poverty-related deaths as well as severe socio-
 
 244 ICESCR, supra note 171, art. 2. 
 245  See U.N. CESCR, General Comment No. 3: The Nature of States Parties' 
Obligations, U.N. Doc. E/1991/23 (Dec. 14, 1990) [hereinafter CESCR General 
Comment No. 3]; CESCR General Comment No. 12, supra note 232; U.N. CESCR, 
General Comment No. 13: The Right to Education, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/10 (Dec. 8, 
1999); U.N. CESCR, General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable 
Standard of Health, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000) [hereinafter CESCR 
General Comment No. 14]; CESCR General Comment No. 15, supra note 232; U.N. 
CESCR, General Comment No. 17: The Right of Everyone to Benefit from the Protection of 
the Moral and Material Interests Resulting from any Scientific, Literary or Artistic 
Production of Which He or She is the Author, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/17 (Jan. 12, 2006) 
[hereinafter CESCR General Comment No. 17]; U.N. CESCR, General Comment No. 18: 
The Right to Work, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/18 (Feb. 6, 2006) [hereinafter CESCR 
General Comment No. 18]; U.N. CESCR, General Comment No. 19: The right to social 
security, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/19 (Feb. 4, 2008) [hereinafter CESCR General 
Comment No. 19]; U.N. CESCR, General Comment No. 21: Right of everyone to take part 
in cultural life, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/21 (Dec. 21, 2009). 
 246  For a critique of the “maximum available resources” clause, see 
Pribytkova, supra note 3, at 292-296. 
 247 See UDHR, supra note 171, art. 22; ICESCR, supra note 171, art. 2, para. 1, 
art. 11, para. 1; CRC, supra note 217, art. 4; see also Vienna Declaration, supra note 2, 
art. 14 (reaffirming that the obligations of the international community to alleviate 
poverty are high priority and immediate obligations). 
 248 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, SDG 1. 
 249 Id. SDG 2. 
 250 Id. SDG 6. 
 251 Id. SDG 3. 
 252 Id. SDG 11. 
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economic deprivations over the next ten years.253  This contradicts 
requirements of both morality and law.  In this regard, the 2030 
Agenda politically justifies the violation of fundamental human 
rights by states and other members of the international community.  
Thomas Pogge and Mitu Sengupta notice that during the fifteen-
year period of the implementation of MDGs, which also allowed for 
the progressive realization of urgent duties to eradicate poverty, 
about 450 million people died from poverty-related causes, which is 
seven times more than the number of those killed during World War 
II.254   The contemporary sustainable development agenda should 
not allow the repetition of this practice. 
Against this background, the sustainable development agenda, 
which embodies a human rights-based approach to development, 
should recognize commitments to eradicate extreme poverty and to 
ensure secure access to (the core components of) a decent standard 
of living as human rights obligations of immediate nature.  The 
acknowledgment of the immediacy of these obligations for 
sustainable development will limit global actors’ discretion to 
decide when to fulfill them.  This does not contradict the nature of 
the sustainable development agenda which already embodies, as to 
certain matters, immediate commitments for sustainable 
development.  An example may be found in SDG 8, which requires 
taking “immediate and effective measures to eradicate forced labour, 
end modern slavery and human trafficking and secure the 
prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labour, 
including recruitment and use of child soldiers.”255 
(3) The 2030 Agenda’s income-based poverty definition appears 
to be insensitive to difficulties of converting income into a minimally 
 
 253 The same argument can be applied to SDG 10, which has the target to “by 
2030, progressively achieve and sustain income growth of the bottom 40 per cent of 
the population at a rate higher than the national average” (10.1) and allows the 
income share of the worst-off to decline within the next decade.  See Pogge & 
Sengupta, supra note 1, at 93. 
 254   Id. at 85.  Pogge and Sengupta also argue that “if we do regard the 
eradication of undernourishment and other severe deprivations as a goal to be 
slowly approached over several lengthy development goal cycles, thereby 
accepting hundreds of millions of poverty-related deaths and deprivations in the 
interim, then we are in effect denying that there is a human right to life, a human 
right to an adequate standard of living, a human right to be free of hunger.”  Id. at 
87. 
 255 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, SDG 8.7 (emphasis added). 
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acceptable standard of living.  The pioneers of the capabilities 
approach, Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, highlight the 
argument that the relations between actual opportunities of people 
and means at their disposal are variable.  For instance, Sen points to 
subjective and objective factors, which generate inequalities in 
individuals’ socio-economic positions even if they possess the same 
quantitative amount of income or any other resource.  These factors 
include individuals’ physical or mental features, such as sex, age, 
health, and disabilities; non-personal resources, including an 
infrastructure, a health care system, and community cohesion; 
environmental conditions, such as climate, epidemics, and crime 
rates; as well as resources required to enjoy relational equality, in 
particular “to appear in public without shame” (as posited by Adam 
Smith).256 
Sen maintains that “the conversion of income into basic 
capabilities may vary greatly between individuals and also between 
different societies, so that the ability to reach minimally acceptable 
levels of basic capabilities can go with varying levels of minimally 
adequate incomes.”257  Following the capabilities approach, Arjun 
Sengupta suggests that development programs and projects should 
be directed not only against income poverty, but also against 
capability poverty as well.258  In light of the capabilities approach, 
the sustainable development agenda should take into account the 
fact that individual and social factors that affect the financial and 
social state of individuals and societies, as well as their ability to 
convert income and other resources into valuable opportunities, are 
of crucial importance for determining both the measure of poverty 
and the scope of social and global guarantees indispensable for the 
enjoyment of a decent standard of living.259 
(4) The definition of poverty inherited by the 2030 Agenda from 
the MDGs serves the interests of developed states and other 
 
 256 Amartya Sen, Human Rights and Capabilities, 6 J. HUM. DEV. 151, 154 (2005). 
 257 Sen, supra note 240, at 41; see also MARTHA NUSSBAUM, WOMAN AND HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH 68 (2000). 
 258  Sengupta, supra note 98, at para. 12. 
 259 Amartya Sen delivered a series of lectures at the World Bank that were 
later published as a book entitled Development as Freedom (1999).  In spite of this, his 
ideas were not reflected in the World Bank’s income-based formulation of extreme 
poverty. 
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powerful global actors rather than the existential needs of the 
poor.260 
As noted above, Global South countries actively opposed the 
World Bank’s definition of poverty being integrated into the global 
development agenda.  For instance, the G-77 coalition of developing 
states considered that each country should develop its own 
definition and criteria of poverty as well as determine their own 
targets and timeframe for poverty eradication.261  That is why they 
rejected attempts to formulate a universal quantifiable definition of 
poverty as part of the global development agenda, in particular its 
inclusion in the action plan of the World Summit for Social 
Development held in March 1995 in Copenhagen.262  According to 
developing countries, the intention to formulate a universal 
definition of poverty stood in tension with the principles of priority 
of national responsibility for poverty eradication as well as 
developing societies’ leadership and ownership in designing, 
implementing and assessing the effectiveness of their development 
programs.  Despite this opposition from developing states, the 
OECD “donor club” issued the document Shaping the 21st Century: 
The Contribution of Development Co-operation (1996), which contained 
six international development goals263 applying the World Bank’s 
standard—“$370 per capita in annual income, or about $1 per 
day”—as the extreme poverty threshold. 264   The report A Better 
World for All (2000) produced by the U.N., the World Bank, the IMF, 
and the OECD, which presented international development goals 
reflecting the World Bank’s extreme poverty definition, had been 
met with strong criticism by representatives of global civil society.265  
 
 260  Seyedsayamdost comes to this conclusion regarding the MDGs and 
considers that the “global development agenda was initially a construct of the 
donor community.”  SEYEDSAYAMDOST, supra note 13, at 48f, 150.  This gives grounds 
for arguing that a commitment to reduce poverty was concurrently, in part, a 
political instrument for developed states to exercise their control over the national 
policies of developing countries.  See Eade, supra note 15, at 630; Shah, supra note 
15; Frankovits, supra note 9, at 123-124. 
 261 See SEYEDSAYAMDOST, supra note 13, at 162. 
 262 As Seyedsayamdost notes, the “donor club” states came back from the 
Copenhagen World Summit “frustrated and angry.”  SEYEDSAYAMDOST, supra note 
13, at 162-163. 
 263 See supra Section II.A. 
 264 See SHAPING THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 37, at 9. 
 265 See SEYEDSAYAMDOST, supra note 13, at 179f. 
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Nevertheless, just several months later, the OECD international 
development goals and the poverty threshold of $1.00 PPP (since 
2008—$1.25 PPP)266 were incorporated into the MDGs (along with a 
new MDG 8).267  A consensus on poverty definition documented by 
the MDGs was imposed by powerful actors and accepted by 
developing countries under the condition that the MDGs include a 
goal of global partnership, which, as shown above in Section II.A, 
appeared to be ineffective.  The 2030 Agenda inherited this 
controversy.  In this context, a combination of measures is necessary 
to solve it:  on the one hand, determining a universal social 
protection floor reflecting the principle of adequacy (see point 1 
above) and, on the other hand, taking into account national and 
regional absolute and relative poverty lines. 
The 2030 Agenda expresses the intention to ensure essential 
social, economic, and cultural guarantees that also constitute objects 
of basic socio-economic rights.268  This relates, in particular, to the 
core and supplementary components of the composite human right 
to a decent standard of living—the right to adequate food, water, 
sanitation, housing, health, transportation, energy, and information 
and communications technology.269  However, as shown above, the 
sustainable development commitments do not have the status of 
human rights obligations, are territorial rather than global, are 
progressive rather than immediate, and are minimalist, that is, 
aimed at securing an access not to a decent, but rather to a “basic” 
standard of living.  In addition, although the SDGs refer to general—
availability, accessibility, acceptability, and quality (AAAQ)270—and 
 
 266 In October 2015, the global poverty line was updated by the World Bank 
to $1.90 a day.  FAQs: Global Poverty Line Update, WORLD BANK, 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/brief/global-poverty-line-faq 
[https://perma.cc/XVH5-XTTK]. 
 267 See SEYEDSAYAMDOST, supra note 13, at 146-49, 207. 
 268 On the MDGs, see Alston, supra note 78, para. 48; see also Nankani et al., 
Human Rights and Poverty Reduction Strategies: Moving Towards Convergence?, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT: TOWARDS MUTUAL REINFORCEMENT 475 (Philip 
Alston & Mary Robinson eds., 2005); CLAPHAM, supra note 78, at 86-87. 
 269 The 2030 Agenda does not address guarantees of adequate clothing.  That 
is a task required for the further evolution of the sustainable development agenda. 
 270 The 2030 Agenda does not explicitly refer to the criterion of acceptability.  It 
does, however, embody the principle of respect of the cultural diversity of 
individuals and societies (paras. 8, 36) that can serve as the basis for the requirement 
to ensure that guarantees of various components of the adequate standard of living 
are culturally acceptable to individuals. 
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specific—nutritiousness, habitability, safety, sufficiency, etc.—
criteria of adequacy there is no consistency in their use throughout 
the 2030 Agenda.  To elaborate these points, I will briefly discuss 
some of the most important elements of a “basic standard of living” 
promoted by the SDGs. 
SDG 2—to end hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition, 
and promote sustainable agriculture—is designed to provide secure 
access to food that, obviously, is an object of the right to adequate 
food.271  Its aim is, by 2030, to “end hunger and ensure access by all 
people, in particular the poor and people in vulnerable situations, 
including infants, to safe, nutritious and sufficient food all year 
round”;272 and “end all forms of malnutrition, including achieving, 
by 2025, the internationally agreed targets on stunting and wasting 
in children under 5 years of age.”273  In addition to these territorial 
obligations, SDG 2 also comprises global distributive justice 
commitments:  first, an interactional commitment to increase 
investment in rural infrastructure and technology in developing 
states to enhance their agricultural productivity;274 and second, an 
institutional commitment to “correct and prevent trade restrictions 
and distortions in world agricultural markets.”275 
Concordant with international human rights instruments, the 
2030 Agenda states that ending hunger and achieving food security 
is a matter of priority. 276   SDG 2, however, enshrines solely 
progressive obligations, which, as shown above, deviates from 
international human rights law.  SDG 2 codifies only the criteria of 
safety, nutritiousness, and sufficiency, 277  corresponding to 
characteristics of adequate food proposed by CESCR General 
 
 271 See the definition of the right to food provided by Jean Ziegler, the U.N. 
Special Rapporteur on the right to food, at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Food/Pages/FoodIndex.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/P4K3-TL5W].  For critique of the 2030 Agenda’s avoidance to 
recognize the right to food, see Vivero Pol & Schuftan, supra note 11. 
 272 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, SDG 2.1 (emphasis added). 
 273 Id. SDG 2.2. 
 274 Id. SDG 2.a. 
 275 Id. SDG 2.b. 
 276  The 2030 Agenda “welcomes” the Rome Declaration on Nutrition and the 
Framework for Action.  Id. para. 24. 
 277 The 2030 Agenda expresses a commitment to ensure that “food is sufficient, 
safe, affordable and nutritious.”  Id. para. 7. 
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Comment No. 12.278  Nevertheless, the interactional and institutional 
commitments of SDG 2 to end hunger and ensure universal access 
to food implicitly rely on some core components of adequacy—
availability, economic and physical accessibility, and quality, 279 
while ignoring the criterion of cultural or consumer acceptability.280  
In addition, the 2030 Agenda demands that development 
commitments concerning food envisioned by SDG 2 satisfy the 
criterion of sustainability.281 
The 2030 Agenda reaffirms “commitments regarding the human 
right to safe drinking water and sanitation” as well as guarantees of 
“improved hygiene.”282  SDG 6—to ensure availability and sustainable 
management of water and sanitation for all—has common objects with 
the human rights to adequate water and sanitation.  It demands by 
2030 to “achieve universal and equitable access to safe and affordable 
drinking water for all” 283  and to improve the quality of water 
globally. 284   In addition, it requires by 2030 the achievement of 
“access to adequate and equitable sanitation and hygiene for all and [the 
end of] open defecation, paying special attention to the needs of 
women and girls and those in vulnerable situations.” 285   Global 
commitments on water and sanitation, embodied in SDG 6, do not 
concern extraterritorial, but territorial reforms, requiring only that 
“the participation of local communities in improving water and 
sanitation management” is ensured. 286   At the same time, they 
mandate obligations of development assistance—the promotion of 
“capacity-building support to developing countries in water- and 
sanitation-related activities and programmes, including water 
harvesting, desalination, water efficiency, wastewater treatment, 
 
 278 See CESCR General Comment No. 12, supra note 232, paras. 1-9. 
 279 Id. paras. 7-9, 12-13. 
 280 Id. para. 11. 
 281  2030 Agenda, supra note 4, SDG 2.4.  According to the CESCR, food 
sustainability is “intrinsically linked” to food adequacy and means the long-term 
availability and accessibility of nutritious food for both present and future 
generations.  See CESCR General Comment No. 12, supra note 232, para. 7. 
 282 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, para. 7. 
 283 Id. SDG 6.1 (emphasis added). 
 284 Id. SDG 6.3.  On SDG 6’s potential to regulate extraterritorial cooperation 
relating to water, see McIntyre, supra note 11. 
 285 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, SDG 6.2 (emphasis added). 
 286 Id. SDG 6.b. 
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recycling and reuse technologies.”287  The sustainable development 
commitments are exclusively progressive, which should be 
corrected with respect to the minimum core obligations 
corresponding to the rights to water and sanitation.288  According to 
the 2030 Agenda, these commitments should correspond to general 
and specific criteria of adequacy, i.e., availability, accessibility, 
acceptability, quality, safety, equitability, non-discrimination,289 and 
sustainability.290 
The 2030 Agenda enshrines a commitment to “achieve universal 
health coverage and access to quality health care”291 that overlaps 
with obligations corresponding to the human right to health.  SDG 
3—to ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages—
states an intention to “reduce the global maternal mortality ratio to 
less than 70 per 100,000 live births” by 2030; 292  and to “end 
preventable deaths of newborns and children under 5 years of age, 
with all countries aiming to reduce neonatal mortality to at least as 
low as 12 per 1,000 live births and under-5 mortality to at least as 
low as 25 per 1,000 live births.”293  SDG 3 is also notable because, in 
addition to territorial guarantees, it embodies global obligations to 
“support the research and development of vaccines and medicines 
for the communicable and non-communicable diseases that 
primarily affect developing countries,” and provide universal access 
to essential medicines and vaccines.294  It is remarkable, however, 
that this commitment does not specify a timeframe for its 
 
 287 Id. SDG 6.a.  
 288  See CESCR General Comment No. 15, supra note 232, para. 37.  On the 
interrelation between human rights obligations and sustainable development 
commitments corresponding to the right to sanitation, see OBANI, supra note 11. 
 289  CESCR General Comment No. 15 on the right to water determines 
general—availability, accessibility (physical accessibility, economic accessibility, 
non-discrimination, and information accessibility), acceptability, and quality 
(paras. 2, 12)—as well as specific—safety, equality, and dignity (paras. 2, 11-14)—
criteria of adequacy. 
 290 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, SDG 6.4.  Cf. CESCR General Comment No. 15 
emphasizes that “the manner of the realization of the right to water must also be 
sustainable, ensuring that the right can be realized for present and future 
generations.”  CESCR General Comment No. 15, supra note 232, para. 11. 
 291 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, para. 26. 
 292 Id. SDG 3.1. 
 293 Id. SDG 3.2. 
 294 Id. SDG 3.b. 
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achievement.  Again, international human rights law requires 
treating these commitments concerning essential health care as 
immediate obligations.295  CESCR General Comment No. 14 on the 
right to the highest attainable standard of health determines the 
criteria of adequacy—availability, accessibility (including non-
discrimination, physical accessibility, affordability, and information 
accessibility), acceptability, and quality296—which are implicitly and 
explicitly presupposed by SDG 3:  to “achieve universal health 
coverage, including financial risk protection, access to quality essential 
health-care services and access to safe, effective, quality and affordable 
essential medicines and vaccines for all.”297 
SDG 11—to make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, 
resilient, and sustainable—addresses the object of the right to 
adequate housing.  It demands, in particular, ensuring by 2030 
“access for all to adequate, safe and affordable housing and basic 
services and upgrade slums.” 298   Bringing these sustainable 
development commitments into sync with obligations 
corresponding to the right to adequate housing requires recognizing 
immediate core commitments to secure access to basic shelter.  The 
content and scope of this commitment should be determined on the 
basis of the criteria of adequacy—availability of services, materials, 
facilities, and infrastructure; accessibility; affordability; cultural 
adequacy; habitability; legal security of tenure; and location—
formulated by CESCR General Comment No. 4 on the right to 
adequate housing.299  The CESCR also assimilates the principle of 
sustainability and claims that “disadvantaged groups must be 
accorded full and sustainable access to adequate housing 
 
 295 CESCR General Comment No. 14, supra note 245, para. 43.  For a critique of 
SDG 3 from a human rights perspective, see Chapman, supra note 11; Williams & 
Hunt, supra note 11. 
 296 CESCR General Comment No. 14, supra note 245, para. 12. 
 297 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, SDG 3.8 (emphasis added). 
 298 Id. SDG 11.1 (emphasis added). 
 299 CESCR General Comment No. 4, supra note 232, para. 8.  The CESCR warns 
against narrow interpretations of the right to adequate housing as the right to “a 
roof over one’s head” and demands it to be treated as the “right to live somewhere 
in security, peace and dignity.”  Id. para. 7.  It follows the definition of adequate 
shelter suggested by the U.N.-Habitat and embodied in the Global Strategy for Shelter 
to the Year 2000: “adequate privacy, adequate space, adequate security, adequate 
lighting and ventilation, adequate basic infrastructure and adequate location with 
regard to work and basic facilities—all at a reasonable cost.”  Id. para. 5. 
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resources.”300  As we can see, some of these criteria of adequacy—
accessibility, affordability, sustainability, and safety—are explicitly 
expressed in SDG 11. 
The SDGs also incorporate other important obligations 
indispensable for securing a decent standard of living, that is, 
commitments to promote transportation, 301  energy, 302  as well as 
information and communications technology.303  The 2030 Agenda 
further reaffirms socio-economic commitments to ensure universal 
access to social protection304 and education.305 
Based on this analysis, it is possible to suggest several significant 
improvements to the contemporary sustainable development 
agenda relating to distributive commitments to eradicate poverty 
and secure a decent and sustainable standard of living.  First, the 
definition of poverty employed by the sustainable development 
agenda should be inclusive, human rights respective, capability-
sensitive and substantively pro-poor.  Second, according to a human 
rights-based approach, sustainable development commitments 
should not contradict—in content, scope and urgency of their 
implementation—obligations corresponding to the composite 
human right to a decent standard of living.306  In particular, third, 
consistent with the 2030 Agenda’s fundamental purpose to ensure 
individuals’ access to “decent, dignified and rewarding lives and to 
achieve their full human potential,” 307  the sustainable development 
agenda should recognize commitments to secure not only a “basic 
standard of living,” but also a decent standard of living.  Fourth, the 
sustainable development agenda should contain not only 
 
 300 The CESCR also demands that “all beneficiaries of the right to adequate 
housing should have sustainable access to natural and common resources, safe 
drinking water, energy for cooking, heating and lighting, sanitation and washing 
facilities, means of food storage, refuse disposal, site drainage and emergency 
services.”  CESCR General Comment No. 4, supra note 232, para. 8 (emphasis added). 
 301 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, SDG 11. 
 302 Id. SDG 7. 
 303 Id. SDG 4-5, 9, 17. 
 304 Id. SDG 1. 
 305 Id. SDG 4. 
 306  The Human Development Report 2000 explicates that socio-economic 
commitments concerning a decent standard of living represent not only 
development goals, but also human rights obligations for development.  See UNITED 
NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, supra note 165, at 8. 
 307 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, para. 50 (emphasis added). 
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progressive duties, but also immediate obligations, including the 
minimum core obligations corresponding to the composite right to 
a decent standard of living.  Fifth, the general and specific criteria of 
adequacy used by the 2030 Agenda should be synchronized with 
those suggested by the CESCR and other U.N. human rights treaty-
based bodies.  This will harmonize and enrich both the sustainable 
development agenda and the human rights agenda.  Sixth, global 
obligations for sustainable development should be directed not only 
to the territorial realization of the SDGs, but also to universally 
ensuring a certain minimum standard of a decent life.  Seventh, the 
sustainable development agenda should comprise not just 
interactional, but also institutional obligations of creating and 
maintaining a global institutional scheme indispensable for the 
realization of the right to a decent standard of living worldwide.308  
D. Summary 
This part addressed global obligations for sustainable 
development embedded in the 2030 Agenda.  Section III.A provided 
an overview of various types of global obligations for sustainable 
development, including global obligations of conduct (obligations 
of development cooperation and assistance) as well as global 
obligations of result (obligations to create and maintain a just and 
sustainable global order and obligations to ensure a decent and 
sustainable standard of living universally).  The subsequent Sections 
concentrated on global obligations of result.  Section III.B argued 
that institutional obligations for sustainable development should 
not be aimed solely at undertaking structural territorial 
improvements, but also at reforming a global institutional scheme.  
Obligations to create and maintain a just and sustainable global 
 
 308  As the Human Development Report 2000 specifies, human rights 
obligations for sustainable development correspond to “claims to a set of social 
arrangements—norms, institutions, laws, an enabling economic environment—that 
can best secure the enjoyment of these rights. It is thus the obligation of 
governments and others to implement policies to put these arrangements in place. 
And in today’s more interdependent world, it is essential to recognize the obligations 
of global actors, who in the pursuit of global justice must put in place global 
arrangements that promote the eradication of poverty.”  UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT 
PROGRAMME, supra note 165, at 73 (emphasis added). 
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order contain both duties of relational and distributive justice.  
Section III.C examined the nature, content, and scope of global 
distributive obligations to ensure a decent and sustainable standard 
of living universally.  It compared interpretations of these 
obligations provided by the CESCR and the 2030 Agenda and 
suggested ways to bring them into sync and to improve the 
contemporary sustainable development agenda.   
IV. GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
A. Cooperation as a Goal and a Means for Sustainable Development 
Obligations of international cooperation are a key element of 
global obligations for sustainable development.  They are justified 
for several reasons.  First, the SDGs, especially the goals relating to 
global poverty eradication and guarantees of a decent standard of 
living,309 cannot be effectively addressed by dissociated actors.  The 
2030 Agenda affirms that “we will not be able to achieve our 
ambitious Goals and targets without a revitalized and enhanced 
Global Partnership and comparably ambitious means of 
implementation.”310   
The goal of global partnership is part and parcel of the intention 
to reshape an unjust global institutional design and eliminate the 
negative consequences of globalization, the costs and benefits of 
which are distributed unfairly.  The most powerful actors framing 
the existing global order benefit disproportionately from it and 
impose the global institutional scheme on the less powerful.311  That 
 
 309 See supra Sections III.B-III.C. 
 310 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, para. 60; see also Sengupta, supra note 98, para. 
42; SACHS ET AL., supra note 12. 
 311 See SALOMON, supra note 10, at 1, 45-46; POGGE, supra note 94, at 118-122; 
TAN, supra note 159, 29-35; EASTERLY, supra note 12.  The World Commission on the 
Social Dimension of Globalization (ILO) emphasized that “the weaknesses in global 
governance have contributed to the uneven social and economic impact of 
globalization.  There are two main channels through which this has happened.  The 
first is the creation of a system of rules governing the global economy that has been 
prejudicial to the interests of most developing countries, especially the poor within 
them.  The second is the failure to put in place a coherent set of international 
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institutional scheme unduly increases poverty, extreme inequality, 
and the marginalization of developing societies, violating basic 
human rights and preventing individuals’ access to a decent 
standard of living.  A global domain characterized by the 
domination of affluent actors is similar to the state of nature 
described by Thomas Hobbes, in which the rules of natural selection 
prevail and the strongest survive. 312   Some experts emphasize a 
special responsibility of powerful actors to improve contemporary 
global order.313  I would like to suggest that, since the current global 
institutional scheme is a product of interaction among various—
dominant and dominated—global actors, all these actors share 
obligations to reform it.314   
States have recognized their obligations to cooperate through 
joining the United Nations315  and ratifying the core international 
instruments.  According to the UDHR, the ICESCR, and the CRC, 
the obligations to cooperate derive from and correspond to socio-
economic rights. 316   The CESCR specifies global obligations to 
cooperate correlating to the core components of the right to an 
adequate standard of living (the rights to adequate food, water, 
sanitation, housing, and health).317  In addition, some commentators 
consider international obligations to cooperate to be a part of 
customary international law.318   
The DRD recognizes states’ “duty to co-operate with each other 
in ensuring development and eliminating obstacles to 
 
economic and social policies to achieve a pattern of globalization that benefits all 
people.”  INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, A FAIR GLOBALISATION: CREATING 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR ALL, para. 353 (2004). 
 312 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (1651). 
 313 See Pogge & Sengupta, supra note 1, at 93-94. 
 314  For instance, according to Gosepath, collective liability gives rise to 
institutional duties to cooperate.  See Gosepath, supra note 76, at 281. 
 315 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 1 UNTS XVI, arts. 1, 55-56 
(Jun. 26, 1945). 
 316 See UDHR, supra note 171, art. 22; ICESCR, supra note 171, art. 2, para. 1, 
art. 11, para. 1; CRC, supra note 217, art. 4. 
 317 See also CESCR General Comment No. 4, supra note 232, paras. 10, 13, 19; 
CESCR General Comment No. 12, supra note 232, paras. 36, 38, 40; CESCR General 
Comment No. 14, supra note 245, paras. 38, 40, 45, 63; CESCR General Comment No. 
15, supra note 232, paras. 30-38. 
 318 See Alston, supra note 78, para. 48; Alston, supra note 36, at 778; CLAPHAM, 
supra note 78, at 86-87. 
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development.”319  The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action 
extends the obligation to cooperate for the realization of the right to 
development to the whole “international community.”320   
The 2030 Agenda acknowledges obligations to cooperate as both 
a goal of and means for sustainable development.321  SDG 17 has the 
aim of “revitalize[ing] the global partnership for sustainable 
development” in several spheres, which involves universal, 
multilateral, rules-based, equitable and non-discriminatory 
cooperation in finance, 322  trade, 323  politics, 324  technology, 325 
developing accountability and monitoring processes, and 
development assistance.326   The 2030 Agenda also recognizes that 
global cooperation is an important instrument for a successful 
realization of the other sixteen SDGs.  In particular, the 2030 Agenda 
documents commitments to develop cooperation for the 
mobilization of resources and the increased investment that are 
important for reaching all SDGs.327   
A global partnership for sustainable development should 
embody several important principles: first, human rights-based 
cooperation; second, non-discriminatory participation of all public 
and private actors; third, human-centered cooperation; and, fourth, 
pro-poor cooperation in the spirit of global solidarity.  The rest of 
this Section examines these principles in more detail.   
(1) As demonstrated above in Section II.C, a human rights-based 
approach should be applied to the sustainable development agenda.  
What does this mean in terms of global partnership?  The latter 
should be guided by principles of individuals’ participation and 
empowerment, accountability, transparency, equality, and non-
 
 319 DRD, supra note 21, art. 3, para. 3.  
 320 Vienna Declaration, supra note 2, para. 10. 
 321 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, para. 40. 
 322 Id. SDG 17.1, 17.3. 
 323 Id. SDG 17.10-17.12. 
 324 Id. SDG 17.13-17.14. 
 325 Id. SDG 17.6-17.8. 
 326  Id. SDG 17.2, 17.4-17.5.  For an analysis of obligations of development 
assistance, see infra Section IV.B. 
 327 See infra Section IV.B. 
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discrimination. 328   The application of a human rights-based 
approach entails that: (a) development cooperation programs, 
policies and processes in all their phases must respect and promote 
the realization of internationally recognized human rights and by no 
means contradict human rights standards; (b) development 
cooperation must enhance capacities of right-holders to claim their 
right to development and basic socio-economic rights and duty-
bearers to fulfill their obligations;329 (c) all stages of development 
cooperation must be monitored to ensure that human rights are not 
abused; (d) independent, objective, competent, and publicly 
accessible ex ante human rights impact assessments and human 
rights due diligence, with participation of all potential stakeholders, 
must be undertaken before introducing any development policies 
and programs;330 and (e) when human rights violations are found, 
corrective measures must be introduced, and responsible actors be 
held accountable.331  
(2) One of the main questions in respect of the global partnership 
for development is:  Who are the global partners?  Although human 
rights law proceeds from the assumption of the primacy of states’ 
obligations in the area of socio-economic rights, it recognizes that 
obligations to cooperate also bind other actors, such as individuals, 
intergovernmental organizations and non-state entities.  According 
to the UDHR, not only states, but also “every individual and every 
organ of society” should strive to promote respect for human rights 
 
 328 Sengupta, supra note 98, para. 22; see also Patrick van Weerelt, А Human 
Rights-Based Approach to Development Programming in UNDP—Adding the Missing 




 329 United Nations Development Group, The Human Rights Based Approach to 
Development Cooperation: Towards a Common Understanding Among the UN Agencies 
(Sept. 2003), https://unsdg.un.org/resources/human-rights-based-approach-
development-cooperation-towards-common-understanding-among-un 
[https://perma.cc/E2B7-9QFN] [hereinafter The Human Rights Based Approach 
to Development Cooperation]. 
 330  See, e.g., Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, supra note 182, para. 105(b). 
 331  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
Frequently Asked Questions on a Human Rights-Based Approach to Development 
Cooperation (2006), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FAQen.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/392G-HSC8]. 
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and to “secure their universal and effective recognition and 
observance” through progressive national and international 
measures.332   Although the ICESCR acknowledges only states as 
bearers of obligations to cooperate, the CESCR extends these 
obligations to other entities, both intergovernmental organizations 
and non-state actors.333 
It is true that the 2030 Agenda and the DRD—like the human 
rights agenda—recognize states’ “primary responsibility” for 
implementing the SDGs.  Yet, at the same time, the sustainable 
development agenda has significant potential for overcoming state-
centrism.  Thus, the DRD acknowledges individual and collective 
obligations of all people and entities.  In particular, it stresses 
obligations of individuals for sustainable development:  
 
All human beings have a responsibility for development, 
individually and collectively, taking into account the need for full 
respect for their human rights and fundamental freedoms as well 
as their duties to the community, which alone can ensure the free 
and complete fulfillment of the human being, and they should 
therefore promote and protect an appropriate political, social and 
economic order for development.334 
 
The 2030 Agenda calls for developing effective multi-stakeholder 
public (especially North-South, South-South and triangular regional 
and international cooperation), public-private and civil society 
partnerships. 335   The inclusive global partnership for sustainable 
development should be based on the rule of leaving no one behind and 
 
 332 UDHR, supra note 171, pmbl.; see also Vienna Declaration, supra note 2, para. 
13; Declaration on the Right and Responsibility, supra note 166, art. 18, para. 3; 
CRPD, supra note 217, art. 32, para. 1.  For an analysis of global human rights 
obligations of multiple actors, see Pribytkova, supra note 144, at 412-424. 
 333 See CESCR General Comment No. 12, supra note 232, paras. 36, 38, 40; CESCR 
General Comment No. 14, supra note 245, paras. 45, 63; CESCR General Comment No. 
15, supra note 232, para. 38; CESCR General Comment No. 17, supra note 245, paras. 
61, 82; CESCR General Comment No. 18, supra note 245, para. 53; CESCR General 
Comment No. 19, supra note 245, para. 61. 
 334 DRD, supra note 21, art. 2, para. 2. 
 335 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, SDG 17, 17.16-17.17. 
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require equal, non-discriminatory, and adequate representation and 
cooperation of “all countries, all stakeholders and all people.”336 
According to Arjun Sengupta’s apt insight, the universality of 
the sustainable development agenda means not only that it is 
applicable world-wide but also that it binds all members of the 
international community.  He also defends an idea that 
development goals are “absolute,” i.e., all duty-holders should 
strive to reach them to the best of their capacity regardless of other 
actors’ degree of success in implementing their obligations.337 
Relevant actors should be guaranteed not just “formal” or 
“nominal” but full-fledged participation in the process of 
sustainable development.  This calls for correcting innumerable 
asymmetries in global governance, democratizing global 
institutions, and strengthening the role of Global South countries in 
core international organizations, especially international financial 
organizations such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO.338  
Developing states should not only enjoy an opportunity to 
participate fully, but also to play a key role in agenda-setting and 
problem-solving processes concerning their own and global 
development.  In other words, they should be recognized as agents 
of development capable of taking part in and contributing to the 
realization of shared global obligations for sustainable 
development.  In this sense, it is necessary to rethink the role of each 
developing society not only in lifting itself out of poverty, but also 
in the process of global poverty eradication.339  
The 2030 Agenda is rightly criticized for not specifying the global 
obligations of various actors. 340   For instance, Pogge and Mitu 
Sengupta assert that the 2030 Agenda, and especially SDG 17, has 
inherited a “key defect” of MDG 8 to the extent it does not attribute 
 
 336 Id. pmbl.  Cf. id. para. 41. 
 337 Sengupta, supra note 98, paras. 18, 24. 
 338 The 2030 Agenda stresses the important mission of the U.N. system and the 
international financial institutions in facilitating an intensive global engagement of 
academia, philanthropic organizations, and volunteer groups.  See also SALOMON, 
supra note 10, at 46. 
 339 In this context, developing societies possess a right to perform their duties 
for sustainable development.  See Study on the Current State of Progress in the 
Implementation of the Right to Development, supra note 147, para. 53. 
 340  For example, Alston points out that commitments to cooperate are 
“generic” and attached to the “undifferentiated international community.”  See 
Alston, supra note 36, at 777. 
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interactional and institutional obligations to concrete duty-bearers 
and, in particular, “shields” powerful global actors from concrete 
duties. 341   In this sense, an important step in advancing the 
contemporary sustainable development agenda is to specify and 
allocate global obligations to concrete actors, including powerful 
public and private actors and developing states.  At the same time, 
the distribution of global obligations should be fair and the tasks for 
developing countries and societies should be feasible.342 
(3) Cooperation for sustainable development should be human-
centered, that is, individuals should be acknowledged as the ultimate 
goals and “key actors in their own development, rather than passive 
recipients of commodities and services.” 343   Embodying the 
principle of human-centricity, which sees an individual as the 
ultimate unit of both moral and legal concern,344 an absolute value 
and supreme goal of social, legal, political, economic, and cultural 
development at both local and global levels is a common objective 
of the human rights agenda and the sustainable development 
agenda. 
Article 1 of the UDHR acknowledges individuals as major right-
holders and proclaims that “[a]ll human beings are born free and 
equal in dignity and rights.”345  All members of the U.N. agree that 
“we must put people at the centre of everything we do.”346  In line 
with the principle of human-centricity, people are treated as “the 
measure of all ‘development.’”347 
 
 341  Pogge & Sengupta, supra note 1, at 93-94. 
 342  Pogge and Sengupta assert that the equal distribution of territorial 
obligations for sustainable development is unfair, since it burdens the poorest 
societies with the largest duties.  Id. at 88. 
 343 The Human Rights Based Approach to Development Cooperation, supra 
note 329. 
 344 See Thomas Pogge, Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty, 103 ETHICS 48, 48-49 
(1992); TAN, supra note 159, at 1.  In addition to individual’s moral status 
conceptualized by Pogge and Tan, this Article concentrates on the legal status of a 
person.  It is important to stress that the principle of human-centricity does not 
contradict the recognition of value of the other species. 
 345 UDHR, supra note 171, art. 1. 
 346 We the Peoples, supra note 204. 
 347  U.N. Secretary-General, Promotion of South-South Cooperation for 
Development: a thirty-year perspective, U.N. Doc. A/64/504, para. 79 (Oct. 27, 2009) 
[hereinafter Promotion of South-South Cooperation for Development]. Human 
development itself is determined as “the expansion of capabilities and freedoms of 
individuals”.  See Sengupta, supra note 98, para. 6. 
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An obvious strength of the sustainable development agenda is 
its approach to individuals as members of humanity and not just as 
citizens of a particular state.  The DRD interprets the right to 
development as “an inalienable human right” and stresses that 
“equality of opportunity for development is a prerogative both of 
nations and of individuals who make up nations.”348  It recognizes 
that “the human person is the central subject of the development 
process and that development policy should therefore make the 
human being the main participant and beneficiary of 
development.”349  The right to development entitles individuals to 
full, meaningful, and effective participation in all stages of decision-
making processes concerning their development; to an equal 
opportunity in their access to basic resources; and to a fair 
distribution of benefits of development.350 
The 2030 Agenda also explicitly expresses its commitment to 
human-centered development and demands to “empower and 
promote the social, economic and political inclusion of all, 
irrespective of age, sex, disability, race, ethnicity, origin, religion or 
economic or other status” by 2030.351  It does not, however, specify 
measures to guarantee individuals’ participation in core local and 
global political processes.  Arjun Sengupta suggests creating special 
mechanisms, including monitoring and accountability mechanisms, 
to uncover deficiencies in meaningful participation and adequate 
representation of all individuals, especially the most vulnerable, and 
to hold responsible actors accountable.  He argues that democratic 
states can perform this role.  In the case of non-democratic societies, 
ad-hoc mechanisms and measures guaranteeing the participation 
and adequate representation of poor individuals should be 
elaborated for particular projects.352 
 
 348 DRD, supra note 21. 
 349 Id. pmbl., art. 2, para. 1. 
 350 DRD, supra note 21, arts. 1, 2, 8.  The Vienna Declaration reaffirms that “the 
human person is the central subject of development.” Vienna Declaration, supra note 
2, para. 10.  As shown in Section III.B, the High-Level Task Force on the 
Implementation of the Right to Development (HLTF) interprets a human-centered 
development policy as one of the main attributes of the right to development.  Right 
to Development, supra note 170, annex at 8-12. 
 351 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, SDG 10.2. 
 352 Sengupta, supra note 98, at para. 30. 
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Human rights advocates repeatedly point to the close 
interrelation between individuals’ political empowerment and their 
ability to enjoy a decent standard of living. 353   In this sense, 
individuals’ capacities to be active drivers of and full-fledged 
partners for sustainable development,354 directly or through their 
agency in state-based and network-based institutions at various 
levels, depend on the realization of the other SDGs.355 
In Joachim Monkelbaan’s apt words, “the SDGs have triggered 
a renaissance of civil society.”356  Global civil society is increasingly 
gaining recognition as a “third force” of the international 
community along with states and international organizations, 
though its role in global deliberation processes still remains limited. 
Both local, regional, and global civil society and its organizations 
should be empowered to play an important role in promoting 
sustainable development, in particular by mobilizing resources, by 
implementing efficient development programs and projects beyond 
state bureaucratic channels, and by monitoring these programs and 
projects.357  NGOs, as essential actors in civil society, are of crucial 
importance for providing international human rights advocacy and 
international sustainable development services, and for promoting 
full-fledged participation of beneficiaries in decision-making 
processes concerning sustainable development.  According to a 2018 
survey of global sustainability leaders, NGOs and social 
entrepreneurs have the most impact on advancing the SDGs, while 
national governments have the least.358 
 
 353 See, e.g., Philip Alston, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and 
Human Rights on the Enjoyment of Civil and Political Rights by Persons Living in Poverty, 
U.N. Doc. A/72/502 (2017); Maria Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona, Report of the 
Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights on Access to Justice for People 
Living in Poverty, U.N. Doc. A/67/278 (2012). 
 354 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, SDG 17. 
 355 See supra Section III.C. 
 356 MONKELBAAN, supra note 13, at 71. 
 357 See Sengupta, supra note 98, at para. 33; see also Sachin Chaturvedi, The 
Development Compact: A Theoretical Construct for South-South Cooperation, RIS 
Discussion Papers, Discussion Paper #203, 7-8 (June 2016), at 
https://ris.org.in/newasiaforum/sites/default/files/Publication%20File/DP203
%20Dr%20Sachin%20Chaturvedi.pdf [https://perma.cc/5LVW-UUMX].   
 358  See The 2018 GlobeScan-SustainAbility Leaders Survey, at 
https://globescan.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/GlobeScan-
SustainAbility-Leaders-Survey-2018-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z3YZ-SEMD].  
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The recognition of a person as a major subject of development is 
the crucial idea in supplanting state-centrism in both the sustainable 
development and human rights agendas.  Guaranteeing human-
centered development should therefore be one of the major steps in 
the further evolution of the sustainable development agenda. My 
article, What Global Human Rights Obligations Do We Have?, 
addressed the conflict within international law between human-
centered human rights law and state-centered public international 
law.359  Contemporary international law must make the “quantum 
leap”360—through recognizing extraterritorial obligations of global 
actors corresponding to human rights of individuals—to a human-
centered normative and institutional order.  In this sense, the 
sustainable development agenda may play a crucial role in 
promoting both the shift from a state-centered to a human-centered 
global order and, due to its close interrelation with the human rights 
agenda, the anchorage of this idea in contemporary international 
law. 
(4) According to the 2030 Agenda, a global partnership for 
sustainable development should “work in a spirit of global 
solidarity, in particular solidarity with the poorest and with people 
in vulnerable situations.”361  In that light, development cooperation 
agreements and programs should focus predominantly on the needs 
and be formulated in the interests of the most vulnerable, 
disempowered, marginalized, and socially excluded individuals, 
especially those suffering from extreme poverty.362  The 2030 Agenda 
expresses a commitment to “endeavour to reach the furthest behind 
first.”363 
The recognition of the urgent necessity to eradicate poverty and 
provide secure access to a decent standard of living universally 
forms an important element of a solidary vision upon which a global 
partnership should be built.  As demonstrated, the intention to leave 
no one behind presumes adequate representation and meaningful 
 
 359 See Pribytkova, supra note 144, at 397. 
 360  See Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, Growing Barriers: International Refugee 
Law, in UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND EXTRATERRITORIAL OBLIGATIONS 80-81 (Mark 
Gibney & Sigrun Skogly eds., 2010). 
 361 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, para. 39, pmbl. 
 362 The Human Rights Based Approach to Development Cooperation, supra 
note 329. 
 363 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, para. 4. 
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participation of poor individuals and societies in designing and 
implementing pro-poor development cooperation programs and 
policies.  Additionally, the idea of global solidarity calls for the 
realization of global obligations to provide assistance for sustainable 
development.  That call is the subject of the next Section. 
B. Global Development Assistance 
Obligations of development assistance are closely interrelated 
with obligations of cooperation: the effective realization of 
obligations to assist presupposes a global partnership of multiple 
actors, while the very opportunity of developing societies and poor 
individuals to actively and meaningfully participate in decision-
making processes relating to sustainable development may depend 
on the implementation of global obligations to assist. 
International human rights instruments prefer the language of 
cooperation to the language of assistance.364  This can be seen in the 
example of the DRD, which stresses, “as a complement to the efforts 
of developing countries, effective international co-operation is essential 
in providing these countries with appropriate means and facilities 
to foster their comprehensive development.” 365   As the travaux 
preparatoires testify, the original version of this article referred to 
“effective international assistance” as a means for the realization of 
the right to development, which was later replaced by a broader 
concept of “effective international co-operation.” 366 
The 2030 Agenda contains several important commitments in 
regard to development assistance being an integral part of global 
partnership commitments. 367   Since development assistance and 
cooperation are two interconnected forms of global partnership for 
 
 364 For instance, neither the U.N. Charter (art. 1 para. 3, art. 55-56) nor the 
UDHR (art. 22), the CRC (art. 4) nor the DRD (art. 3 para. 3, art. 4 para. 2, art. 6 para. 
1), mention obligations to assist but do acknowledge obligations to cooperate.  It 
should be noted, however, that although it is not explicitly stated in the ICESCR 
and the CRC, the CESCR and the U.N. CRC interpret obligations to assist as part of 
obligations to cooperate. 
 365 DRD, supra note 21, art. 4, para. 2 (emphasis added). 
 366  Report of the working group of governmental experts on the right to 
development.  See SALOMON, supra note 10, at 77. 
 367 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, SDG 17. 
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sustainable development, their targets intersect.368   If the former 
implies relations between donors (developed states) and recipients 
of assistance (developing countries), the latter presupposes 
interaction between equally empowered actors.  For the purposes of 
this part—to clarify the nature, status, content, and scope of 
obligations of development cooperation and assistance—they are 
analyzed separately.  This Section seeks to shed light on global 
obligations of development assistance. 
Like cooperation, assistance for sustainable development is 
considered to be both a means for and a separate goal of sustainable 
development.  SDG 17 specifies targets for international assistance 
within global partnership guarantees:  first, to assist developing 
countries in mobilizing resources from multiple sources on local369 
and international levels;370 second, to provide official development 
assistance (hereinafter ODA), while reaching the donor’s target of 
0.7% of GNI, including 0.15 to 0.20% of GNI for the least developed 
states;371  third, to assist developing states in achieving long-term 
debt sustainability through promoting debt financing, relief and 
restructuring and reducing debt distress of highly indebted poor 
countries;372 fourth, to secure investment promotion regimes373 and 
duty-free and quota-free market access374 for the least developed 
states; fifth, to enhance knowledge sharing with and technology 
transfer to developing societies as well as their access to science, 
technology and innovation, including through a “global technology 
facilitation mechanism”; 375  and, finally, to intensify international 
assistance to ensure effective and targeted capacity-building and 
skills upgrading in developing countries in order to enable them to 
 
 368 See supra Section IV.A. 
 369 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, SDG 17.1. 
 370 Id. SDG 17.3. 
 371 Id. SDG 17.2. 
 372 Id. SDG 17.4. 
 373 Id. SDG 17.5. 
 374 Id. SDG 17.12. 
 375 Id. SDG 17.6.  The 2030 Agenda stresses a shared obligation of multiple 
actors—governments, international organizations, the business sector, as well as 
other non-state actors and individuals—to contribute to “financial and technical 
assistance.”  Id. para. 28. 
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implement their own national sustainable development plans and 
achieve the SDGs.376 
In addition, the 2030 Agenda emphasizes that development 
assistance is an indispensable measure for implementing the other 
SDGs, such as promoting inclusive and sustainable economic 
growth; full and productive employment and decent work for all;377 
reducing inequality within and among countries; 378  and making 
cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and 
sustainable.379 
Development assistance commitments expressed in the 2030 
Agenda have the following features.  First, they do not represent 
claimable and enforceable human rights obligations, but rather 
constitute humanitarian obligations of self-identified donors. 380  
Second, the 2030 Agenda acknowledges only interactional global 
obligations of development assistance and does not demand their 
institutionalization.  Third, the general state-centrism of the 2030 
Agenda is reflected in its approach to development assistance.  
Fourth, the 2030 Agenda sees obligations to provide ODA as binding 
only on developed states; any rights and obligations of developing 
countries to contribute to the realization of shared global 
commitments of development assistance are non-existent.  Fifth, 
according to the 2030 Agenda, obligations of development assistance 
are subsidiary and conditional on developing states’ inability to 
realize their sustainable development commitments independently.  
Let us take a closer look at these features of the 2030 Agenda’s 
regulation of global commitments of development assistance as well 
as the possibilities for its improvement. 
(1) As demonstrated above in Section II.B, the 2030 Agenda 
implicates sustainable development commitments that are non-
claimable and non-enforceable humanitarian self-obligations of 
states.  This also applies to commitments of development assistance.  
As shown, the application of a human rights-based approach 
requires harmonizing the human rights agenda and the sustainable 
development agenda.  This will not, however, solve the problem, 
 
 376 Id. SDG 17.9. 
 377 Id. SDG 8.a. 
 378 Id. SDG 10.b. 
 379 Id. SDG 11.c. 
 380 See supra Section II.B. 
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since the status of global obligations to assist is disputed in human 
rights theory and practice itself.  In my dissertation, I argued that 
global obligations to assist should be recognized as human rights 
obligations.381  The recognition and realization of these obligations, 
however, are important tasks for the further evolution of the human 
rights agenda rather than a fact of modern legal reality.  Perhaps a 
closer interrelation of the human rights agenda and the sustainable 
development agenda will promote the recognition, 
institutionalization, and implementation of global obligations to 
assist. 
Under which conditions and to what extent can obligations of 
development assistance be claimable and enforceable?  According to 
the DRD, the right to development gives rise to corresponding 
obligations of the international community to assist developing 
countries—as a “complement” to their own efforts.  It is possible to 
conclude that the right to development implies the right of 
developing countries (unable to realize the right to development to 
the full extent) to seek development assistance and the correlative 
obligations of members of the international community to cooperate 
effectively and to provide the former “with appropriate means and 
facilities to foster their comprehensive development.” 382   It is 
important to note that the right to development, as formulated in the 
DRD, presupposes the right of states to seek assistance, but not the 
right to receive it.  In this respect, according to the contemporary 
sustainable development agenda, obligations to provide 
development assistance represent beneficence commitments.383 
In addition, the right to seek development assistance does not 
mean that developing states are entitled to demand assistance from 
any particular global actor. 384   It is a right directed against the 
international community as a whole.  The realization of this right 
manifestly requires the institutionalization of obligations of 
development assistance, i.e., the creation of a global system of 
institutions through which requests for development assistance may 
be elicited, collected and considered, obligations to assist may be 
assigned to particular actors, necessary resources may be mobilized 
 
 381 See Pribytkova, supra note 3, at 222-333. 
 382 DRD, supra note 21, art. 4, para. 2. 
 383 See supra Section II.B. 
 384 See Alston, supra note 36, at 777. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss4/4
2020] Global Obligations for Sustainable Development 1111 
   
 
and distributed, and assistance practices may be monitored (see 
below).  Thus, the sustainable development agenda must find a way 
to specify, allocate and institutionalize obligations of development 
assistance.  The implementation of these obligations must be 
claimable on the basis of the internationally recognized sustainable 
development instruments and/or mutual development 
commitments between various global actors.385 
(2) The 2030 Agenda acknowledges only interactional obligations 
of development assistance and does not demand their 
institutionalization.  As shown above, the SDGs place emphasis on 
territorial institutional commitments relating to sustainable 
development and leaves open the question of global institutional 
improvements concerning development assistance.  The 2030 
Agenda relies on the OECD “donor club” for providing ODA386 and 
bypasses the issue of creating a well-coordinated and efficient 
system of global institutions for the realization of obligations of 
development assistance. 387   Global institutional reforms 
indispensable for the realization of obligations of development 
assistance should incorporate three interrelated mechanisms:388  (a) 
institutions necessary to accumulate means for development 
assistance; (b) mechanisms for distributing these means among poor 
individuals and societies; and (c) monitoring and accountability 
 
 385 See infra Section IV.C. 
 386 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, SDG 17.2. 
 387 The OECD itself recognizes that financing the “ambitious” SDGs calls for 
the reflection of “the vast and ongoing transformation of the international 
development finance landscape.”  ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., MEASURING 
TOTAL OFFICIAL SUPPORT FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, at 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-
development/TOSSD%20flyer.pdf [https://perma.cc/6MM9-TS6E].  On the 
inadequacy of the existing OECD mechanism for the realization of global 
obligations of development assistance, see SACHS ET AL., supra note 12, at 22-24. 
 388  Among the most promising global projects that propose solutions for 
designing these mechanisms one can mention, e.g., the World Development Fund 
(Brandt Commission), the World Solidarity Fund (U.N.), the Global Fund for Social 
Protection (Olivier De Schutter & Magdalena Sepúlveda), the Global Resources 
Dividend (Thomas Pogge), the Health Impact Fund (Aidan Hollis & Thomas Pogge), 
the Unconditional Basic Income (various authors); and a global initiative Move 
Humanity (Jeffrey Sachs et al.).  For an analysis of some of these proposals, see 
Pribytkova, supra note 3, at 323-29. 
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mechanisms for holding multiple actors responsible for breaches of 
their obligations of development assistance.389 
(3) The state-centrism of the 2030 Agenda relating to 
development assistance commitments manifests itself in two ways.  
First, it designates governments of developing states, rather than 
poor individuals or social groups, as the recipients of development 
assistance. 390   Second, despite its emphasis on the necessity to 
develop a multilateral and multilevel partnership inclusive of all 
global actors,391 it sees developed states as the principal providers of 
development assistance.392 
The 2030 Agenda presupposes state-centered international 
assistance, which is aimed at enabling states to fulfill their territorial 
human rights obligations and sustainable development 
commitments.  It does not guarantee, however, human-centered 
global assistance that flows expressly to individuals or social groups 
in need (even if it is provided through their states or other entities 
domiciled in their states’ territory).  
Thus, contemporary development assistance does not aim to 
directly help the most vulnerable individuals and social groups, but 
rather to support their state in implementing its obligations.  A state-
centered character of development assistance does not, therefore, 
allow poor individuals and their non-state representatives to submit 
a legitimate request for assistance.  Since recipients of ODA are 
developing countries, the majority of which are undemocratic, 
people in these countries cannot effectively control their 
governments’ activities related to seeking, receiving, and 
distributing assistance.  The lack of mechanisms for effective control 
over development assistance administration and for direct global 
 
 389 See also Dann (2006), supra note 9. 
 390 The SDGs recommit to “providing focused and scaled-up assistance to 
least developed countries and other countries in special situations, in line with 
relevant support programmes.”  2030 Agenda, supra note 4, para. 16. 
 391 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, SDG 17; see also United Nations, Sustainable 




 392  According to the OECD, “while private sector investment will be 
fundamental, official development assistance (ODA) will continue to play a crucial 
role, particularly for countries most in need.”  ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., 
supra note 387. 
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assistance enables states to abuse their representational functions.  
Instead of using assistance to promote sustainable development and 
support the poor, corrupt recipient governments only drive their 
population into debt.393 
I argue for the necessity to shift from state-centered 
development assistance to a human-centered one.394  Two measures 
are required to overcome state-centrism of contemporary 
development assistance. 
First, creating mechanisms for individuals’ participation in and 
control over the process of the implementation of international 
assistance, including the administration of international assistance 
by their government.  States should be recognized as bearers of 
obligations to facilitate the implementation of their people’s right to 
seek international assistance rather than as the holders of the right.395 
The inability of a certain state to provide social support to their 
residents promptly and in full should give rise to the obligation of 
the state to seek international assistance.396  In the role of a facilitator 
of the right to international assistance, the state would per se 
“redirect” a request of its residents for social support to the 
international level. 397   The recognition of this obligation would 
 
 393 The CESCR has indicated many cases of “mismanagement of international 
cooperation aid,” “unbalanced budgetary allocations” (especially “low budgetary 
allocations to the social sectors”), and “the limited effectiveness of the use of foreign 
funds” that constitute “serious breaches” of states’ human rights obligations.  See 
U.N. CESCR, Concluding observations on the Second Periodic Report of Georgia, U.N. 
Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.83, para. 11 (Dec. 19, 2002); U.N. CESCR, Concluding 
observations on the Combined Second to Fourth Periodic Reports of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/COD/CO/4, para. 16 (Dec. 16, 2009); see 
also ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., PARIS DECLARATION ON AID EFFECTIVENESS 
art. 4, para. 5 (Mar. 2, 2005) [hereinafter PARIS DECLARATION]; ORG. FOR ECON. 
COOPERATION & DEV., BUSAN PARTNERSHIP FOR EFFECTIVE DEVELOPMENT CO-
OPERATION art. 33 (Dec. 1, 2011) [hereinafter BUSAN PARTNERSHIP]; POGGE, supra note 
14, at 49f; MOYO, supra note 12, at ch. 4. 
 394 See Pribytkova, supra note 3, at 276-82.   
 395 See SALOMON, supra note 10, at 114f. 
 396 See ICESCR, supra note 171, art. 2, para. 1, art. 11.  The Maastricht Principles 
claim the recognition of the obligations of states to seek international assistance.  
ETO CONSORTIUM, supra note 145, at princ. 34. 
 397 Though international human rights law has not yet acknowledged this 
obligation, the CESCR often encourages states to seek international assistance.  See, 
e.g., U.N. CESCR, Concluding observations on the second periodic report of Yemen, 
E/C.12/YEM/2, para. 4 (2011); U.N. CESCR, Concluding observations on the second 
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require the creation of mechanisms which allow individuals to claim 
the implementation of the obligation to seek international 
development assistance by their state, and to call the latter to 
account for its failure to fulfill this obligation.  
Second, elaborating non-state, non-bureaucratic and inclusive 
mechanisms for direct global assistance (or improving and 
expanding already existing private and public channels of direct 
support, for instance, conditional and unconditional cash transfer 
programs), which would enable poor individuals and their 
democratically representative communities to submit a request for 
global assistance.  This implies the recognition of individuals as 
independent full-fledged subjects of diagonal extraterritorial legal 
relations and their right to formulate a legitimate request for 
assistance, to control the behavior of global actors providing 
assistance and to hold them accountable for their failure to fulfill 
global obligations to assist.  This measure does not demand 
abolishing international assistance, but rather supplementing it 
through global assistance. 
Recent research draws attention to the fact that the state is 
incapable of solving all sustainable development problems.398  In 
now-widely accepted views of governance, states should transform 
from power “monopolists” and major “problem-solvers” to 
“managers of political authority” articulating pressing social 
problems and promoting multilevel and multi-stakeholder 
partnerships for finding appropriate solutions.399  This also applies 
to obligations of development assistance.  Overcoming the state-
centrism of development assistance also presupposes the 
acknowledgement that not only states, but all members of the 
international community, as elaborated in Section IV.A, are bearers 
of shared global obligations of development assistance. 
 
periodic report of China, including Hong Kong, China and Macao, China, 
E/C.12/CHN/CO/2, para. 12 (2014). 
 398  SACHS, supra note 12, at 496f; SACHS ET AL., supra note 12, at 1-2; 
MONKELBAAN, supra note 13, at 58. 
 399 See MONKELBAAN, supra note 13, at 58, 79; Philipp Genschel & Bernhard 
Zangl, Transformations of the State. From Monopolist to Manager of Political Authority, 
76 TRANSTATE WORKING PAPERS 1 (2008); Jorge Soto, The Weakening of Representative 
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(4) According to the 2030 Agenda, obligations to provide ODA 
bind only the OECD developed states, 400  while the right and 
obligations of developing countries to contribute to the realization 
of shared global commitments of development assistance are not 
specified.  As shown above in Section IV.A, the dominant pattern of 
development assistance cooperation must be changed from the 
traditional bilateral donor-recipient relations 401  to a multi-
stakeholder partnership. 
According to the principle of the “ownership of development 
priorities by developing countries,” 402  the latter should be 
empowered to become equal and full-fledged co-authors of the 
global development assistance agenda as well as co-equal actors in 
its implementation.  All development assistance programs should 
be designed and realized in partnership with poor communities and 
authorized representatives acting in their interests in order to ensure 
that the voices of the poor are heard.  Global actors, especially 
NGOs, should collaborate with poor communities in building 
arenas in which the latter can formulate their authentic demands for 
development assistance, to understand and claim the realization of 
their human right to development and other basic socio-economic 
rights, as well as use current local, regional, and international 
mechanisms for holding global actors accountable.403 
 
 400  In 2019, ODA amounted only to $152.8 billion, which is extremely 
insufficient for achieving the SDGs, and only a small portion of it was directed to 
least developed countries ($33 billion).  See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., 




 401  This feature is inherited from the MDGs that interpreted “global 
partnership” as relations of development assistance, that is, bilateral donor-
recipient relations between developed and developing countries.  See supra Section 
II.A. 
 402 See BUSAN PARTNERSHIP, supra note 393, art. 11(a).  Contemporary (soft) law 
instruments requiring the recognition of developing countries as partners and 
leaders in assistance cooperation are still based on the traditional distinction 
between donors and recipients.  See, e.g., PARIS DECLARATION, supra note 393, art. 14; 
ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., THE ACCRA AGENDA FOR ACTION paras. 8, 12-
14 (Sept. 4, 2008) [hereinafter AAA]. 
 403 Cf., e.g., Gay J. McDougall, A Decade of NGO Struggle, 11 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 12 
(2004); Heena Shah Phillips, A Rights-Based Approach to Lawyering: Legal 
Empowerment as an Alternative to Legal Aid in Post-Disaster Haiti, 10 NW. UNIV. J. INT’L 
HUM. RTS. 7 (2011). 
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To ensure that the contemporary development assistance 
agenda is truly global, cross-culturally legitimate and pro-poor 
oriented, several important steps are required:  the democratization 
of international institutions 404  as well as guarantees of non-
discrimination, non-domination, and the active and meaningful 
participation of developing states and poor communities in the core 
international agenda-setting relating to global assistance.  This will 
also allow developing societies to realize their right to contribute to 
global poverty eradication.405 
Assistance is not limited to financial support but includes also 
other forms, such as legal, social, technical, informational, scientific, 
and educational assistance as well as the protection of interests in 
the international arena.  Every developing community has, 
therefore, the capacity to promote, to varying degrees, the 
implementation of shared obligations of development assistance.  
This is empirically proven by the fact that in recent times, many 
middle-income and even low-income countries are involved in 
various assistance programs through South-South and triangular 
cooperation. 406   Even developing states that require support for 
themselves often take on obligations to assist other poor 
communities.  On top of that, they share their valuable experience 
concerning efficient strategies of poverty alleviation.407 
 (5) The U.N. stresses that the primary responsibility for states’ 
sustainable development lies on them.408  In line with contemporary 
 
 404 SALOMON, supra note 10, at 46; Ralph Wilde, Dilemmas in Promoting Global 
Economic Justice through Human Rights Law, in THE FRONTIERS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 127 
(Nehal Bhuta ed., 2016). 
 405 See supra Section IV.A. 
 406 See infra Section IV.C. 
 407 See AAA, supra note 402, art. 5, art. 19(b); BUSAN PARTNERSHIP, supra note 
393, art. 14. 
 408 Promoting self-help and self-reliance of developing states is considered to 
be one of the major methods of fighting poverty.  At the same time, the U.N. General 
Assembly acknowledges that “however great their own efforts, these will not be 
sufficient to enable them to achieve the desired development goals as expeditiously 
as they must unless they are assisted through increased financial resources and 
more favourable economic and commercial policies on the part of developed 
countries.”  G.A. Res. 2626, International Development Strategy for the Second 
United Nations Development Decade, para. 11 (Oct. 24, 1970). 
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human rights law,409 sustainable development agenda introduces a 
two-level model of sustainable development commitments.  As 
mentioned above in Section III.A, the DRD and the 2030 Agenda 
embody the principle that international obligations for sustainable 
development are secondary obligations, which are complementary 
to the home state’s primary obligations for sustainable 
development. 410   The 2030 Agenda reaffirms the obligation to 
“respect each country’s policy space and leadership to establish and 
implement policies for poverty eradication and sustainable 
development,” 411  while “remaining consistent with relevant 
international rules and commitments.”412  In this context, obligations 
of development assistance are portrayed as conditional and 
subsidiary commitments.  In other words, the provision of 
development assistance is conditioned on a developing state’s 
inability to fulfill its territorial obligations for sustainable 
development.413 
Taking into account the variety of obligations of development 
assistance analyzed above—international and global obligations as 
well as interactional and institutional obligations to assist—this rule 
must be reshaped.  While international assistance directed to states is 
indeed conditional on these states’ inability to guarantee the 
 
 409  The ICESCR interprets socio-economic rights as claim-rights primarily 
addressed to the state and secondarily to the global community.  ICESCR, supra 
note 171, art. 2, para. 1, art. 11.  On subsidiarity of international obligations to assist 
in the realization of socio-economic rights, see, e.g., Ashfaq Khalfan, Division of 
Responsibility between States, in GLOBAL JUSTICE, STATE DUTIES: THE EXTRATERRITORIAL 
SCOPE OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 299, 331 
(Malcolm Langford et al. eds. 2013); Wouter Vandenhole & Wolfgang Benedek, 
Extraterritorial Human Rights Obligations and the North-South Divide, in GLOBAL 
JUSTICE, STATE DUTIES: THE EXTRATERRITORIAL SCOPE OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND 
CULTURAL RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 332, 338 (Malcolm Langford et al. eds. 
2013). 
 410 See DRD, supra note 21, art. 4, para. 2; the 2030 Agenda also states that “each 
country has primary responsibility for its own economic and social development.”  
2030 Agenda, supra note 4, paras. 41, 63. 
 411 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, SDG 17.15. 
 412 Id. paras. 21, 63.  The 2030 Agenda also stresses the importance of “regional 
and sub-regional frameworks” which “can facilitate the effective translation of 
sustainable development policies into concrete action at the national level.”  Id. 
para. 21. 
 413 Conditionality of global obligations of development assistance should not 
to be confused with conditionality of assistance.  For a discussion of conditionalities 
of assistance, see Pribytkova, supra note 3, at 310-12, 320-21. 
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realization of the right to development to the full extent, this 
principle cannot be automatically applied to both interactional and 
institutional global obligations of development assistance.  As 
demonstrated, all individuals have the right to a just and sustainable 
global order in which their right to development and corresponding 
obligations of development assistance may be realized.414   Global 
institutional obligations to create and maintain a fair and sustainable 
global institutional scheme indispensable for providing global 
development assistance are primary and not conditioned on states’ 
inability or unwillingness to fulfil their territorial sustainable 
development obligations.  Global interactional obligations of 
development assistance may be conditional on individuals’ initial 
requests for support from their state and, thereby, subsidiary in 
relation to states’ territorial obligations.  In emergency situations, 
however, parallel requests for national and global development 
assistance must be permitted.415 
In my dissertation, I defended the idea that the scope of global 
obligations to assist should be determined by the principles of 
sufficiency and a decent minimum sacrifice.  The principle of 
sufficiency establishes an external border for global actors’ freedom 
to dispose of their funds.  The right to development implies that 
global actors align their priorities with the obligations to contribute 
to the creation of a fair and sustainable global order and provide 
development assistance.  At the same time, the role of an internal 
criterion of the scope of global development assistance should be 
played by the principle of decent minimum sacrifice.  This means 
that the burdens of development assistance should be generally 
consistent with public and private actors’ fundamental interests, 
goals, human rights and obligations.  Requests for development 
assistance that overreach this decent minimum level of sacrifice do 
not correspond to the criteria of human rights-based obligations or 
strong beneficence commitments and their satisfaction should be left 
to the discretion of global actors.  The convergence between the 
principle of sufficiency and the principle of a decent minimum 
sacrifice may be achieved through the fair distribution of the 
 
 414 See supra Section III.B.  
 415 See Pribytkova, supra note 3, at 272-74. 
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burdens of development assistance among all members of the 
international community.416 
The U.N. target for ODA, which currently amounts to 0.7% of 
GNI and is designed to be gradually increased to 1% of GNI, may 
serve as an example of this convergence, since it is considered to be 
both sufficient for progressive eradication of poverty (combined 
with other public and private actors’ contributions)417 and not too 
burdensome for states.418 
Contemporary mechanisms and practices of development 
assistance are targets of strong and justified criticism for being 
insufficient, inefficient and violating human rights of recipients of 
assistance. 419   Since development assistance and cooperation are 
essential for reducing extreme poverty and inequality, empowering 
the most vulnerable individuals and societies, and realizing both 
human rights and sustainable development agendas, the 
recognition, institutionalization, and implementation of obligations 
of development assistance and cooperation are tasks of 
extraordinary importance. 
Institutional obligations of development cooperation and 
assistance aimed at creating and maintaining a just and sustainable 
global structure call for the substantial transformations of 
contemporary global order.  Some of them will be discussed in the 
next Section. 
 
 416 Id. at 293-96. 
 417 According to Move Humanity’s initiative, in addition to ODA, which should 
be increased through the engagement of all high income and upper middle-income 
countries, financing for SDGs calls for new forms of taxation of multiple actors and 
enhanced philanthropy by world’s richest individuals.  See SACHS ET AL., supra note 
12, at 24-26. 
 418 See Shah, supra note 15.  In 2019, however, only 0.30% of the “donor club” 
countries’ combined GNI was reached.  See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., 
supra note 400.  Apparently, the same reasoning of a decent minimum sacrifice 
underlies the Move Humanity’s proposal of 1% SDG wealth tax of the world’s 
billionaires and “ultra-high-net worth individuals,” which would bring additional 
$420 billion per year (ca. 2.7 times more than the current ODA rate—$152.8 billion).  
SACHS ET AL., supra note 12, at 26. 
 419 See Pribytkova, supra note 3, at 305-315. 
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C. Institutionalizing Global Partnership 
Globalization brings about various institutionalization processes 
in the extraterritorial domain. 420   The need for institutionalizing 
sustainable development commitments for global partnership has 
been widely stressed by researchers and practitioners.421  A human 
right-based approach to development advocates for the shared 
obligations of all members of the international community to 
contribute to creating and maintaining a just and sustainable global 
institutional scheme, which includes mechanisms for accumulating 
and distributing means for sustainable development programs, 
allocating duties to multiple actors, governing and monitoring the 
performance of those duties, and holding actors responsible for 
violations of their sustainable development obligations. 422  
However, as shown, the 2030 Agenda places emphasis on territorial 
institutional reforms, while the task remains to significantly extend 
global institutional changes in order to fully realize a more robust 
normative program of sustainable development. 
There is no single way to institutionalize the sustainable 
development commitments contained by the 2030 Agenda.  On the 
contrary, there are numerous traditional state-centered and 
alternative, more informal and non-bureaucratic institutional 
solutions for global partnership that are intensively discussed by 
scholars and practitioners.423  This Section briefly reviews some (the 
most promising) of these solutions, brings into sharp focus their 
strengths and weaknesses, analyzes to what extent they correspond 
to the principles of global partnership, and examines what further 
improvements are desirable. 
State-centered avenues to institutionalize global partnership for 
sustainable development are represented by two models of 
development compacts, comprising two sets of mutual 
commitments between North-South and South-South countries.  
 
 420 See, e.g., Andreas Rasche & Dirk Ulrich Gilbert, Institutionalizing Global 
Governance: the Role of the United Nations Global Compact, 21 BUS. ETHICS: EURO. REV. 
100, 104-105 (2012); TAN, supra note 159, 29. 
 421  See MONKELBAAN, supra note 13; SACHS ET AL., supra note 12; Pogge & 
Sengupta, supra note 1. 
 422 See supra Section III.B. 
 423 See Rasche & Gilbert, supra note 420, at 104-105. 
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Arjun Sengupta proposes “development compacts” as an 
instrument to apply a human rights-based approach to development 
and the implementation of the right to development.424  At the heart 
of this idea lies the concept of “development contracts” suggested in 
1989 by Thorvald Stoltenberg, who, at that time, served as the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway.  Stoltenberg proposed that 
short-term and ineffective adjustment programs “be replaced with 
more comprehensive ‘Development Contracts,’ which could be 
defined as a comprehensive instrument for the financing of a 
medium- and long-term development plan prepared by a 
developing country itself (with outside technical support where 
appropriate).” 425   Sengupta maintains that North-South 
development compacts should be concluded between developed 
and developing countries and provide a normative basis for their 
collaborative development programs, as well as for their mutual and 
“callable” obligations.  He suggests that obligations imposed on 
developing states on a unilateral basis should be counterbalanced 
by reciprocal obligations of the international community. 426  
Developing states would be required to realize their territorial 
human rights obligations relating to sustainable development to the 
maximum of their capacities, while developed countries and 
international organizations would be responsible for providing the 
former with resources necessary for the fulfillment of their 
obligations. 
Sengupta suggested creating “a focal organization where 
members of the international community can meet and work with 
those developing countries willing to enter into development 
compacts.”  In his scheme, this focal organization coordinating 
collaboration between donors and developing countries would be 
 
 424 Arjun Sengupta, Aid and Development Policy in the 1990s, 37 ECON. POL. 
WKLY 453 (1993); see also Study on the Current State of Progress in the 
Implementation of the Right to Development, supra note 147, paras. 65-66; 
Sengupta, supra note 98, at paras. 56-74. 
 425 Thorvald Stoltenberg, Towards a World Development Strategy, in ONE WORLD 
OR SEVERAL?: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 25TH ANNIVERSARY SYMPOSIUM OF THE O.E.C.D. 241-
242 (Louis Emmerij ed., 1989); see Chaturvedi, supra note 357, at 5. 
 426 In Sengupta’s plausible opinion, “one lesson that has been learnt from the 
experience of international cooperation is that one-sided conditionality imposed on 
a party, even if in principle it is beneficial for the party, seldom works and is 
honoured more often in the breach than in the observance.”  Sengupta, supra note 
98, at paras. 53-54. 
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based on the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC).  
Each developing country willing to gain international support in the 
realization of the right to development would submit a request for a 
development compact to the DAC.  It would also elaborate and put 
forward a country-specific sustainable development plan 
designating particular measures to be undertaken for implementing 
the SDGs, identifying its own commitments as well as its needs for 
international assistance.  Members of the international community, 
especially U.N. agencies and international financial institutions 
(including the World Bank and the IMF) and independent external 
experts, would provide developing countries with technical 
assistance in designing their sustainable development plans.  
Developing states’ obligations would consist of ensuring the full-
fledged and meaningful participation of all individuals and social 
groups, especially the most vulnerable, in the process of formulating 
the sustainable development program. 
In Sengupta’s proposal, the DAC would establish a special 
“support group” composed of self-identified donor countries, 
regional development agencies and banks, as well as representatives 
of international organizations (including: the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, FAO, UNICEF, WHO, IMF, and 
World Bank) and NGOs.  The support group’s mandate would be to 
review and approve the development plan suggested by a 
developing state, allocate concrete obligations to the group’s 
members, specify methods of providing sufficient ODA, and 
“monitor and adjudicate on the fulfilment of the obligations and 
conditionalities accepted by the developing countries.”  The burden 
of financing the realization of development compacts would fall on 
OECD donors.  The support group would create a “new financing 
facility called the Fund for Financing Development Compacts” 
replenished through the deduction of 0.7% of GNI for ODA. 427 
This general type of North-South development compact 
represents a toolkit to enshrine mutual obligations of developed and 
developing states, giving rise to the entitlement of the latter to the 
assistance of the former.  On the basis of development compacts, 
developing countries that have fulfilled their obligations to the best 
of their abilities would submit a legitimate request for developed 
countries’ assistance in the realization of their territorial obligations.  
 
 427  Sengupta, supra note 98, paras. 58-67. 
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In this sense, North-South development compacts are designed to 
guarantee the developing states’ full realization of their sustainable 
development programs and projects and, therefore, the enjoyment 
of the right to development by their residents and citizens will not 
be jeopardized by the lack of sufficient resources.428 
Sengupta stresses that development compacts should embrace 
not only resource transfer, but also other types of international 
support, such as securing fair trade conditions and market access for 
developing states, ensuring debt rescheduling and financial 
restructuring, and promoting investment, technology transfer and 
knowledge exchange.429  These important measures were specified 
in the 2030 Agenda.430 
It is important to emphasize that for Sengupta, the 
implementation of development programs is inextricably linked 
with the realization of human rights.  The Commission on Human 
Rights Working Group on the Right to Development reaffirms that: 
 
[T]he logic of a development compact rests on the acceptance 
by and a legal commitment of the international community 
to pursue, individually and collectively, the universal 
realization of all human rights and, on their part, for the 
developing countries to follow explicitly a development 
strategy geared towards the universal realization of human 
rights.431 
 
The idea of the North-South development compact was taken up 
in the Human Development Report 2003.  The report set out a 
Millennium Development Compact as a partnership between 
developing and developed states aimed at implementing the MDGs 
and assigning obligations for sustainable development “squarely on 
 
 428  As Sengupta notes, the major intention of North-South development 
compacts is “to assure the developing countries that if they fulfil their part of the 
bargain and carried out their obligations, the programme will not be derailed 
because of the lack of international cooperation.”  Id. paras. 64-65. 
 429 Sengupta also proposes that in cases where these measures are efficient, 
the provision of ODA may not be needed.  See Sengupta, supra note 98, paras. 64-
65; see also POGGE, supra note 14, at 20. 
 430 See supra Section IV.B. 
 431 U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Review of progress and obstacles in the 
promotion, implementation, operationalization, and enjoyment of the right to development, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/WG.18/2, para. 36 (Feb. 17, 2004). 
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both sides: requiring bold reforms from poor countries and obliging 
donor countries to step forward and support those efforts.” 432  
Through this global compact the “world community can work 
together to help poor countries achieve” the MDGs, since it 
demands all stakeholders—rich and poor countries, public and 
private international actors and civil society organizations—to 
combine their efforts to implement their shared mutual obligations 
for sustainable development and, in return, entitles them to claim 
their realization from other parties.  Being parties to development 
compacts, developing states may insist that developed countries 
provide them with increased international financial and 
technological assistance, debt relief, and better market access; poor 
individuals can demand that their governments accumulate and 
manage resources more effectively and hold them accountable for 
reaching poverty reduction targets within a certain timeframe; and 
developed countries can claim that developing states implement 
effective, equitable, and accountable use of international 
assistance.433 
Many of the North-South development compact’s institutional 
arrangements comply with the principles of partnership set out in 
the 2030 Agenda.  However, this development compact model has a 
number of evident shortcomings.  First, although the obligations of 
developing and developed states are mutual and reciprocal, 
relations between them are still unequal (vertical) relations of 
dependency between donors and recipients that contradict the 
principle of partnership sealed in the SDGs.434  Second, though they 
are presumed to be concluded in the interests of developing states, 
North-South development compacts are often constructed 
disproportionately in the interests of donors states.435  Third, they 
 
 432 UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 
2003, MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS: A COMPACT AMONG NATIONS TO END 
HUMAN POVERTY, at V (2003). 
 433 Id. at 15, 20, 145. 
 434  Besides exacerbating already poor practices of inequality, relations of 
dependency proved to be inefficient. See, e.g., ACTIONAID, REAL AID: ENDING AID 
DEPENDENCY 17-18 (2011); MOYO, supra note 12, at ch. 4-5. 
 435 See Clair Apodaca, Foreign Aid as a Foreign Policy Tool, in OXFORD RESEARCH 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS (2017); Chaturvedi, supra note 357, at 4; 
Richard Manning, Aid as a Second-Best Solution: Seven Problems of Effectiveness and 
How to Tackle Them, 21f (World Inst. for Dev. Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
24, 2012).  
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authorize or permit excessive interference by developed states in the 
internal affairs of developing states, on the ever-available pretext 
that effective use of international assistance demands “good 
governance.” 436   Fourth, conditionalities imposed by developed 
states and international financial institutions on developing 
countries in many cases violate human rights and may “have more 
adverse consequences than the initial problem itself.” 437   Fifth, 
despite the declared commitments to promote the participation of 
all stakeholders, the North-South development compacts remain 
primarily state-centered. 
Another development compact model emerged, partly as a 
response to the inadequacy of the North-South cooperation pattern, 
through relations among actors from the South.  Through South-
South partnerships, developing countries have demonstrated their 
unwillingness to be dependent exclusively upon developed states’ 
assistance as well as their strong intention to support each other in 
getting out of poverty. 438   Global South countries’ common 
experience and views on efficient development strategies, their 
mutual sympathies and sense of solidarity, and their strategic goal 
of countering the power of Global North states, catalyze South-
South cooperation.439  Contributions of South-South cooperation to 
sustainable development and, in particular to poverty eradication, 
have substantially increased in recent years. 440   Some emerging 
economies (for instance, Brazil, China, India, Qatar, South Africa) 
have become major donors of development assistance to developing 
countries. 441   South-South partnership embraces not only direct 
 
 436 See ERIC POSNER, THE TWILIGHT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 61 (2014); ISSA G. 
SHIVJI, SILENCES IN NGO DISCOURSE: THE ROLE AND FUTURE OF NGOS IN AFRICA 14-16, 
41 (2007); Wilde, supra note 404, at 143-45. 
 437  See Chaturvedi, supra note 357, at 4; see also Edmar L. Bacha, IMF 
Conditionality: Conceptual Problems and Policy Alternatives, 15 WORLD DEV. 1457 
(1987); Milindo Chakrabarti, Development Compact—The Cornerstone of India’s 
Development Cooperation: An ‘Externalities’ Perspective, 53 INT’L STUD. 6 (2017). 
 438 See e.g., Chaturvedi, supra note 357, at 1. 
 439 See, e.g., G.A. Res. A/64/L.37, Nairobi Outcome Document of the High-
Level United Nations Conference on South-South Cooperation, paras. 17-18 (Dec. 
21, 2009) [hereinafter Nairobi Outcome Document]. 
 440  See G.A. Res. 71/244, South-South Cooperation, para. 7 (Dec. 21, 2016) 
[hereinafter South-South Cooperation]. 
 441 See Chaturvedi, supra note 357; Chakrabarti, supra note 437; Shailly Nigam, 
The Challenges Faced Across South-South Cooperation, 4 J. WORLD ECON. RES. 27 (2015). 
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development assistance, debt forgiveness or cost-sharing projects, 
but also capacity-building training programs and scholarships, 
duty-free trade regimes and investment programs, technology and 
knowledge exchange, as well as joint scientific projects.442 
The South-South development compact model is characterized 
by several important strengths over the North-South development 
compact pattern:  first, it initiates horizontal relations, in which 
participants are equal and full-fledged partners and agents of 
sustainable development, promoting developing states’ self-
reliance; second, it presupposes a win-win collaboration that 
embodies a principle of reciprocity not only in the sense of reciprocal 
obligations, but also of mutual gain and growth opportunities; third, 
it respects the principles of national sovereignty and non-
interference in domestic affairs; and fourth, it does not impose 
conditionalities on recipients of assistance. 443   South-South 
development compacts strive to embody principles and good 
practices of global partnership for sustainable development, 
including the primacy of national responsibility and ownership, 
independence, self-reliance, respect for sovereignty, non-
conditionality, equality, solidarity, mutual accountability, 
transparency, and effective cooperation.444  It is true, however, that 
an objective assessment of the South-South development compacts’ 
effectiveness and positive contribution to the achievement of the 
SDGs requires deep empirical study that is beyond the scope of this 
Article.445 
Broadening and deepening South-South cooperation catalyzes 
positive changes within the framework of the global partnership for 
sustainable development, in particular influencing practices of 
 
 442  Sachin Chaturvedi distinguishes between five areas of arrangements 
within South-South development compacts, which correspond to the main aspects 
of development assistance specified in the 2030 Agenda (see Section IV.B): capacity 
building, trade and investment, development finance, grants, and technology 
exchange.  Chaturvedi, supra note 357, at 10, 13; see also Chakrabarti, supra note 437, 
at 11; Nairobi Outcome Document, supra note 439, para. 15. 
 443 See Chaturvedi, supra note 357, at 1. 
 444  Nairobi Outcome Document, supra note 439; South-South Cooperation, 
supra note 440, para. 5; see also Chakrabarti, supra note 437, at 6. 
 445 On problems of domination and other bad practices within South-South 
cooperation, see, e.g., KRISTOFFER NILAUS TARP & SIGNE MARIE COLD-RAVNKILDE, 
ADDRESSING THE DILEMMAS IN SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION (2015); Apodaca, supra 
note 435. 
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North-South cooperation.  The U.N. General Assembly stresses, 
however, that “South-South cooperation is not a substitute for, but 
rather a complement to, North-South cooperation.”446  Participants 
in South-South cooperation patently continue to require 
international support to overcome poverty within their territory and 
enhance their capacities. 
A partial solution may be found in triangular cooperation that 
combines a (vertical) international assistance model with 
(horizontal) collaboration projects.  Paying attention to the 
asymmetries in Global South states’ development, the U.N. calls for 
two different types of development assistance, the first aimed “to 
meet the basic survival needs of those at the bottom rungs of 
development,” and the second, to answer “the needs of those who 
are advanced in the development scale.”447  At the same time, the 
role of the U.N. as a whole and its particular agencies is to facilitate 
South-South and triangular cooperation, “while collecting, 
analysing and disseminating best practices and lessons derived 
from its ongoing development programmes.”448 
A substantial deficiency of prevailing partnership patterns, 
represented by North-South and South-South development 
compacts, is their state-centrism and hierarchical top-down 
approach, which ignore full-fledged agency, obligations, and 
accountability of non-state actors, and above all the leading role of 
civil society for achieving the SDGs.  There is a wide consensus that 
the “command-and-control” model of state-based governance is 
ineffective in the contemporary context of multi-level, multi-agent 
extraterritorial relations.449 
In accordance with the principles of global partnership 
formulated in Sections IV.A and IV.B, several important measures 
should be undertaken.  First, multi-stakeholder and multi-level 
cooperation should be promoted, which involves not only North 
 
 446  On “the complementary nature of South-South to North-South 
cooperation”, see, e.g., South-South Cooperation, supra note 440, paras. 5, 9. 
 447 Promotion of South-South Cooperation for Development, supra note 347, at para. 
89. 
 448 South-South Cooperation, supra note 440, paras. 14, 17. 
 449 Rasche & Gilbert, supra note 420, at 102; MONKELBAAN, supra note 13, at 40; 
see also Guido Palazzo & Andreas Georg Scherer, Globalization and Corporate Social 
Responsibility, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 415 
(Andrew Crane et al. eds., 2008). 
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and South states, but also non-state actors, including NGOs, private 
entities, civil society, and academia, as full-fledged partners for 
sustainable development. 450   In order to be efficient and avoid 
becoming “closed-clubs,” global partnerships should embrace all 
actors and provide mechanisms for symmetrizing power in 
prevailing relations of domination and subordination among states, 
non-state organizations, and individuals. 451   Second, individuals 
should be recognized as both major right-holders, beneficiaries and 
duty-bearers of sustainable development, that is, both their claim-
rights to which global obligations of multiple actors correspond and 
their own global obligations for sustainable development should be 
acknowledged.  Third, the accountability of multiple actors for 
breaches of their global obligations for sustainable development 
should be enhanced; this is an essential precondition for the effective 
realization of the sustainable development agenda. 
Diverse alternative approaches to global governance underscore 
a fundamental defect of the hierarchical, top-down and state-
centered approach of the 2030 Agenda.  Achieving the SDGs as well 
as harmonizing and coordinating universal goals and local needs, 
extraterritorial and territorial structural changes, top-down and 
bottom-up initiatives, centralized and decentralized programs, and 
binding obligations and voluntary commitments, requires both 
traditional and innovative approaches to governance and 
accountability.   
Among innovative approaches, polycentric governance, 
network-based governance, experimentalist governance, and 
metagovernance deserve special mention.  Polycentric conceptions 
stress that “effective global governance institutions are necessarily 
polycentric in nature,” 452  i.e., decision-making and institution-
designing relating to the SDGs should be spread among various 
independent centers at different levels.  A network-based approach 
functions through multiple autonomous agents acting in various 
national and transnational arenas and linked by shared goals rather 
than legal obligations.453  Experimentalist forms of governance shift 
 
 450  Nairobi Outcome Document, supra note 439, para. 19; South-South 
Cooperation, supra note 440, para. 24; Rasche & Gilbert, supra note 420, at 102-04. 
 451 Rasche & Gilbert, supra note 420, at 107. 
 452 MONKELBAAN, supra note 13, at 32. 
 453 Rasche & Gilbert, supra note 420, at 104. 
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the burden of responsibility for the elaboration, implementation, 
and monitoring of general norms (resulting from a universal 
political overlapping consensus)454 to local levels, while activating 
the inclusive, participatory and non-hierarchical collaboration 
among various national and global actors pursuing the SDGs in their 
own way and sharing their valuable experiences and lessons 
learned.455  Addressing multilevel interactions of public and private 
sectors as well as civil society, a metagovernance approach intends to 
integrate and coordinate hierarchical, network and market 
governance modes and employ their advantages to increase the full-
fledged participation of multiple actors and make highly 
fragmented and complex global governance more coherent.456 
These governance approaches partly overlap and complement 
each other in such important aspects as polycentricity, diversity, 
decentralization, multi-levelness, deliberation, power-sharing, 
inclusiveness, participation, bottom-up orientation, voluntariness of 
commitments, as well as informal and non-bureaucratic agenda-
setting and institution-building.  All of them should be engaged, 
integrated, and balanced to both create new and modify the existing 
multi-level and multi-actor institutional architectures indispensable 
for reaching the SDGs. 457   Though these alternative governance 
 
 454  According to John Rawls, a universal overlapping consensus may be 
reached only politically, i.e., “each of the comprehensive philosophical, religious, 
and moral doctrines accepts justice as fairness in its own way.”  John Rawls, Justice 
as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223, 247 (1985). 
 455 Charles F. Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin define experimentalist governance as 
“a machine for learning from diversity.”  Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, 
Experimentalist Governance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF GOVERNANCE 169, 175 
(David Levi-Faur ed., 2012); see also Gráinne de Búrca, Robert O. Keohane, & 
Charles Sabel, New Modes of Pluralist Global Governance, 45 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 
723 (2013); Gráinne de Búrca, Robert O. Keohane, & Charles Sabel, Global 
Experimentalist Governance, 44 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 477 (2014); Gráinne de Búrca, Human 
Rights Experimentalism, 111 AM. J. INT’L L. 277 (2017). 
 456 See LOUIS MEULEMAN, PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AND THE METAGOVERNANCE OF 
HIERARCHIES, NETWORKS AND MARKETS: THE FEASIBILITY OF DESIGNING AND 
MANAGING GOVERNANCE STYLE COMBINATIONS 11 (2008); MONKELBAAN, supra note 
13, at 27-32. 
 457 For an excellent overview of alternative approaches to institutionalizing 
the SDGs and suggestions of ways on how to integrate them, see MONKELBAAN, 
supra note 13.  Examples of institutions aimed at facilitating global partnership for 
sustainable development are numerous and include but are not limited to the U.N. 
Sustainable Development Solutions Network, the U.N. Global Compact, the World 
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models rely on common goals and commitments rather than on 
human rights-based obligations, 458  this does not exclude the 
possibility that they become a platform for concluding specific 
multilateral cooperation agreements, following, even while 
modifying, the general schema of North-South and South-South 
development compacts. 
In conclusion, a few lines should be devoted to issues 
surrounding accountability for the SDGs.  As mentioned, periodic 
monitoring is the only form of accountability required by the 2030 
Agenda.  This must be greatly strengthened. 
The U.N. High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable 
Development should play a key role in reviewing the realization of 
sustainable development commitments at the global level.459  SDG 
17 requires developing measurements of progress on sustainable 
development.460  The global indicator framework, which currently 
embraces 247 (231 unique) indicators for the SDGs, was elaborated 
by the Inter-Agency and Expert Group on SDG Indicators (IAEG-
SDGs), and, after agreement with the U.N. Statistical Commission, 
adopted by the U.N. General Assembly (2017).461 
On the one hand, SDGs’ indicators represent definite strengths 
of the 2030 Agenda, because they determine firm benchmarks for 
monitoring the progressive realization of global obligations for 
sustainable development.462  On the other hand, the SDG monitoring 
processes are targets of extensive criticism for several reasons. First, 
the redundancy of global, regional and local indicators significantly 
complicates the monitoring process.  This issue may be resolved by 
formulating a set of key global indicators.  Second, there is no 
 
Business Council for Sustainable Development, the B20, the Global Sustainability 
Network, and the Global Business Alliance for 2030. 
 458 For an analysis of alternative governance modes for human rights, see de 
Búrca, supra note 455. 
 459 See High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development, UNITED NATIONS, 
at https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/hlpf [https://perma.cc/48TQ-WSS9]. 
 460 2030 Agenda, supra note 4, SDG 17.19. 
 461 Work of the Statistical Commission pertaining to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development, General Assembly Resolution, U.N. Doc. A/RES/71/313, annex (Jul. 
6, 2017); UNSTATS, SDG Indicators, Global indicator framework for the Sustainable 
Development Goals and targets of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, at 
https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/indicators/indicators-list [https://perma.cc/Z9H8-
98XS]. 
 462 SEYEDSAYAMDOST, supra note 13, at 32-33. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss4/4
2020] Global Obligations for Sustainable Development 1131 
   
 
common approach to identifying the content, scope and number of 
national indicators to monitor the realization of the SDGs, which 
range from 34 in Belgium to 244 in Canada.  Eurostat has identified 
100 indicators to monitor the E.U.’s implementation of its SDGs 
obligations. 463   Bringing (where possible) national and regional 
indicators in line with key global indicators, while leaving enough 
space for country-specific metrics, would be a solution to this 
problem and establish a necessary balance between the principles of 
the “ownership of development priorities” and universality of 
sustainable development commitments.  Third, the process of 
elaborating global indicators on the SDGs is still incomplete and 
many important indicators and targets are still missing, preventing 
timely and quality monitoring.464  The process of the creation of 
relevant global indicators should be intensified and made more 
inclusive for all stakeholders.  Fourth, since much of the data 
necessary for a full and unbiased assessment of the SDGs’ 
realization is currently lacking, there is a tendency to choose those 
indicators for which measurable data is available instead of those 
that give a correct picture of the progress of sustainable 
development. 465   Strengthening accountability for sustainable 
development is impossible without promoting the collection of data, 
which is necessary for SDGs monitoring, by both public and private 
actors.  Fifth, states and international organizations are often a 
biased source of SDG implementation reports, in light of obviously 
distorted incentives. 466   In order to establish independent and 
credible monitoring mechanisms which assess the effectiveness of 
development programs and projects and their accordance with 
human rights, one should guarantee the inclusion of civil society, 
NGOs and independent experts as part of the monitoring 
 
 463  See BERTELSMANN STIFTUNG AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT SOLUTIONS 
NETWORK, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 6-7 (2019). 
 464 Additions and refinements of indicators are annually made to the official 
indicator list.  See UNSTATS, supra note 461. 
 465 For an analysis of problems surrounding the unavailability of data and 
measurability of sustainable development indicators, see, e.g., Sakiko Fukuda-Parr 
& Desmond McNeill, Knowledge and Politics in Setting and Measuring the SDGs: 
Introduction to Special Issue, 10 GLOBAL POL’Y 5 (2019); Fukuda-Parr et al., supra note 
14, at 9-10; SEYEDSAYAMDOST, supra note 13, at 237. 
 466 Pogge & Sengupta, supra note 1, at 94. 
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processes.467  Sixth, the voluntary nature of the monitoring of the 
SDGs is heavily criticized.  One should recognize that all global 
actors involved in partnership for sustainable development share 
obligations of SDGs’ monitoring. 468   Seventh, mechanisms for 
monitoring the realization of the SDGs, beyond the (weak) 
aspirations of the 2030 Agenda, are lacking. Periodic monitoring 
should be complemented and coordinated with other traditional 
and innovative forms of accountability, including legal (both 
judicial and non-judicial), economic, and political.469 
As shown, global obligations to create and maintain a just and 
sustainable global order, and to ensure a decent standard of living 
universally represent an area of intersection between the human 
rights agenda and the sustainable development agenda.  In this 
sense, one possible solution to the problem of monitoring may be 
combining efforts of both the sustainable development and human 
rights agendas in terms of synchronizing the criteria and indicators 
of assessment as well as using common monitoring and 
accountability mechanisms for sustainable development. 
As demonstrated above in Section III.C, this is already 
happening in relation to the common criteria of assessment.  For 
instance, the 2030 Agenda relies on the CESCR’s general (AAAQ) and 
specific criteria of adequacy, though the application of the latter is 
quite inconsistent. 470   The CESCR, in turn, uses the criterion of 
sustainability as a significant dimension for determining whether 
the realization of human rights is adequate.471  At the same time, 
indicators developed for the SDGs may be useful for assessing the 
progressive realization of basic socio-economic rights, especially the 
 
 467 Alston, supra note 36, at 815. 
 468 Pogge & Sengupta, supra note 1, at 94. 
 469 See Langford, supra note 150, at 172. 
 470 The intention to synchronize indicators was already demonstrated during 
the preparation of the MDGs.  Michael Doyle, who, as Assistant Secretary-General 
and Special Adviser to U.N. Secretary-General, was responsible for the elaboration 
of the MDGs, remembers the discussions of the possibility of including human 
rights indicators in the sustainable development agenda.  This idea was, however, 
rejected by the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, 
because no universal set of indicators for human rights existed.  In Doyle’s words, 
“[T]hat was discouraging. Having failed on human rights where I saw a lot of 
promise and aware of the enormous amount of work involved with the MDGs, I 
said let’s just stick with what we have.”  SEYEDSAYAMDOST, supra note 13, at 204. 
 471 See supra Section III.C. 
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right to a decent standard of living.472  Such common indicators will 
help ensure the consistent implementation of minimum human 
rights obligations for sustainable development and help avoid 
contradictions between the sustainable development agenda and 
the human rights agenda. 
In addition, we should intensively explore ways of using the 
international human rights machinery, including the CESCR and 
other relevant U.N. treaty-based monitoring and accountability 
bodies, to ensure the implementation of the SDGs.473  Some of these 
bodies already monitor the realization of sustainable development 
commitments by states, including their commitments of global 
partnership. 474   Since these bodies are increasingly paying more 
attention to states’ extraterritorial obligations in the area of socio-
economic rights, 475  their jurisdiction may embrace monitoring 
 
 472 The CESCR already uses some SDG indicators in its periodic reporting 
procedure to assess the performance of obligations by states, including obligations 
related to development assistance.  In particular, it uses the U.N. 0.7% target for 
ODA to determine the scope of states’ obligations to assist.  See, e.g., U.N. CESCR, 
Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of Spain, E/C.12/ESP/5, para. 10 
(2012); U.N. CESCR, Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of France, 
E/C.12/FRA/CO/4, paras. 7-8 (2016); U.N. CESCR, Concluding observations on the 
sixth periodic report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
E/C.12/GBR/CO/6, para. 14 (2016); see also U.N. CRC, General Comment No. 5: 
General measures of implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, U.N. 
Doc. CRC/GC/2003/5, para. 61 (Nov.27, 2003); U.N. CRC, General Comment No. 15: 
On the right of the child to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health (art. 
24), U.N. Doc. CRC/C/GC/15, para. 89 (Apr. 17, 2013). 
 473 For debates on the theme, see Alston, supra note 78, pt. 7; Alston, supra note 
36, at 814f; Judith Bueno de Mesquita et al., Monitoring the Sustainable Development 
Goals through Human Rights Accountability Reviews, 96(9) BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 
627 (2018). 
      474    See, e.g., U.N. CESCR, Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of 
Ecuador, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/ECU/CO/4, para. 65 (2019); U.N. CRC, Concluding 
observations on the sixth periodic report of Hungary, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/HUN/CO/6, 
paras. 6, 16, 19, 24, 33 (2020); U.N. CEDAW, Concluding observations on the fifth 
periodic report of Pakistan, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/PAK/CO/5, paras. 7, 16, 22 (2020). 
 475 See, e.g., CESCR’s, CRC’s and CEDAW’s concluding observations. U.N. 
CESCR, Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of Switzerland, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/CHE/CO/4, paras. 11-19 (2019); U.N. CRC, Concluding observations on the 
combined fifth and sixth periodic reports of Austria, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/AUT/CO/5-6, 
paras. 13-14 (2020); U.N. CEDAW, Concluding observations on the eighth periodic report 
of Australia, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/AUS/CO/8, paras. 29-30 (2018).  Relevant 
documents are collected by ETO Consortium, 
https://www.etoconsortium.org/en/main-navigation/library/documents/ 
[https://perma.cc/U4Z6-48HF]. 
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North-South, South-South and triangular development compacts as 
well as states’ obligations to regulate the conduct of non-state actors 
regarding their sustainable development commitments. 
Thus, the global partnership for sustainable development 
envisioned by the 2030 Agenda requires creating an institutional 
framework in which various state-centered and alternative modes 
of cooperation and assistance are interconnected and which 
provides opportunity for the joint elaboration of solutions for 
pressing problems of global poverty eradication. 
D. Summary 
The final part of this Article addressed global obligations of 
conduct, i.e., obligations to cooperate for sustainable development 
(Section IV.A) and obligations of development assistance (Section 
IV.B).  Section IV.A argued that all global actors—states, 
intergovernmental organizations, non-state actors, and 
individuals—possess shared global obligations to cooperate for 
sustainable development.  Whereas global obligations of 
development assistance are often seen as duties of developed states 
towards residents of poor countries, Section IV.B suggested shifting 
discussions to the rights and duties of developing societies to take 
part in and to contribute to the realization of shared global 
obligations to assist.  Further, obligations of development assistance 
should be seen not only as interactional obligations, but also as 
institutional obligations to create and maintain a global institutional 
structure indispensable for providing development assistance.  
Section IV.C discussed institutional guarantees of global 
partnership for sustainable development.  In particular, it focused 
on traditional state-centered and alternative, more informal and 
polycentric, institutional solutions for global partnership and 
opportunities to promote their complementarity. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This Article sought to provide a general outline of the conception 
of global obligations for sustainable development.  The main theses 
of the study can be capsulized as follows: 
(1) Although the 2030 Agenda has been significantly improved 
compared to the MDGs, it still contains many substantial gaps, such 
as:  (a) insufficient attention to human rights and corresponding 
obligations; (b) non-recognition of remedial extraterritorial 
obligations for sustainable development; (c) concentration 
predominantly on territorial rather than global institutional 
guarantees of freedom from poverty; (d) employment of an 
inadequate definition of poverty; (e) state-centrism; (f) lack of 
attention to institutional obligations of development assistance; and 
(g) inadequate specification of institutions for the realization of the 
SDGs, including independent and efficient monitoring and 
accountability mechanisms (Section II.A). 
(2) The human rights agenda and the sustainable development 
agenda should be brought into sync.  This requires:  (a) the 
recognition of the human rights framework as a normative basis for 
certain global obligations for sustainable development, the objects 
of which coincide with the objects of internationally recognized 
human rights; (b) the acknowledgement that global obligations 
corresponding to basic socio-economic rights indispensable for 
leading a decent life represent minimum core obligations for 
sustainable development; and (c) the development of monitoring 
and accountability mechanisms for evaluating the progress of the 
realization of global obligations for sustainable development and for 
holding global actors responsible (Sections II.B-II.C). 
(3) Global obligations for sustainable development include 
obligations of conduct (obligations of development cooperation and 
assistance) as well as obligations of result (obligations to create and 
maintain a just and sustainable global order and obligations to 
ensure a decent and sustainable standard of living universally), all 
of which are embedded, to a greater or lesser degree, in the 2030 
Agenda (Section III.A).  Global institutional obligations for 
sustainable development should be aimed not solely at undertaking 
structural territorial improvements, but also at reforming a global 
institutional scheme.  Obligations to create and maintain a just and 
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sustainable global order embrace both duties of relational and 
distributive justice (Section III.B). 
(4) Complementary to and specifying significant general steps 
mentioned in points (2)-(3), essential measures to guarantee the 
realization of distributive obligations to ensure a decent and 
sustainable standard of living universally presuppose:  (a) 
embracing commitments to secure not just a “basic standard of 
living,” but also a decent standard of living; (b) recognizing not only 
progressive, but also immediate human rights obligations for 
sustainable development; (c) applying a poor-centered, inclusive, 
human rights respective, and a capability-sensitive concept of 
poverty; (d) synchronizing general and specific criteria of adequacy 
suggested by the U.N. human rights treaty bodies, especially the 
CESCR, with those used in the 2030 Agenda; (e) guaranteeing the 
enjoyment of a minimum standard of a decent life universally 
(Section III.С). 
(5) Human rights-based, non-discriminatory, human-centered 
and a pro-poor global partnership for sustainable development 
presupposed by the 2030 Agenda calls for the fair distribution of 
shared global obligations of development cooperation among all 
members of the international community—states, 
intergovernmental organizations, non-state actors, and individuals 
(Section IV.A). 
(6) State-centered international development assistance should 
be supplemented through a human-centered global development 
assistance.  Interactional and institutional obligations of 
development assistance should not be seen solely as duties of 
developed states towards residents of poor countries.  Developing 
societies have both rights and duties to take part in and to contribute 
to the realization of shared obligations of development assistance 
(Section IV.B). 
(7) A global partnership for sustainable development requires 
creating and maintaining an institutional framework in which 
various traditional (top-down and state-centered) and alternative 
(bottom-up and polycentric) governance and accountability modes 
are interconnected and coordinated.  It should involve multi-
stakeholder and multi-level North-South, South-South and 
triangular cooperation, while recognizing private and public non-
state actors as full-fledged partners for sustainable development 
(Section IV.C). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss4/4
